Point HEI Review 2026: 58 CFPB Complaints, 56% Pool Share

What “Point” is, and what this page counts

Point is the trade name of Point Digital Finance, Inc., a Delaware corporation based in Palo Alto, California (NMLS ID 1610752). It sells a home equity investment (HEI): cash today in exchange for a share of the home's future change in value, repaid in one payment when the homeowner sells, refinances or chooses to settle. The CFPB's January 2025 market review says the market is “dominated by four companies: Unison, Point, Hometap, and Unlock,” and that Point was founded in 2015. Our home equity investment contracts page covers the category, its laws and the lawsuits against other companies; our Hometap review does the same line-by-line job for Hometap, whose price Hometap publishes. Point does not publish its price, and this page measures what can be measured around that gap.

We read four kinds of documents on November 11, 2026: Point's own website and help center (company claims); the CFPB Consumer Complaint Database, queried for the exact company name; SEC filings (Form D, Form ABS-15G and Form 8-K); and Morningstar DBRS press releases on Point's rated securitizations, which are freely readable. We could not query NMLS Consumer Access, an interactive site, so the licence list below is Point's own. Complaints are not proof of wrongdoing, and the absence of a regulator action in our search is not proof that none exists.

What Point's pages say, and what they leave out

Point's HEI page says it plainly: “Point will place a lien on your home to secure performance of the underlying agreement. There are no monthly payments or interest accrual.” Repayment “is based on the future value of the subject property at the time of exit.” The help center fills in the mechanics. “We make two calculations to determine your repayment and you always pay the lower of the two”: the first is the appreciation formula, “how much your home has appreciated from the Appreciation Starting Value, multiplied by your HEI percentage”; the second is the Homeowner Protection Cap, “a fixed annual rate, compounded monthly.” The starting value is set below the appraisal “to help offset the risk Point takes on by not requiring monthly payments.”

Point's published terms, as read November 11, 2026

The help center says why the percentage is missing: it “is based on a number of factors including your credit profile, amount requested, property characteristics, home valuation, and available equity.” It adds that pricing “can't be negotiated,” though the amount and the settlement date can be changed. Point also says the HEI percentage and the cap both depend on the credit score. Two practical consequences: the only way to learn the price is to prequalify, and two neighbors can owe very different amounts for the same cash.

The one worked example Point publishes, and what it implies

Point's HEI page shows “Tim,” who gets $50,000 against a home worth $500,000 and exits after five years. It gives three results. The text says Point applies “a home value risk adjustment of 29%” and prints a “risk adjusted value” of $365,000; 29% off $500,000 is $355,000, so the page disagrees with itself.

Point's own example: $50,000 on a $500,000 home, exit after 5 years

Net cash is $50,000 less a 4.9% fee ($2,450), before third-party costs, so the yearly figures are slightly low (our arithmetic). A starting value of $355,000 and a share of 25.35% reproduce all three paybacks within rounding: $50,000 plus 25.35% of the gap between the sale price and $355,000 gives $51,800, $110,547 and $125,665 (our fit; Point does not state either number). Even in the depreciation case Tim pays back more than he received, because the sale price stays above the starting value. The page says Tim's cost in the two appreciation cases “is capped”; the three payoffs fit the plain formula with no cap, so the example does not tell a reader where the cap sits.

That example uses a contract worth 10% of the home. Point's contracts are usually thicker. Point told California's regulator that “Point's average investment to a typical California consumer is 16 percent of the home's current value,” and DBRS reports an average of 17.01% across the 2026-2 pool. DBRS also reports the weighted-average share of appreciation for the three rated pools: 55.07%, 55.91% and 56.45%, more than twice the 25.35% implied by Tim.

A $100,000 payout at years 3, 10 and 30 (our arithmetic)

We built the example on a typical contract rather than Tim: $100,000 on a $588,000 home (17.01% thickness, the 2026-2 average), a share of appreciation of 56.45% (the 2026-2 average), a starting value 29% below the home value (Point's own example) and a cap of 18.5% a year compounded monthly. The cap is our assumption, not a Point figure: the CFPB says “several companies have rate caps around 18-20%, compounded monthly,” and Hometap publishes 18.5%. The owed amount is the lower of the formula ($100,000 plus 56.45% of the gain over the starting value) and the capped amount. Net cash is $95,100 after the 4.9% fee; third-party costs are left out. Your offer will carry its own percentage, starting value and cap.

Typical contract: $100,000 payout, $588,000 home, 56.45% share, 18.5% cap assumed (our arithmetic)

Three readings. First, the early years are set by the cap, so the year-3 figure of about 22% a year is the cap assumption and not the formula; the CFPB's January 2025 market review puts the growth of the settlement amount at 19.5-22% a year under many contracts. Second, after the cap stops mattering the cost depends on the home: 7.5% a year at year 10 with a flat house against 17.0% with 6% growth. Third, the cap never binds at 30 years, so on a 30-year contract the protection is early-years protection only, which is how Point's help center describes it: “most likely to apply in the first few years.”

To show how much the percentage matters, the same $100,000 on Point's own Tim terms (a $1,000,000 home, 25.35% share, same cap) owes $173,458 at year 3 (22.2% a year), $173,515 at year 10 and $173,515 at year 30 if the home stays flat; at 6% growth it owes $373,995 at year 10 and $1,375,990 at year 30 (9.3% a year). The full 18 rows are in the CSV. The comparison with a HELOC, a cash-out refinance or a reverse mortgage depends on rates we do not set here; for homeowners 62 and older, our HECM reverse mortgage page reads HUD's principal limit table.

The CFPB complaint record, by year, product and issue

The CFPB database lists complaints under the exact name “Point Digital Finance, Inc.” We queried it on November 11, 2026 and tabulated all 58 records; the latest was received October 26, 2026.

Complaints under “Point Digital Finance, Inc.” by year received

The rest of the 58 are conventional, VA, FHA or reverse mortgage (7 in all) and credit-reporting or personal-line records (3). Consumers pick the sub-product themselves, so the 30 “other type of mortgage” records are where HEIs are most likely to sit, but the database does not label them. Counts doubled in 2026: 22 records in 10 months against 11 in all of 2025.

By issue, state and outcome (all 58 complaints)

The pattern is closing and payoff friction rather than one dominant complaint: disclosures at closing, appraisals that came in low, and lien releases and payoff figures at exit. We cannot read what consumers wrote because none of the 58 has a published narrative. The CFPB's own review of 38 home equity contract complaints, across all companies, found “surprise at the size of the repayment amounts” among the themes; Point is one of the four companies it covers. Four complaints come from Massachusetts, a state that is not on Point's list of HEI states (Point also sells a HELOC, and the sub-product label does not tell us which product a Massachusetts consumer meant).

Where Point says it can lend, and what it is licensed for

Point's help center lists 31 states and the District of Columbia where HEI is available, “select regions” with availability varying by county: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. Massachusetts is not listed. Its licenses page lists licences in 20 states and the District of Columbia, and Point's HEI disclosure says the HEI “is offered as a licensed mortgage product in Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. HEIs offered in other states are not currently required to be licensed.” For California it says the HEI “is not offered under its California Financing Law license.”

Licences and HEI availability on Point's own pages (November 11, 2026)

A missing licence is not a violation: Point says HEIs outside the nine states are not currently required to be licensed, and that is the legal question the courts and regulators are now deciding. Point told California's regulator in December 2024 that “TILA explicitly excludes option contracts from the definition of ‘credit,’” and in the same letter asked the department to require HEI providers to register and report data. The Washington Department of Financial Institutions named Point as one of five HEI providers it surveyed in its September 12, 2024 inquiry report; the report does not break results out by company. See our contracts page for the states with HEI-specific rules.

Courts and regulators

We searched for Point in federal and state court summaries, SEC filings and regulator publications on November 11, 2026. What we found:

• A homeowner v. Point Digital Finance, CV 2025-024855 (Arizona Superior Court). The National Consumer Law Center, a consumer-side advocacy group, reports that the plaintiff alleged violations of Arizona consumer protection law and the federal Truth in Lending Act and sought rescission, and that on December 19, 2025 the court denied Point's motion to compel arbitration, “holding that the arbitration clause was contrary to the Truth in Lending Act's prohibition on arbitration in mortgage contracts.” This is NCLC's summary: we did not retrieve the complaint or the order, and we did not verify later proceedings.
• No regulator action found. We found no consent order, enforcement action or attorney general suit against Point. The Massachusetts Attorney General's 2025 suit we cover on the Hometap page is against Hometap, not Point.
• Point's own record claim. Its help center says “Point has never foreclosed on a homeowner.” That is a company statement we could not test.

Case names here are companies and case numbers only. A single arbitration ruling in one state court is not a finding about Point's contracts in general.

Who buys Point's contracts: three rated securitizations and four SEC diligence reports

Point sells its contracts to investors and funds them through securitizations, and securitization filings are where the price terms leak. DBRS's press releases say “HEIs are nonrecourse” and that the investor's return is “typically subject to a returns cap.” For each deal DBRS lists the contract count, current intrinsic value and weighted-average HEI percentage:

Morningstar DBRS-rated Point securitizations (final press releases)

Counts and values for 2023-1 and 2025-1 are the sum of the lien-position figures DBRS prints (our arithmetic). In the 2026-2 pool, 82.94% of contracts are second-lien, the weighted-average combined loan-to-value is 50.93%, and 59 contracts worth $8.82 million (1.73% of the pool) had already had a mortgage delinquency of 90 or more days after origination; DBRS gave those contracts no growth credit. The cumulative advance rate on the senior class is 64.6%, and the B-2 class, which Point retained according to its press release, sits at 100.0%.

Point also files Form ABS-15G because it is a securitizer: its annual Rule 15Ga-1 reports for 2024 and 2025 (filed February 7, 2025 and January 26, 2026) check the “no activity to report” box for trusts 2021-1, 2023-1, 2024-1, 2025-1, 2025-2 and 2025-PRE1. The reports that carry content are the third-party diligence reports filed under depositor names that include “BOAC HOWL Point Depositor,” the Blue Owl-linked vehicles. Selene Diligence reviewed a sample of each pool:

Selene Diligence reviews filed with the SEC (ABS-15G)

Selene gives every file an initial and a final grade; the final grade “considers additional information and supporting documentation” supplied afterward. Grade D means the file “is missing critical document(s) to support the review.” After cure, the 2026-2 sample was 636 of 636 grade A, and the three earlier samples were 99.4% to 100% A. Two cautions. The average amount per contract here is the amount invested ($90,835 to $101,837), and Point's own pages say $600,000 is the maximum. And the diligence report states: “Selene did not review or test the Option Investments for compliance with any federal, state or local credit or consumer protection laws,” and that the client “confirms and represents” the contracts “are not mortgage loans or debt.” That is a representation by Point, and it is the question the Arizona court and other regulators are testing.

Other SEC records: Form D filings and the GlassBridge forward-flow deal

Point Digital Finance, Inc. filed one Form D, on May 10, 2022, for an equity offering under Rule 506(b): a total of $140,009,312, $115,880,126 sold to 18 investors, $24,129,186 remaining, first sale April 22, 2022. An earlier vehicle, Point Digital Finance CA1 Fund, LP, a pooled venture-capital fund, filed a Form D on November 25, 2015 and an amendment on April 19, 2017 showing $7,100,000 sold to 19 investors. Neither is a vehicle that holds homeowners' contracts today. Our Form D guide explains the boxes.

Two other SEC filers have disclosed deals with Point. Redwood Trust told the SEC on October 12, 2021 that it had completed with Point “the first-ever securitization backed entirely by residential home equity investment agreements.” GlassBridge Enterprises disclosed on its Form 8-K of January 5, 2024 a forward-flow agreement signed December 29, 2023 to buy $100,000,000 of Point's “home equity interest option assets,” with an option to raise the commitment to $300,000,000. Point had to offer at least $5,000,000 and at most $12,000,000 a month, and GlassBridge's price was 105% of the option amount on the first $10,000,000 each month and 103.35% above that. GlassBridge funded $10,000,000 by February 14, 2024 (our sum of three fundings), and on May 23, 2025 sold Point option assets into a securitization for about $23,400,000.

Three different counts of Point's contracts

Point's own figures for how many contracts it has written do not agree, and the gap matters when reading any complaint ratio. The CFPB review says Point “originated 10,000 home equity contracts in 2023.” Point's letters to California's regulator say it had originated more than 4,200 HEIs for about $387 million since 2019 in both December 2021 and December 2024: the same figures three years apart. Its website says it has “funded more than 30,000 homeowners,” a figure that may include its HELOC product. The 2025 and 2026 securitization pools alone hold 4,464 contracts (2026-2) or 3,819 (2026-1). We cannot reconcile these, so we do not compute a complaint rate.

What a reader can do with this

This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice. Points the documents support:

• Ask for the numbers Point does not publish. The offer carries the HEI percentage, the appreciation starting value and the cap. Ask for each in writing, plus the equivalent APR that Point's help center says it shows in estimates, and a payoff schedule at years 3, 5, 10 and 30 for three home-price paths.
• Compare to the pool, not to the website. The website example implies a 25.35% share. The rated pools average 55% to 56%. If your offer is far from the pool average, ask why; if it is close, the example on the page understated what a typical contract costs.
• Read the year-3 and year-30 lines separately. The cap sets the early cost; the share sets the late cost. A homeowner who may settle in under five years is buying the cap; one who may keep the contract 20 years is buying the percentage.
• Know the exit before signing. The agreement is repaid in one payment. If you cannot refinance or sell by the end of the term, Point's own help center says it may exercise its option and become co-owner with the right to sell, and refusing to cooperate is a default.
• Check your state. Point lists 31 states and the District of Columbia; the HEI is described as a licensed mortgage product in nine. Your state regulator can tell you whether HEIs are licensed or covered by a specific law.
• Check the file. The diligence reports show that large shares of files lacked documents until Point supplied them. Keep your own copy of everything you sign, and the appraisal.

More on home equity contracts, read from the same kind of primary records: Splitero, Unlock, Unison, Hometap, Truehold (sale-leaseback) and all five companies side by side.

FAQ

Sources, read and saved on November 11, 2026: Point's HEI page, How the HEI Works page, Licenses page and help-center articles 444, 462, 471, 473, 478, 503, 563, 568, 570, 571, 575, 576, 577, 578, 581, 637, 642 and 831 (point.com and help.point.com); CFPB Consumer Complaint Database, company “Point Digital Finance, Inc.” (queried November 11, 2026); CFPB Issue Spotlight: Home Equity Contracts: Market Overview (January 15, 2025); Morningstar DBRS press releases on Point Securitization Trusts 2023-1 (October 31, 2023), 2025-1 (May 23, 2025) and 2026-2 (July 15, 2026); SEC Form ABS-15G filings by Point Digital Finance, Inc. (CIK 1927899) and the BOAC HOWL Point Depositor vehicles (accessions 0000929638-25-001825, -25-003851, -26-000427, -26-002297) including the Selene Diligence reports; SEC Form D filings 0001567619-22-009939, 0001659110-15-000001 and 0001659110-17-000001; SEC Forms 8-K of GlassBridge Enterprises (0001493152-24-001399, -24-006869, 0001641172-25-013118) and Redwood Trust (0001104659-21-125088); Point's comment letters to the California DFPI (December 20, 2021 and December 12, 2024); Washington DFI Home Equity Sharing Agreement Inquiry Report (September 12, 2024); National Consumer Law Center, “Courts Expose Deception of Home Equity ‘Investments.’” A company website is the company's claim, and terms change by state and by date.