VCMIX Review: $23.04 NAV, Oct 23 Repurchase Offer, Fees, Holdings

Correction, September 20, 2026: this review's title and summary announced, in the present tense, a Nasdaq secondary auction whose order entry had already closed on September 18. The citable snippet was also out of step with the body and with the current filings: it said 13 pro-rated quarters (14), a total expense ratio of "about 1.21%" with a 1.05% management fee (1.82% and 1.08% in the prospectus dated July 29, 2026), and a minimum investment of $10,000,000 (the prospectus says $25,000, or $10,000 for the fund's own officers and employees); the verdict repeated the 1.21%. We described the adviser as having raised the repurchase offer to add liquidity without saying that the offer had been 8% every quarter until October 2022 and was cut to 5% in the quarter the queue formed, and our own table skipped the July 2023, July 2024, July 2022 and April 2025 offers, so the "14 consecutive quarters" claim was only partly shown. We put the benchmark gap at "roughly 5 points over five and ten years" (5.3 points at five years, 3.4 at ten). And the page said we earn nothing on it while carrying a paid advisor-matching box. All fixed below; the dataset now carries all 24 repurchase offers since 2020 with the accession number of each.

Updated October 11, 2026 — VCMIX at a glance, every figure from SEC filings. Latest NAV: $23.04 per share on September 18, 2026, against $24.11 on September 25, 2025, the figure in the repurchase notice a year earlier, a fall of $1.07 a share (our arithmetic: about 4.4%); the NAV stood at $23.25 on March 31, 2026 (Form N-23C3A filed September 25, 2026, accession 0001213900-26-103315; prior year accession 0001515001-25-000011). Distributions: $0.24 per share each quarter, $0.96 for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, an annualized yield of about 4.00% on the fund's own figures, of which $0.31 a share was return of capital (FY2026 Form N-CSR). Repurchase offers: the offer open now is for 5% of outstanding shares and closes October 23, 2026; the April 24, 2026 offer filled about 16.6% of the 19,400,493 shares tendered, the January 30, 2026 offer 16%, and every offer since January 2023 has been pro-rated; the July 31, 2026 result is not yet filed. Net assets: $3.21 billion at March 31, 2022, $1.49 billion at March 31, 2026 and $1,448.5 million at June 30, 2026, with $88.0 million drawn on the bank line (Form N-PORT filed August 28, 2026). Fees: total annual expenses of 1.82% in the prospectus dated July 29, 2026 (1.08% management fees, 0.18% other, 0.32% interest, 0.24% acquired-fund fees; no sales load, no early-withdrawal charge, no 12b-1); the realized gross expense ratio for fiscal 2026 was 1.72%. Largest holdings at June 30, 2026 (percent of net assets, Form N-PORT): CBRE U.S. Logistics Partners 12.76%, Invesco Core Real Estate USA 7.75%, Clarion Lion Properties Fund 7.20%, a fund filed as Everwest Funds Advisors LLC 6.67%, Heitman America Real Estate 5.45%, Walton Street Real Estate Core-Plus 4.76%. The percentages add to more than 100% in total because of the credit line.

Update, October 1, 2026: the fourth-quarter offer is open until October 23

The notice for the next repurchase offer was filed on September 25, 2026 (Form N-23C3A, accession 0001213900-26-103315). What it says, and what it means for a holder deciding this month:

• Size: 5% of outstanding shares, the same as the January, April and July offers. If tenders exceed it, the fund "may, in its sole discretion" pro-rate or "increase the number of Shares to be repurchased by up to 2.0%" — the discretionary extra it used in 2020 and, as explained below, has not used in any quarter since the queue formed. Shares tendered by the estate of a deceased shareholder can be taken in an additional "Estate Offer" of up to 0.20% of the shares.
• Deadline and price: October 23, 2026, at the close of the New York Stock Exchange (normally 4:00 p.m. ET), and the price is the NAV on that day, not the NAV on the day you submit. Intermediaries "may set times prior to the Repurchase Request Deadline," so the practical deadline is your platform's, which can be earlier. A request can be withdrawn or changed until the deadline.
• Payment: expected by October 27, 2026, and "in no event later than seven (7) calendar days" after pricing.
• NAV: $23.04 on September 18, 2026, against $23.47 on June 22 and $23.25 at March 31. Part of that is the quarterly distribution paid out of NAV, so the fall in the price is not the same as a loss of that size; the point for a seller is that the repurchase price is set on October 23 and can move again before then.

What the odds look like: every offer since January 2023 has been pro-rated, and the last one with a published result (April 24, 2026) filled about 16.6% of what was tendered. The July 31 result is not yet filed. If the October offer is filled at the April rate, a holder who tenders $100,000 of shares would be paid roughly $16,600 and keep the rest — our arithmetic on the April fill, not a forecast; the fill depends on how many others tender, and the fund need not use the extra 2%.

What the fund looked like at June 30, 2026 (the fund's first-quarter Form N-PORT, accession 0001193125-26-373502, filed August 28): net assets $1,448.5 million, down from about $1.49 billion at March 31 and about 55% below the $3.21 billion peak; total assets $1,541.5 million; $88.0 million drawn on the bank line, down from $113 million at March 31. The monthly flows show the shape of the problem in one quarter: $19.1 million of new shares sold across April, May and June ($7.4 million, $5.9 million, $5.8 million) against $75.3 million paid out, almost all of it the April 24 repurchase ($75.2 million in April). Monthly returns were +2.20% in April, −0.21% in May and +0.26% in June. A quarter in which almost four times as much money leaves as arrives is a quarter in which the fund has to sell or borrow to pay its leavers — the mechanism behind the 54% asset decline described below.

Why this review exists: the interval fund that honored its promise — and that is the point

CrowdfundedWealth's 2026 cluster keeps asking one question of every non-traded real estate vehicle: when the 2022-onward rate shock hit, could you get out? The non-traded NAV REITs — BREIT, Starwood's SREIT — answered by gating: discretionary caps the boards could tighten or, in SREIT's case, effectively freeze. The "true interval funds" answer differently: a quarterly repurchase offer the board is legally required to make, and can suspend only on the narrow grounds Rule 23c-3(b)(3) lists.

The Versus Capital fund is the cleanest test of whether that legal protection actually protects you. It is a real Rule 23c-3 interval fund. It never suspended. It made a repurchase offer every single quarter straight through the downturn — and even raised the offer size to add liquidity. By every structural measure, it did the honest thing.

And its investors still could not get out. That is the indictment this review documents. The "mandatory interval" structure converted a liquidity event into a slow-motion liquidity queue — and the SEC filings put hard numbers on it. This review is built from primary EDGAR filings under CIK 1515001 — the FY2026 annual report on Form N-CSR (fiscal year ended March 31, 2026), the FY2023 through FY2025 N-CSRs, and the N-2 prospectus — cross-checked against Harrison Street and Colliers disclosures.

The name changed twice: Versus to Colliers to Harrison Street

Before the numbers, the corporate history, because the fund you may have researched under "Versus Capital" now carries a different name on its filings.

• 2010-2011: Versus Capital founded in Denver by Mark Quam and partners; the fund commenced operations December 9, 2011.
• June 2022: Colliers International acquired a controlling interest in Versus Capital (a roughly $6 billion firm at the time).
• 2022-2025: Versus was integrated into Harrison Street, Colliers' alternatives and real-assets arm (about $56 billion AUM).
• July 28, 2025: the entire retail platform rebranded Harrison Street Private Wealth LLC. The fund became the Harrison Street Real Estate Fund LLC; the adviser, Versus Capital Advisors, became Harrison Street Private Wealth LLC. The ticker VCMIX was kept. Founder Mark Quam and the original team (Bill Fuhs, Casey Frazier) stayed on to lead the division.

Two ownership changes in three years is a continuity flag, not a disqualifier — the team carried over and Harrison Street is a deeper institutional platform than independent Versus was. But there is one structural consequence worth flagging: the fund now holds the Harrison Street Core Property Fund among its underlying institutional positions, which is now an affiliated holding — a fee and conflict layer that did not exist before the acquisition. The size is worth stating rather than leaving as a dark hint, and the direction of travel is the interesting part. Note 12 of the FY2026 annual report — the affiliated-issuer table, in which this is the only entry — opens the year at $0 of affiliated value (the adviser change took effect July 28, 2025, so the holding only became "affiliated" mid-year), records $94,659,393 of additions and $88,619,021 of reductions, and closes at $4,166,012, having paid the fund $2,020,893 of dividend income. In other words, the one underlying fund the fund got almost entirely out of during fiscal 2026 was its own adviser's — while Note 11 shows it still waiting in line at twelve others. Read the two notes together before concluding anything about the conflict: the closing position is 0.3% of net assets, but the flow through it during the year was not small.

A note on a dead ticker: VCMRX (the old Class F) was eliminated in 2018. The fund is now single-class. If you see VCMRX quoted anywhere, it is stale.

The liquidity record: every repurchase offer since 2020, and the number in the first column

This is the centerpiece, and it is the part that gets told wrong. An interval fund must offer to repurchase shares every quarter; it does not have to offer the same amount every quarter. This fund's own policy range, in the sponsor's 2026 calendar, is "no less than 5% and not more than 25% of its outstanding shares." So the first column below is a decision, not a constant — and it moved.

Here is the complete primary-source timeline from the annual reports, showing the offer size, what shareholders asked for, and the share of tendered shares actually repurchased. The percentages in the last column are the filings' own ("Percentage of Tendered Shares Repurchased"), except the April 2026 row, which is our arithmetic on the numbers in the subsequent-events note.

Three things fall out of that table, and only the first one is usually reported.

One: 14 consecutive pro-rated quarters. From January 27, 2023 through April 24, 2026, every offer was oversubscribed and every shareholder was filled pro rata. In April 2026 the fund offered to buy 3,211,639 shares, holders tendered 19,400,493, and about 16.6% was filled for roughly $75.1 million (FY2026 N-CSR, subsequent-events note, accession 0001213900-26-065345). At that fill rate a full exit is a multi-year queue taken one partial fill at a time.

Two: the offer size was cut in the quarter the queue formed. For seven straight quarters, from April 2021 to October 2022, the fund offered 8% of its shares and everyone who asked was paid in full — because almost nobody asked. At the very next deadline, January 27, 2023, tenders jumped to 12.3 million shares and the offer was 5%. The later move to 6% (January through October 2025) is real, and it is also a partial restoration that never got back to the 8% on offer when the offer was cheap; by January 2026 it was 5% again. Rule 23c-3 fixes the frequency of the offer, not its size, and this fund's own history shows the size moving with demand — down in 2023, and down again in July 2020, the other quarter in which tenders spiked.

Three: in the 2020 stress the fund repurchased more than it had offered; in this one it did not. The FY2021 annual report footnotes its fill percentages as including "a voluntary increase above each quarter's Repurchase Offer Amount, as allowed by Rule 23c-3 of the 1940 Act" — the discretionary extra 2% the rule permits. No such footnote appears in the FY2023, FY2024, FY2025 or FY2026 tables; there, the only additions are the 0.10%-0.20% "estate offer" for shares tendered by the estates of deceased shareholders. The tool used in 2020 was available in every quarter of this queue and was not used.

The July 31, 2026 result is not yet filed — it will appear in the semi-annual report for the period ended September 30, 2026. What is on file is the offer itself: 5% of outstanding shares, a July 31 deadline, and a NAV of $23.47 at June 22, 2026 (Form N-23C3A, accession 0001213900-26-072371). The next offer is open now: 5% of outstanding shares, notice dated September 25, deadline and pricing date October 23, 2026, NAV $23.04 at September 18 (Form N-23C3A, accession 0001213900-26-103315; details in the update at the top of this review).

The queue behind the queue: the fund is waiting in line too

This is the part of the file nobody quotes, and it is the mechanism behind everything above. VCMIX does not own buildings. It owns units in other people's private funds, and those funds have their own redemption rules — which means an investor's queue at VCMIX sits on top of VCMIX's queue at them.

Note 11 of the FY2026 annual report sets it out for each of the 20 private funds held at March 31, 2026. Three facts from it:

• The fund had already asked for its money back from 12 of them. The note's "Redemption Request" column marks a full redemption request pending at AEW Value Investors US, CBRE U.S. Core Partners, Trumbull Property Income Fund and UBS Trumbull Property Fund, and a partial request at CBRE U.S. Logistics, Clarion Gables Multifamily, Clarion Lion Properties, Sagard Real Estate, GI Partners ETS, both Heitman funds and both Invesco funds. The footnote's own wording is that the fund "submitted a redemption request prior to period end, but will maintain market exposure to the investment through a future date," and that the manager "expects to meet all redemptions over time."
• Those redemptions are at the underlying managers' discretion, at 45 to 90 days' notice, and three positions are locked or illiquid by design: CBRE U.S. Logistics and Hines European Property Partners carry three-year lock-ups on initial contributions, Walton Street a two-year lock-up, and the two DigitalBridge AI Infrastructure funds are closed-end vehicles with redemption frequency listed as N/A — they terminate when their assets are sold. The financial statements say plainly that each underlying fund "can suspend redemptions if its respective Board deems it in the best interest of its shareholders."
• And the fund owes money it has not yet paid in. Unfunded commitments at March 31, 2026 were $107,963,000: $81.7 million to Hines European Property Partners, $27.0 million to Walton Street, and $12.5 million across the two DigitalBridge funds. That is 7.3% of net assets contractually promised out while roughly $75-110 million a quarter is going out of the door in repurchases and $113 million of the credit line is drawn.

Put together: the reason the fill rate keeps falling is not that the board changed its mind about liquidity. It is that the fund's own exit from its holdings is slower than its shareholders' demand to exit from it, and it is funding the difference with a credit line whose interest bill ($7,503,188 in fiscal 2026) is spread over a shrinking asset base. Two of its twenty holdings cannot be redeemed at all.

One more thing worth knowing about what is inside: this is described everywhere, including by us until today, as a fund-of-ODCE-funds. It is no longer only that. At March 31, 2026 it held $73.5 million across DigitalBridge AI Infrastructure B and D (6.1% of the private book, first acquired January 24, 2025) and $65.8 million in GI Partners ETS Fund, alongside Heitman's real estate debt fund, Hines European and Invesco's Asia fund. A buyer who thinks they are buying core US open-end real estate should read the schedule of investments.

The 2026 secondary auction: what it was, and why it is not a standing exit

The first auction for these shares ran from August 28 to September 18, 2026, with settlement expected October 2. Order entry is closed. What matters now is the rule behind it, because the rule is what tells a holder whether to wait for another one — and it is in the prospectus, not in the press coverage.

The July 29, 2026 prospectus authorizes transfers through Nasdaq Fund Secondaries (NFS) auctions "in the event the Fund has pro-rated two consecutive quarterly repurchase offers." The August 6, 2026 supplement (accession 0001133228-26-011246) turned the authorization on and named the April 24, 2026 offer as the first of that pair. The second was the July 31 offer, and an auction "may commence in the month following the month in which the second consecutive pro-rated Repurchase Offer's Repurchase Pricing Date occurs" — which is exactly when it opened.

Then comes the sentence that matters: "Following a second consecutive pro-rated Repurchase Offer, this measuring period will reset." Transfers "would not again be authorized unless, and until, two more consecutive pro-rated Repurchase Offers occurred." So the counter is back at zero. The next auction cannot be authorized until the October 23, 2026 and January 2027 offers are both pro-rated, and it could then commence no earlier than February 2027 — and even then only if NFS chooses to run it, because it "will have discretion to not commence an auction if it determines that insufficient demand exists," and it may never run one during the window between a repurchase notice and its pricing date. Every offer since January 2023 has been pro-rated, so the trigger is likely; the auction is not guaranteed by it.

Four more things the prospectus says about that exit, which a seller should weigh before treating it as an alternative to the queue:

• The price is expected to be a discount, and the prospectus does not hedge it. The clearing price "will likely be lower than, but could be at a premium to, the Fund's last calculated NAV" in the summary, and in the body: it "will likely be substantially below the Fund's last calculated NAV."
• Individuals cannot bid. "Currently, investors that are natural persons are not able to purchase Shares directly through the NFS platform." Buyers must be Eligible Purchasers, represented by a broker-dealer, adviser or other participant that meets NFS's requirements, and the adviser and the fund "reserve the right to reject any proposed purchaser for any reason."
• Nobody is supporting the bid. The fund "and any affiliated purchaser thereof" may not participate in the auction or help set its terms.
• Sellers pay no fee to the fund. No fees or commissions are charged by the fund or its affiliates to participating sellers — the adviser pays NFS's service fees — but a shareholder's own intermediary may charge them.

For a holder, then, the choice is not "auction or queue" on any given day. It is: tender into the October 23, 2026 offer at NAV and accept a partial fill, or hold and watch for a possible auction from February 2027 at a price the issuer's own prospectus expects to be substantially below NAV. The prospectus frames the trade-off the same way: "potentially quicker liquidity, but possibly of a price below the Fund's last calculated NAV, versus liquidating their Shares over multiple Repurchase Offers at the Fund's NAV (which could decline over the course of successive Repurchase Offers)." Our September auction guide covers how that first auction was set up.

Here is the fair, two-sided read. The Rule 23c-3 mechanism delivered something the discretionary-gate NAV REITs did not: a reliable, never-suspended, partial quarterly exit. An investor who could tolerate redeeming in slices was always able to take some money off the table — SREIT's holders, by contrast, hit an outright freeze. But "mandatory quarterly liquidity" still meant 16% to 41% of what you asked for, for three straight years. The structure was more honest than a gate. The economic outcome for a 2022-vintage redeemer converged toward the same place.

The asset spiral: down about 54% from peak

Persistent net redemptions do something corrosive to a fund: they shrink it, and a shrinking interval fund risks a self-reinforcing squeeze. Net assets, fiscal year-end (March 31):

Net assets fell about 54% from the $3.21 billion of March 31, 2022 — the highest figure in any reported period, and higher than every fiscal year back to 2018 ($2.18bn in 2018, $2.80bn 2019, $2.97bn 2020, $2.50bn 2021) and than the $3.14 billion reported at the September 30, 2022 half-year. That is far more than NAV's roughly 26% decline, which tells you the shrinkage is driven by redemptions, not just markdowns. That is the dynamic to watch in any interval fund under stress: as investors exit, the fund tends to sell its most liquid holdings (the public REIT sleeve) first, which can leave the remaining holders with a relatively more illiquid private book — and a fixed cost base (including a now roughly $7.5 million annual line-of-credit interest bill) spread over fewer assets, pushing the per-share expense ratio up. The fund's gross expense ratio rose from about 1.24% to about 1.72% as assets shrank.

Performance: honest structure, weak outcome

The fund markets low volatility and low correlation, and on volatility the thesis held. On return, it has been poor. The since-inception net return is only about 4.05% annualized; the 10-year is about 2.86%, the 5-year about 1.05%, and the 1-year about -0.38%. The fund's own report puts the S&P Real Assets Index at 15.74% over one year, 6.32% annualized over five years and 6.25% over ten: gaps of roughly 16 points at one year, 5.3 at five and 3.4 at ten. The comparison the report makes against its own asset class is closer and no kinder — the fund's private real estate portfolio returned -0.70% in fiscal 2026 while the NCREIF-ODCE Equal Weight index it tracks returned +3.06%. Low volatility is worth something, but a real-estate fund that compounds at under 3% over a decade has not delivered the return half of the risk-return bargain.

Fees and distribution: the one clear structural win, and a return-of-capital caveat

On fees, this fund is genuinely the best of the three big interval funds in this cycle. The July 29, 2026 prospectus puts total annual expenses at 1.82% — 1.08% of management fees, 0.18% other expenses, 0.32% interest on borrowings and 0.24% acquired-fund fees — with no sales load, no early-withdrawal charge, and no 12b-1 fee. That is materially cheaper on paper than Apollo's roughly 2.5% or Bluerock's 3%-plus loads-and-all structures.

The honest caveat: the underlying institutional ODCE funds charge their own management and performance fees — roughly 0.85% to 1.25%-plus — that are embedded in their NAVs. The current prospectus shows 0.24% of acquired-fund fees (an earlier fee table, which this review criticized, showed 0.01%), and even 0.24% does not capture everything charged inside those funds, so the true all-in economic cost is above the 1.82% headline.

On distributions, the fund pays quarterly: $0.96 per share in fiscal 2026, roughly 4% of NAV — and down every year from $1.91 in fiscal 2022 ($1.16, then $1.05, then $1.00). Return of capital was about 47% of distributions in fiscal 2025 ($37,990,000 of roughly $81.3 million) and about 33% in fiscal 2026 ($22,091,260 of $67,565,484, against $0 of ordinary income) — a meaningful reliance on returning investors' own capital, though less extreme than Apollo's or Bluerock's 90%-plus ROC years.

How it sits in the cluster

As one of the three big equity real estate interval funds, VCMIX / the Harrison Street Real Estate Fund lands at 3.0 — tied with Apollo's GIREX/GRIFX (3.0) and above Bluerock's former TIPRX, now BPRE (2.5). Versus is cheaper and more transparent than Apollo on fees; Apollo has the shallower NAV drawdown and deeper sponsor. Against the NAV REITs, its rationed liquidity and weak returns place it below the never-gated leaders like JLL Income Property Trust (4.0) and Nuveen Global Cities REIT (3.9). For the category-wide liquidity picture, see our real estate crowdfunding liquidity analysis.

ProsCons

FAQ

Verdict

The Versus Capital Multi-Manager Real Estate Income Fund — now the Harrison Street Real Estate Fund LLC, ticker VCMIX — earns 3.0 out of 5 in this forensic SEC-primary-source review. It is the cluster's clearest case study in a hard truth: a fund can do everything its legal structure requires and still leave its investors stranded. It is a real Rule 23c-3 interval fund, it never suspended, it even raised its repurchase offer to add liquidity, and it charges the lowest stated fees of the three big interval funds — no load, no early-withdrawal charge, no 12b-1, 1.82% all-in on the July 29, 2026 fee table. An investor who valued rules-based, never-gated, partial liquidity got exactly that.

What caps the rating at 3.0 is the outcome behind the honest structure. For 14 straight quarters redemptions were pro-rated, from 41% down to 16.6% of each request — true liquidity a fraction of the headline "5% to 6% per quarter," and that headline itself was 8% until the quarter the queue formed. Net assets bled about 54% from peak in a redemption spiral, returns have been poor in absolute terms and badly behind the benchmark, and a third to nearly half of recent distributions were return of capital. The structure is more honest than KREST's discretionary tender or a non-traded REIT's gate — but the 2022-vintage redeemer's real-world experience was strikingly similar.

For an investor weighing it: read the FY2026 N-CSR directly, and focus on four things — the repurchase table in Note 8 (the offer size column, not just the fill rate), Note 11's redemption-request and redemption-frequency table for the underlying funds, the net-assets trend, and the return-of-capital line in the distribution note. Those four tell you whether you are comfortable owning a structurally honest fund whose liquidity, in a down cycle, is a slow quarterly trickle — and whether you believe it clears before your own deadline does. Harrison Street pays us nothing for this review and we link only to the issuer's own materials; the advisor-matching box above is a paid placement.

Sources

Primary SEC EDGAR filings:

• Versus Capital / Harrison Street Real Estate Fund — CIK 1515001 EDGAR filings index
• Annual Report on Form N-CSR (FY2026, fiscal year ended March 31, 2026)
• Annual Report on Form N-CSR (FY2025)
• Annual Report on Form N-CSR (FY2024)
• Annual Report on Form N-CSR (FY2023, fiscal year ended March 31, 2023)
• Annual Report on Form N-CSR (FY2022) and FY2021 — the pre-wave 8% offers and the 2020 voluntary increases
• Prospectus dated July 29, 2026 (Form 486BPOS: fee table, minimums, the auction process)
• Supplement dated August 6, 2026 (Form 424B3: the auction is switched on; April 24, 2026 counts as the first pro-rated offer)
• Form N-23C3A filed June 26, 2026 (the July 31, 2026 repurchase offer; NAV $23.47 at June 22, 2026)
• Form N-23C3A filed September 25, 2026 (the October 23, 2026 repurchase offer; NAV $23.04 at September 18, 2026)
• Form N-PORT for the quarter ended June 30, 2026 (net assets, borrowings, monthly flows and returns), filed August 28, 2026
• N-2 registration statement / prospectus (fee table, structure, minimums)

Secondary and analytical sources:

• Harrison Street — launch of the Private Wealth division (July 28, 2025)
• Colliers International — investment in Versus Capital (June 30, 2022)
• Harrison Street Private Wealth — VCMIX fund page, fact sheets, and the 2026 Share Repurchase Offer & Distribution Calendar (fourth-quarter notification targeted September 25, 2026; repurchase request deadline October 23, 2026)