PeerStreet Recovery: The Projected Percentages Investors Voted On, and Where the Money Actually Stands in 2026

The number everyone wants, and where it has been sitting

Search for what PeerStreet investors are actually going to get back and you will find the same handful of pages, all of which say a version of recovery is uncertain and depends on each loan. That is true, and it is also an evasion, because a specific set of projected percentages was published, class by class, and every investor who voted on the Plan was sent them.

They are in a twelve-slide deck titled Official Creditors' Committee Overview of Chapter 11 Plan, dated March 2024, prepared by the Committee's counsel Morrison & Foerster and its financial advisers IslandDundon, and filed on the case's public document site. Here is the whole table.

Read the table twice, because the important thing about it is not any single number. The four classes with tight ranges are the ones where the money was already cash. Pocket, the liquidated notes, the Portfolio product: those loans had been sold, the proceeds were sitting there, and the only open question was how much of the estate's costs each pool would absorb. That is why the Committee could quote 83%-87% and 90%-93% with a straight face.

The class with the range that means nothing is the one holding the most money. Classes 11 and 11-1, the fractional notes on loans that had not yet been resolved, covered roughly $119.7 million of claims, more than the other five classes put together, and the estimate for it was 0% to 90%.

A 0%-90% range is a disclosure, not a forecast

It is worth being fair to the Committee here, because that range is honest in a way that a single number would not have been.

An MPDN, a mortgage-dependent promissory note, is tied to one specific loan. Your recovery is whatever that particular property fetches, minus that particular loan's share of the costs. A performing loan that pays off returns close to par. A non-performing loan that becomes REO and sells into a soft market can return very little. Averaging those into "investors will recover 62%" would have been a more satisfying number and a less truthful one, because almost nobody holds the average. You hold three loans, or eleven, and your outcome is the outcome of those.

So the range is doing real work: it is telling you that the Plan could not promise you anything, and that your recovery would be determined by collateral you cannot inspect and a resolution strategy you do not control. It is worth sitting with how unusual that is as a disclosure, because the same structure is still being sold today: every platform that funds individual hard-money loans with individual notes hands you this exact risk profile, and the way Groundfloor's LROs are structured is the closest living relative of the PeerStreet MPDN.

What that range cannot do is tell you whether you are near the top or the bottom of it, and two years and three months after the Effective Date there is still no published figure that closes it.

The schedule the Plan published, against the calendar

The same Committee deck contains a chart headed Unliquidated MPDN Claims — Proposed Wind Down Schedule. Its horizontal axis runs from 5/1/24 to 7/1/25, and it shows the performing, non-performing and REO buckets running off to nothing across those fourteen months, with net cash to creditors accumulating as they go. The deck labels it "illustrative," and it is fair to hold it loosely.

But it is now August 2026. The May 28, 2026 filing describes the Asset Manager as continuing "liquidating the remaining Loan Assets" in the present tense. The wind-down is running roughly fourteen months past the end of its own illustrative schedule, which is to say it has taken about twice as long as the picture investors were shown when they voted.

This is where the 14.2% matters. The deck sets out two ways to fund the costs of carrying unliquidated loans: a third-party exit facility, or a backup "funding pool" in which proceeds of already-liquidated loans are held back to finance the rest. Both are costed at an estimated 14.2% financing cost, and under the backup option the interest is paid to the very investors whose money was held back, while under the third-party option it goes to an outside lender. The deck told voters that the choice would be disclosed in the Plan Supplement and that they should "assume that either option is possible."

Either way, the arithmetic runs one direction: an estate that carries loans for twice as long as planned pays financing and professional costs for twice as long, and those costs come out of the same pool the recoveries come from. That is the mechanism by which delay converts into a lower number at the bottom of the page, and it is why "it is taking longer than expected" is not a neutral fact in a bankruptcy.

What has actually been paid, as distinct from what was projected

PeerStreet has published the distribution amounts, and they should be separated cleanly from the projections above, because they are a different kind of fact.

Two details in that December 17 notice are easy to skim past and both are consequential.

First, a charge-off is not a distribution. It is the recognition of the loss on loans that have already been sold for less than their principal. The notice states that those investments "are now fully distributed and no further distributions will be made to them." For anyone whose exposure was to pre-Effective-Date liquidated loans, that is the end of the line, and the $22.2 million is what did not come back.

Second, the company said what happens next in one sentence: "We plan on performing further distributions for the remaining MDPNs liquidated after the Plan Effective Date." That is the Class 11 pool, the $119.7 million with the 0%-90% range. It remains open.

The filing nobody told investors about

On May 28, 2026, counsel for the Plan Administrator, the Advisory Committee and the Prepetition Agent filed a Joint Certification of Counsel consenting to an order extending a deadline [Docket No. 1825]. It is a three-page document and it is not dramatic, which is probably why it has gone unremarked.

Paragraph 44 of the Confirmation Order gave the Plan Administrator and the Advisory Committee two years from the Effective Date to ask the Court to decide whether certain Corporate Loans are part of the Prepetition Agent's collateral under the prepetition credit agreement, with the same right running the other way for the Prepetition Agent. Two years from May 31, 2024 is May 31, 2026. Three days before it expired, all three parties agreed to push it to November 30, 2026.

Their stated reason, quoted in full: they "desire to avoid the expense, burden and uncertainty of litigating an Action at this time and have agreed to extend the deadline ... for purposes of judicial efficiency and to preserve the status quo while the Debtors and Asset Manager continue liquidating the remaining Loan Assets."

What is at stake in that unresolved question is who owns a pool of value. If certain Corporate Loans fall inside the secured lender's collateral, that value services secured debt. If they fall outside it, it belongs to the estate, and the estate is where unsecured noteholders get paid from. Two years on, the parties have chosen to leave it open rather than pay to resolve it.

I want to be careful about what this filing does and does not show. It is a certification and a proposed order, consented to by every affected party, which in Delaware practice is ordinarily entered as a matter of course. I have not been able to confirm the docket entry of the signed order, so the accurate statement is that the extension was jointly requested on May 28, 2026 and unopposed. If you are relying on this, check the docket.

The silence is its own data point

Here is the part that should bother anyone still owed money.

PeerStreet's investor updates page has not been touched since December 17, 2025. I pulled the raw page on August 24, 2026 and extracted every dated entry on it. The most recent is December 17, 2025. There are seven entries dated 2025 and five dated 2024. There are none dated 2026.

That silence sits on top of a policy the company stated in writing in its September 17, 2025 update: the PeerStreet team "is unable to provide any details beyond what is posted here or available on your account dashboard, and we will not be able to respond to emails requesting updates regarding distributions or individual investments."

Taken together, those two facts mean something specific. The only channel investors were told to watch is the channel that has gone quiet, and the alternative channel was closed in advance. Meanwhile the estate has been active: a deadline was extended in May 2026, and the case calendar carried hearings in February, May and July of 2026.

None of that is misconduct. Plan administrators are not obliged to run a blog, and a wind-down with nothing new to report has nothing new to report. It is also not unique to bankruptcy: the same quiet is what a live non-traded REIT sounds like when its redemption programme is suspended and the queue simply stops moving, which is worth knowing because that is the state a lot of people's money is in right now without a court supervising it. But if you are trying to work out whether your money is coming, absence of news is not evidence that nothing is happening, and in this case the court record shows plainly that things were happening while the investor-facing page did not move.

How to read your own position against these numbers

The projections are per class, and your claim sits in one or more of them. Working out which is the only way to make the table above mean anything to you personally.

If your holdings totalled $5,000 or less in principal at the petition date, you were placed in the convenience classes 10-1 or 11-1 and were offered a choice: stay in the funding-pool mechanism, or opt out of it and take a 10% discount on your recovery in exchange. The deck says explicitly that this discount "explains the disparity between the estimated recoveries for Class 10 and Class 10-1." It was a straight trade of about a tenth of the money for not having your proceeds held back to finance somebody else's loan. Small holders got the cleanest deal available in the whole case, which is close to the opposite of what usually happens when a crowdfunding platform fails.

There is also a tax dimension here that matters more than most people realise, because a charge-off notice is the sort of document that fixes the year in which a loss becomes deductible, and the distinction between a worthless security and a non-business bad debt changes the answer. We have gone through that separately in our writeup of how to claim the loss on a failed platform.

What I would want to know if it were my money

The projections are two and a half years old and were produced by an advocate. The Committee deck ends with "The Committee urges Peer Street investors to ACCEPT the Plan" and warns that failing to do so "could result in significant delays in distribution and additional professional costs which will further dilute creditor recoveries." That is a fair argument and it was probably the right advice. It is still advocacy, prepared while soliciting votes, using claims data frozen at January 31, 2024. Treat the ranges as what the Committee believed and published under its own name, not as an outcome.

The confirmed Plan is not the March 8 document the deck describes. The Court confirmed an Amended Combined Disclosure Statement and Joint Chapter 11 Plan on May 17, 2024. The deck was prepared from the version filed March 8, 2024 [Docket 930]. Where the amended plan differs, the amended plan governs.

The one number that would settle this has never been published. Nobody has released a cumulative recovery-to-date percentage per class. It could be computed, and until it is, every discussion of PeerStreet recoveries, including this one, is reasoning from a projection and a handful of distribution announcements rather than from a result.

If you want the wider story of how the platform got here, we covered the collapse itself in detail, and PeerStreet is one of the case studies in our work on which platforms are actually bankruptcy-remote and which only sound like it — which is the structural question underneath all of this, since the reason PeerStreet noteholders are creditors in a Chapter 11 at all is that their notes were obligations of an operating company rather than of an insulated vehicle.

Sources

Every figure above comes from one of three places, and all three are public.

• Official Creditors' Committee, Overview of Chapter 11 Plan, In re Peer Street, Inc., et al., March 2024 — prepared by Morrison & Foerster LLP and IslandDundon from the combined plan and disclosure statement filed March 8, 2024 [Docket No. 930]. Source of every estimated recovery percentage, the estimated claims and distribution amounts, the convenience-class 10% discount, the 14.2% exit-facility cost and the May 2024 to July 2025 wind-down schedule. Case document site
• Joint Certification of Counsel and proposed Order Extending Deadline Established in Paragraph 44 of the Confirmation Order, filed May 28, 2026 [Docket No. 1825], In re Peer Street, Inc., Case No. 23-10815 (LSS), D. Del. Source of the Confirmation Order date, the Effective Date, the Plan Administrator's identity, the paragraph 44 collateral question and the extension to November 30, 2026.
• PeerStreet investor updates page, peerstreet.com/content/bankruptcy/updates — source of the distribution and charge-off amounts and dates, and of the fact that no update has been posted since December 17, 2025. Raw page retrieved and every dated entry extracted on August 24, 2026.

This page will be updated when the next distribution or a docket development changes the picture. If you are a PeerStreet claimant and have received something that contradicts anything here, we would genuinely like to see it.