CIM Real Assets & Credit Fund (RACR) 2026: NAV $20.78, Prorated

Updated October 10, 2026 — Class I NAV is $20.78, net assets are down to $229.8 million, and the quarterly 5% repurchase offer closed on October 9; as of October 10 the fund has filed nothing on how many shares were tendered. Per the fund's Form N-23c-3 notice filed September 9, 2026, the offer to repurchase up to 5% of shares ran until October 9, 2026 (EDGAR shows no later filing as of October 10; the semiannual report is where earlier offers’ outcomes appeared), and on September 2 the NAV was $20.78 for Class I (IRACX), $19.53 for Class C (RACRX), $20.45 for Class A (ARACX) and $20.13 for Class L (LRACX), against $22.25 for Class I at September 30, 2025. The semiannual report (N-CSRS) filed June 5, 2026 for the six months to March 31 says that both offers it covers (notice dates September 10 and December 10, 2025) were oversubscribed and capped at 5% (“repurchase requests received by the Fund exceeded the limit described above”), reports $11,224,794 of Class I shares repurchased in the March–April 2026 offer, and shows net assets of $237.7 million, down from $265.1 million; N-PORT puts them at $229.8 million on June 30, 2026. The board lowered the annualized distribution rate from 8.0% to 7.5% of NAV, borrowing rose (reverse repurchase agreements of $86.4 million at March 31 against $34.9 million at September 30, 2025), and Level 3 holdings (valued with unobservable inputs) were $189.1 million, about 80% of net assets, up from about 73%. The rating of 2.3 is unchanged; the sections below carry the date of every figure.

Why this review exists: the same structure as Forum, the opposite outcome

CrowdfundedWealth's 2026 cluster keeps asking one question of every non-traded real estate vehicle: when the 2022-onward rate shock hit, could you get out? The CIM Real Assets & Credit Fund is the cleanest "no" in the credit-interval tier — and it is most useful read directly against Forum's Real Estate Income Fund. The two funds share nearly identical legal wrappers: both are Rule 23c-3 interval funds with a mandatory 5% quarterly repurchase offer, both tilt toward real estate credit, both came of age in the same rate environment. Yet Forum quadrupled its assets and filled every repurchase offer with room to spare, while CIM's RACR was oversubscribed and pro-rated every single quarter and shrank. The difference is not the structure — it is the same structure — but the life stage and the marks. This review is built from primary EDGAR filings under CIK 1767074, chiefly the fiscal 2025, 2024, and 2023 annual reports on Form N-CSR, the June 5, 2026 semiannual report (N-CSRS), the Form N-23c-3 repurchase notices through September 9, 2026 and the N-PORT filings through June 30, 2026.

A "real assets" fund that is half corporate credit

Start with what RACR actually owns, because the name oversells the real estate. As of September 30, 2025, the portfolio looked like this (percentages of net assets); the March 31, 2026 mix follows the next paragraph:

At September 30, 2025, add the CLOs and bank loans and you get roughly 48% corporate credit — the single largest exposure, and not real estate at all. Real estate equity is about 33% (including a CIM-affiliated Los Angeles property held through a taxable subsidiary), and real estate credit is about 27%. The fund's long-term target is 30% real estate equity and 70% credit, and it deliberately rebalanced into real estate equity in late 2024 "in anticipation of a recovery." That is a defensible tactical call, but a buyer should be clear: "Real Assets & Credit" is, in practice, a leveraged credit fund with a real estate sleeve, not a real estate fund.

The semiannual report (N-CSRS) shows the mix six months later, as of March 31, 2026:

The real estate equity share rose from about 33% to about 41% (direct real estate went from $87.3 million at September 30, 2025 to $98.2 million at March 31, 2026 while net assets fell), well above the fund’s 30% long-term target, and the separate real estate-related loan line of September 2025 no longer appears in the March breakdown; after quarter-end the fund reported investing $10.0 million in real estate related debt. Corporate credit (CLOs plus bank loans) is about 46%. Two things changed for the worse: leverage, and how much of the book cannot be priced from the market. Total investments were 132.24% of net assets at March 31 (117.62% at September 30), financed by $20.0 million drawn on the unsecured facility (7.67%; the facility can lend up to $70.0 million and matures in December 2026 unless extended) and $86.4 million of reverse repurchase agreements (against $34.9 million). Level 3 holdings were $189.1 million at March 31, about 80% of net assets, against $194.7 million and about 73% at September 30 — the dollars barely moved while net assets shrank. Adding up the line items of the fund’s N-PORT for June 30, 2026, we get about $199 million at Level 3, roughly 87% of the $229.8 million of net assets, with $41.5 million of bank borrowings and total liabilities of $159.2 million.

The liquidity record: pro-rated every single quarter

This is the centerpiece, and it is the worst record in the credit-interval tier. An interval fund offers to repurchase a set percentage of shares each quarter — here at least 5% of NAV, with discretion to bump up to 7%. When investors tender more than the offer, repurchases are pro-rated and rejected holders must re-queue. Here is the primary-source record:

For ten consecutive quarters — all of fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2025, plus the two offers noticed in September and December 2025 — the fund's own N-CSR and N-CSRS state that "repurchase requests received by the Fund exceeded the limit... and therefore the Fund limited the number of shares repurchased during each quarterly repurchase offer to 5%." Two details make this worse than it looks. First, the fund never used its discretionary authority to raise the offer to 7% — it held shareholders to the bare 5% minimum every quarter even as demand to exit ran well above it; the notices of March 11, June 10 and September 9, 2026 again offer only 5%. Second, the asset base is shrinking: net assets fell from about $314 million in fiscal 2023 to about $278 million in fiscal 2024 to about $265 million in fiscal 2025, to $248.9 million at December 31, 2025, $237.7 million at March 31, 2026 and $229.8 million at June 30, 2026 (N-PORT). Class I alone saw about $52.6 million repurchased against about $37.1 million sold in fiscal 2025, and about $24.5 million repurchased against about $8.7 million sold in the six months to March 31, 2026 — a net outflow in both periods.

That is the textbook signature of an interval fund in a redemption queue, the same dynamic that has stressed Starwood's SREIT and NexPoint's NRSAX. A redeeming RACR shareholder today should expect to wait multiple quarters to fully exit, getting only a pro-rated slice each time.

Distribution quality: about half is your own money back

On distributions, RACR is near the bottom of the cluster. The fund pays monthly. In April 2025 the board set an annualized rate of 8.0% of NAV, and in March 2026 it lowered it to 7.5%. The tax-character table in the fiscal 2025 N-CSR shows how much of the 8% was actually earned:

On a per-share basis, Class I distributed about $1.87 in fiscal 2025 — about $0.93 of net investment income and about $0.94 of return of capital. In the six months to March 31, 2026 it distributed $0.85 per Class I share, all booked as net investment income so far; the tax character is set at year-end, and the fund says it expects a portion of the distributions to be a return of capital. Some of that return of capital is legitimately tax-deferred real estate depreciation, which management is right to highlight. But the ratio rose from about 38% to about 50% in a single year, against a NAV that is now about 22% below its peak ($20.78 against $26.54) and an asset base that is shrinking on net redemptions. That combination — a distribution that increasingly exceeds earnings, partly funded by selling assets — is exactly what you do not want to see. Compare it with Forum's fund (0% return of capital, two years running) or PIMCO's REFLX (also 0%): RACR is handing investors a meaningful chunk of their own capital back and calling it yield.

Fees: about 5% net, with an incentive fee on non-cash income

The fee load is among the heaviest in the entire non-traded universe. For Class I — the cheapest, no-load class — the net expense ratio was about 5.16% and the gross about 6.96% in fiscal 2025, and 4.75% net and 6.87% gross (annualized) in the six months to March 31, 2026. The January 2026 prospectus shows 8.91% gross and 2.25% after the waiver for Class I, but that net figure excludes borrowing interest and swap interest, so it is not comparable. The structure stacks a 1.50% management fee on net assets, a 15% incentive fee over a 6%-annualized hurdle, sales loads up to 5.75% (Class A) and 4.25% (Class L), and leverage interest running 5% to 8% on borrowings.

Two things make the fee worse than the headline. First, the much-advertised 0.75% expense cap is largely cosmetic: it applies only to "ordinary" operating expenses and explicitly excludes the management fee, the incentive fee, the servicing and distribution fees, property and development and leasing fees, and all leverage interest — that is, every large cost item. The adviser waived about $4.8 million in fiscal 2025 and reimbursed $2.5 million in the six months to March 31, 2026, but it retains a three-year recoupment right to claw those waived fees back. Second, the incentive fee is charged on net investment income that includes non-cash PIK income (for example, a 12.5% payment-in-kind preferred): the adviser earns its cut on income the fund accrues but has not received in cash. For a fund delivering about 8% (half of it return of capital), a roughly 5% net drag is extraordinary.

Sponsor: large and transparent, with a legacy

The sponsor is CIM Group, a real and sizable manager (about $32 billion AUM), and to its credit RACR's disclosure is genuinely good — the repurchase tables, the return-of-capital breakdown, and the affiliate relationships are all laid out clearly in the filings. That transparency is the main reason this fund clears the 2.0 floor.

But the sponsor history warrants context. CIM acquired Cole Capital in 2014; the legacy Cole non-traded REITs (now CIM Real Estate Finance Trust) are the subject of active plaintiff-firm investigations into the broker-dealers that sold them to retail investors — matters that target the legacy Cole/CMFT vehicles and their distributors, not RACR directly, but that speak to the sponsor's non-traded-product track record. Third-party research (the Private Equity Stakeholder Project) has flagged peer underperformance across several CIM flagship funds, and CIM has faced construction-defect and tenant-treatment controversies on individual assets. Within RACR itself, the conflict surface is real: the fund holds a CIM-affiliated Los Angeles property, co-invests alongside other CIM and OFS vehicles under SEC exemptive relief, and the adviser both marks the private real estate to fair value and collects property-management, development, and leasing fees on the REIT-subsidiary assets. None of this is hidden — but it is a lot of related-party machinery to trust.

How it sits in the cluster

RACR lands at 2.3 — the stressed end of the spectrum, below Bluerock's former TIPRX (2.5) and well below its structural twin Forum (3.4), Versus Capital's Real Assets Fund (3.2), PIMCO's REFLX (3.7), and the FS Credit REIT (3.6). It sits just above the cluster floor shared by NexPoint's NRSAX (2.0) and Starwood's SREIT (2.0), earning the extra notch only for its genuine transparency, its large real sponsor, and the fiscal 2025 mark recovery (which the first half of fiscal 2026 partly gave back: Class I returned −0.93% at NAV over the six months to March 31, 2026). The lesson it teaches is the cluster's central one, in negative form: the interval-fund wrapper does not protect you when the fund is in run-off, the distribution outruns earnings, and the fees compound the drag. For the category-wide liquidity picture, see our real estate crowdfunding liquidity analysis.

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