Manhattan Bridge Capital Loan Review: 9% to 12% Hard Money, $60.1M Book, $935K Florida Foreclosure (Q3 2026)

Who this lender is, and who it lends to

Manhattan Bridge Capital is a New York corporation founded in 1989 that makes what its 10-Q calls “short-term, secured, non–banking loans to real estate investors (also known as hard money loans)”. It is listed, so unlike most hard-money lenders it has to publish its loan terms, its loan book and its funding every quarter. Its subsidiary MBC Funding II holds part of the loans against a Valley National Bank credit line. We use the filings here to describe what a borrower would be signing, and we say nothing about the share price.

The filing describes the borrower and the property narrowly:

It does not publish a rate card, a minimum credit score or a closing time in these filings, and its filings describe only short-term loans, not rental (DSCR) loans. For how this pricing sits against the market and against Sachem Capital, see our hard money loan extension, default interest and points page and our hard money loan rates page.

What a loan costs: a worked example (our arithmetic)

Take a hypothetical $1,000,000 loan at 11%, inside the stated 9% to 12% range, with 2 points, the top of the points range. The property would need an appraised value of at least $1,333,333 under the 75% ceiling (our arithmetic).

The filings give a cross-check from the other side. Dividing the company's nine-month interest income ($5,099,291) and origination fees ($1,067,114) by 0.75 of a year and by the average of its loans at December 31, 2025 and September 30, 2026 ($60,373,095) gives about 11.3% in interest and 2.4% in fees, 13.6% of the average loan a year in total (our arithmetic). That is close to the 13% in the example and says the example is not far from what the book actually pays. The 10-K does not state the extension fee as a number, so the extension column is an assumption based on its sentence about the “same origination fee”.

The number nobody else shows: loans past their original due date

Every quarter the notes to the financial statements list the dollars of loans “originally due or committed to lend to borrowers” in each year. Putting five of those lists side by side shows how much of the book runs beyond its first 12 months:

Three readings. First, the share has fallen for three quarters in a row, and $3,087,000 more was paid down or paid off after September 30, 2026 (including $615,000 originally due on or before that date). Second, the older buckets did not move in the latest quarter: the amounts for 2020 ($920,250), 2022 ($1,500,000), 2023 ($4,155,144) and 2024 ($6,426,620) are identical at June 30 and September 30, 2026, $13.0 million in total (our arithmetic). Third, the 10-Q says “Generally, borrowers are paying their interest, and the Company receives a fee in connection with the extension of the loans.” The 10-Q for March 31, 2026 also said “In all instances, the borrowers have either signed an extension agreement or are in the process of signing an extension.” We did not find that sentence in the 10-Qs for June 30 or September 30, 2026.

For a borrower this is the real product: a 12-month loan the lender will usually extend for a fee while interest is paid, which is useful if your project runs long and expensive if it always does. The filing's wording is “originally due or committed”, so a few dollars in a year's bucket may be construction commitments rather than maturities; the 10-Q does not split them. Our New York hard money loans page shows who else lends in the same market.

The Florida default and what changed in the wording

At June 30, 2026 the 10-Q said one borrower with about $935,000 on two Florida properties had stopped paying interest for about three months and had not answered the notice of default, and that management believed the collateral's estimated fair value “substantially exceeds” the principal balance. At September 30, 2026 the facts had moved on:

The same 10-Q says that since the company started in 2007 it has not completed a foreclosure or taken title to a collateral property, and the June 30, 2026 10-Q said that none of its loans had resulted in a credit loss. The September 30, 2026 10-Q does not repeat that last sentence. The $935,000 is about 1.6% of the $60.1 million book (our arithmetic), so this is one loan and not a pattern. What it shows a borrower is the path: missed interest, a notice of default, counsel, then a court filing and a public record of liens ahead of the lender's, which is also where a guarantor's personal exposure starts. Our Florida hard money loans page covers the state's process.

Who funds the lender

A hard-money lender can only extend loans if its own lenders let it. Manhattan Bridge has two bank lines:

The 17.5% rule is the one a borrower should know about: with $60,072,315 of loans, 17.5% is about $10.5 million (our arithmetic), while $28.8 million was originally due before September 30, 2026. The filing does not say how many of those are over 30 months old, and the 10-Q reports the company in compliance with all covenants, so we do not read this as a problem. We read it as a reason the lender has a financing incentive to clear older loans and the older buckets above are the ones to watch. Total lines of credit fell from $17,601,132 at December 31, 2025 to $17,034,621.

How its terms compare with another public hard-money lender

Manhattan Bridge is cheaper on paper and offers higher leverage, but with a shorter first term. Sachem's own situation is different, as our Sachem Capital review explains. These are two lenders' stated terms, not the market.

Why 3.5 out of 5

The rating scores what a borrower can check in public documents. In its favor: the terms are written down in SEC filings and have been steady; points are capped at 2%; the lender has a stated first-mortgage position and a leverage ceiling of 75%; no borrower is above 10% of the book; funding runs to 2027 and 2029. Against: it lends only in the New York area and Florida; every loan needs a personal guarantee; there is no escrow or reserve; the extension fee is not quantified; about half the book has run past its original date; and the Florida loan has priority and property-condition problems. We have not closed a loan with the company, reviewed its complaints or spoken to its borrowers, so this is a score of disclosure and record, not of service.

What a reader can do with this

• Compare on the same basis. Ask each lender for rate, points, extension fee and extension rate on the same loan amount, using the 24-month column of the worked example above.
• Ask for the extension terms before closing. The 10-K says the usual extension fee equals the original one; get the figure, and the rate on an extension, in writing.
• Check your own guarantee. Every loan here is personally guaranteed, so an LLC borrower does not shield the owner.
• Use the competition signal. The company itself says competition is lowering the rates and fees it charges; quote it against other lenders rather than accepting the top of the range.
• Outside New York metro or Florida, or for a longer hold, this lender does not fit; compare lenders with a rental or construction program.

Frequently asked questions

Sources, read November 2, 2026: Manhattan Bridge Capital, Inc. (CIK 1080340) Form 10-K for 2025 (accession 0001493152-26-013241), Forms 10-Q for March 31, 2026 (0001493152-26-016965), June 30, 2026 (0001493152-26-034411) and September 30, 2026 (0001493152-26-047912), and Forms 8-K of December 16, 2025 (0001493152-25-027893) and October 9, 2026 (0001493152-26-046424); Sachem Capital Corp. (CIK 1682220) Form 10-K for 2025 (0001682220-26-000014). Percentages, sums, the average-loan yield and the worked examples are our arithmetic. This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal, lending or tax advice.