What Is a Trust Protector? Powers vs. a Trustee, by State
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Quick Answer
A trust protector is a person other than the trustee whom the trust’s terms give powers over the trust, most often to remove and replace the trustee or to amend administrative terms, and whether that person is a fiduciary depends on the state. As of November 8, 2026, in the seven state statutes we read, Nevada (NRS 163.5553(3)), Tennessee (35-15-1202(a)), Wyoming (4-10-711), New Hampshire (RSA 564-B:12-1202(a)) and Delaware (12 Del. C. 3313(a)) make a protector a fiduciary by default. South Dakota reverses that default (SDCL 55-1B-1(2)), and Alaska’s statute only says that, subject to the instrument, a protector “is not liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary” (AS 13.36.370(d)). The tax side turns on who holds the power. On a $1,500,000 irrevocable trust holding a rental LLC with $90,000 of taxable income, a non-grantor trust that keeps the income owes $31,231 for 2026, against $21,600 if the trust is a grantor trust and the owner’s rate is an assumed 24% (our arithmetic). A settlor who names himself protector with an unrestricted power to remove the trustee and appoint himself risks pulling the $1,500,000 into his gross estate (Treas. Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1)).
Key Takeaways
- A protector is defined by what the person is not. Tennessee calls a protector “any person, and may be a committee of more than one person, other than a trustee” who has a power or duty over the trust (35-15-1201(a)). The Uniform Directed Trust Act, as West Virginia enacted it, defines a trust director by a power of direction “exercisable while the person is not serving as a trustee” (44D-8A-802).
- The duty default is split. Nevada, Tennessee, Wyoming and New Hampshire make a protector a fiduciary by default, Delaware does the same for an adviser and lets the instrument say “nonfiduciary,” South Dakota says a protector “may not be considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity except to the extent the governing instrument provides otherwise,” and Alaska is silent on status. The Uniform Trust Code, section 808(d), says a holder of a power to direct, other than a beneficiary, “is presumptively a fiduciary.”
- Removing and replacing a trustee and amending terms for tax or legal changes appear in all seven lists. Changing situs or governing law is listed in five (South Dakota, Nevada, Tennessee, Wyoming, New Hampshire), terminating the trust in three (South Dakota, Nevada, Tennessee), and increasing or decreasing beneficial interests in six (all but Delaware, whose list reaches only a beneficiary’s power of appointment). Where a statute says “may include,” the list is not exclusive.
- Grantor trust status can follow a protector’s power. Section 674(a) reaches a power over beneficial enjoyment exercisable by “a nonadverse party,” which is “any person who is not an adverse party” (672(b)), and the independent-trustee exception in 674(c) is written for “a trustee or trustees.” Section 675(4) reaches a power of administration exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity “by any person,” including the power in 675(4)(C) to reacquire trust property by substituting property of equivalent value.
- If the grantor can become the protector, estate inclusion is the risk. Treas. Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1) says “a power in a donee to remove or discharge a trustee and appoint himself may be a power of appointment,” and 26 U.S.C. 2038(a)(1) reaches a power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate held “in whatever capacity exercisable.” Rev. Rul. 2004-64 lists a retained power to remove the trustee and name oneself successor as a fact that may cause inclusion.
- Inclusion is not always a tax cost. The 2026 basic exclusion amount is $15,000,000 (26 U.S.C. 2010(c)(3), Rev. Proc. 2025-32), so $1,500,000 is 10% of it, and property included in the gross estate takes a date-of-death basis (26 U.S.C. 1014(a)(1), (b)(9)). On a $600,000 basis that removes $900,000 of gain (our arithmetic). It can still defeat what the trust was built to do.
- We could not verify every state. We read seven statutes line by line and did not compile a list of Uniform Trust Code or Uniform Directed Trust Act states; the Uniform Law Commission’s enactment map could not be saved as text.
CSV · 123 rows
Trust protector statutes, tax rules and a $1.5 million worked example
123 rows: for seven states the statute citation, the name of the role, the fiduciary default and which of seven powers the statute lists, plus Uniform Trust Code section 808, the West Virginia Uniform Directed Trust Act, the Internal Revenue Code and regulation text on grantor trusts and estate inclusion, Rev. Rul. 2004-64 and 2008-22, and our arithmetic for a $1,500,000 trust.
This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.
What the statutes mean by “trust protector”
A trust has a trustee who holds title and runs the administration. A protector is someone else the document names to hold a defined set of powers, usually to watch the trustee or to fix the trust later without a court. No federal statute defines the role. Each state that has one defines it itself, and the names differ: Delaware folds “protector” into “adviser” (12 Del. C. 3313(f)), South Dakota keeps “trust protector” separate from investment, distribution and tax “trust advisors” (SDCL 55-1B-1), Wyoming keeps a “trust protector” (4-10-710) and a “trust advisor” (4-10-712) as two roles, and the Uniform Directed Trust Act says “trust director” and does not care what the document calls the person (W. Va. Code 44D-8A-802(5)).
The Uniform Trust Code’s official comment to section 808 says that “Subsections (b)-(d) ratify the use of trust protectors and advisers,” and that the term trust protector “usually connotes the grant of greater powers, sometimes including the power to amend or terminate the trust.” That is the practical split. An adviser directs a function, such as investments. A protector holds a power that reaches the trust itself.
If you are weighing what the trustee charges against what a protector adds, our guide to executor and trustee fees by state covers the trustee side.
Table 1: what each statute calls the role, and whether it is a fiduciary by default
Read on November 8, 2026 from the state codes named in the sources paragraph. “Default” means what applies when the document says nothing.
| State and citation | Role named in the statute | Fiduciary by default? | What the text says |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delaware, 12 Del. C. 3313(a), (f) | Adviser; the term “shall include a ‘protector’” | Yes, with an opt-out | Persons with authority to direct, consent to or disapprove a fiduciary’s decisions “shall be considered to be advisers and fiduciaries when exercising such authority provided, however, that the governing instrument may provide that any such adviser (including a protector) shall act in a nonfiduciary capacity.” |
| South Dakota, SDCL 55-1B-1(2), 55-1B-1.1 | Trust protector | No, with exceptions | A protector “may not be considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity except to the extent the governing instrument provides otherwise,” but is a fiduciary to the extent exercising the authority of an investment, distribution or tax trust advisor. The instrument may also give the protector a trustee’s powers and immunities. |
| Nevada, NRS 163.5547, 163.5553(3) | Trust protector | Yes, with an opt-out | “Unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, the powers of the trust protector shall be considered fiduciary in nature.” The subsection carries a 2023 amendment note. |
| Alaska, AS 13.36.370 | Trust protector | Not stated | Subsection (d): “Subject to the terms of the trust instrument, a trust protector is not liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary because of an act or omission of the trust protector taken when performing the function of a trust protector.” |
| Tennessee, Tenn. Code 35-15-1201, 35-15-1202 | Trust protector or trust advisor | Yes, if the holder is not a beneficiary | A protector “is a fiduciary with respect to each power granted” and must act “in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.” The section has no clause letting the trust terms override this. |
| Wyoming, W.S. 4-10-710, 4-10-711 | Trust protector (and, separately, trust advisor) | Yes, to the extent of the powers granted | “Trust protectors are fiduciaries to the extent of the powers, duties and discretions granted to them under the terms of the trust instrument.” Section 4-10-105(b)(xiii), as amended by the 2023 Enrolled Act 53, also makes a protector a fiduciary where the trustee is an excluded fiduciary for those powers. |
| New Hampshire, RSA 564-B:12-1201, 12-1202 | Trust protector or trust advisor | Yes for noncharitable trusts, with an opt-out; always for charitable | “Except as otherwise provided under the terms of the trust,” a protector of a noncharitable trust is a fiduciary for each power; for a charitable trust the status is not open to the terms. Words such as “absolute” or “sole” do not remove the duty of good faith. |
Nevada, Tennessee, Wyoming and New Hampshire make a protector a fiduciary by default, and a family choosing a state is choosing a different standard of care for the person holding the power. In South Dakota the default runs the other way, so the document has to say what standard applies.
Table 2: which powers each statute lists
Where the statute says the powers “may include” or “without limitation,” the list is a menu and not a limit, and the trust can grant more. “Not listed” means only that the statute does not name the power.
| Power | Delaware | South Dakota | Nevada | Alaska | Tennessee | Wyoming | New Hampshire |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Remove and replace a trustee | Yes, 3313(f)(1) | Yes, 55-1B-6(4) | Yes, 163.5553(1)(e) | Yes, (b)(1) | Yes, (a)(7), for reasons in the instrument | Yes, for reasons in the instrument | Yes, (a)(7), for reasons in the instrument |
| Amend terms for tax status or changes in law | Yes, 3313(f)(2) | Yes, 55-1B-6(1) | Yes, (1)(a) | Yes, (b)(2) | Yes, (a)(1) | Yes | Yes, (a)(1) |
| Amend administrative terms or use other state-law changes | Yes, “efficient administration” | Yes, 55-1B-6(11) | Yes, (1)(b) | Not listed | Yes, (a)(2) | Yes | Yes, (a)(2) |
| Change situs or governing law | Not listed | Yes, 55-1B-6(7) | Yes, (1)(h) | Not listed | Yes, (a)(5) | Yes | Yes, (a)(5) |
| Increase or decrease beneficial interests | Only a beneficiary’s power of appointment, 3313(f)(3) | Yes, 55-1B-6(2), (13), (14) | Yes, (1)(c), (d) | Yes, (b)(3), (b)(4) | Yes, (a)(9) | Yes | Yes, (a)(9), not for the protector or the protector’s estate or creditors |
| Terminate the trust | Not listed | Yes, 55-1B-6(5) | Yes, (1)(f) | Not listed | Yes, (a)(15) | Not listed | Not listed |
| Veto, direct or consent to distributions | Not in (f); 3313(a) covers authority to direct, consent or disapprove | Yes, 55-1B-6(6), “veto or direct” | Yes, (1)(g), “direct or veto” | Not listed | Yes, (a)(16), “veto or direct” | Yes, direct, consent or disapprove | Consent only, (a)(8) |
Three limits in the text are easy to miss. Alaska bars a modification that grants a beneficial interest to anyone the instrument does not already provide for (AS 13.36.370(c)(1)). New Hampshire bars using the beneficiary-shifting power to benefit the protector or the protector’s estate or creditors (12-1201(a)(9)). South Dakota lets a protector add an individual or a charity from a class the instrument identifies (55-1B-6(13), (14)). The more a statute lets the protector change who benefits, the more the tax sections below matter.
For a rental held in an LLC, one more line matters: Tennessee lists the power “to vote proxies and exercise all other rights of ownership relative to securities and business entities held by the trust” (35-15-1201(a)(19)). Delaware’s definition of an investment decision includes “all management, control and voting powers” over nonpublicly traded investments (3313(d)). Who votes the LLC interest is a protector or adviser question, not only a trustee one.
Protector versus trustee: what changes for the trustee who follows a direction
The practical difference is the trustee’s exposure when it acts on the protector’s say-so.
| Question | Statute | What it says |
|---|---|---|
| Does a trustee who follows a direction bear the loss? | Delaware 3313(b) | If the fiduciary acts in accordance with the direction, “except in cases of wilful misconduct on the part of the fiduciary so directed, the fiduciary shall not be liable for any loss resulting directly or indirectly from any such act.” |
| Same, under the Uniform Directed Trust Act | W. Va. Code 44D-8A-809 | A directed trustee “shall take reasonable action to comply” and is not liable, but must not comply to the extent it is directed knowingly to violate law. |
| Does the trustee have to watch the protector? | Delaware 3313(e); New Hampshire 12-1204 | Delaware: no duty to monitor, advise or warn unless the instrument says otherwise. New Hampshire: the same, but an excluded fiduciary that actually knows of a serious breach must take reasonable steps to redress it (12-1204(c)). |
| Does the protector answer to the state’s courts? | Delaware 3313(g); Nevada 163.5555; New Hampshire 12-1203(a); South Dakota 55-1B-7 | Accepting the appointment submits the protector to the state’s courts. Delaware: personal jurisdiction “regarding any matter related to the trust.” |
| Can the protector be given a trustee’s protections? | South Dakota 55-1B-1.1 | Yes. Unless the instrument says otherwise, a protector “has no greater liability to any person than would a trustee holding or benefiting from the rights, powers, privileges, benefits, immunities, or authority.” |
| Can creditors reach the protector’s power? | Nevada 163.417(1)(b) | A creditor may not exercise, and a court may not order the exercise of, any power listed in NRS 163.5553 held by a protector. |
The Uniform Trust Code and the Uniform Directed Trust Act
The Uniform Trust Code, section 808, is the model many state trust codes copy. It has four rules for a person who holds a power to direct: the trustee follows an exercise of the power “unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the beneficiaries” (808(b)); the terms may confer a power “to direct the modification or termination of the trust” (808(c)); and a holder other than a beneficiary “is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries,” and “is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty” (808(d)). Tennessee (whose chapter is titled the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code), New Hampshire and Wyoming place their protector sections inside trust codes numbered on the Uniform Trust Code pattern. We did not compile the count of states that enacted section 808 as written.
The Uniform Directed Trust Act is a separate act with its own vocabulary. West Virginia’s enactment (Chapter 44D, Article 8A) gives a trust director “the same fiduciary duty and liability in the exercise or nonexercise of the power” as a sole trustee if the power is held individually, and as a cotrustee if it is held jointly (44D-8A-808(a)(1)), and lets the terms vary that “to the same extent the terms of the trust could vary the duty or liability of a trustee in a like position” (808(a)(2)). It also excludes a power held “in a nonfiduciary capacity” where it “must be held in a nonfiduciary capacity to achieve the grantor’s tax objectives” (805(b)(5)). That exclusion is the bridge to the next section.
How a protector’s powers interact with grantor trust status
Our guide to the grantor trust rules, sections 671 to 679 covers who pays and how to report. The narrower question here is which protector powers feed those rules. Section 672 supplies the vocabulary: an adverse party is a person “having a substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses respecting the trust” (672(a)), and “the term ‘nonadverse party’ means any person who is not an adverse party” (672(b)). A protector with no beneficial interest is ordinarily nonadverse.
| Provision | What the text says | What it can mean for a protector (our reading) |
|---|---|---|
| 26 U.S.C. 674(a) | The grantor is treated as owner of any portion of a trust whose beneficial enjoyment is “subject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval or consent of any adverse party.” | A protector power to increase or decrease interests, add beneficiaries or terminate in favor of someone is a candidate trigger, because the protector is a nonadverse party. |
| 26 U.S.C. 674(c) | Subsection (a) does not apply to a power “solely exercisable” by “a trustee or trustees, none of whom is the grantor, and no more than half of whom are related or subordinate parties,” to distribute or accumulate income or pay out corpus. The exception is lost “if any person has a power to add to the beneficiary or beneficiaries.” | The exception is written for trustees. Its text does not mention a protector or other non-trustee, and any person’s power to add beneficiaries takes a power outside it. Whether a given protector power falls in another exception is a question for counsel. |
| 26 U.S.C. 675(4) | A power of administration “exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity by any person without the approval or consent of any person in a fiduciary capacity.” | The person need not be the grantor. A protector holding such a power in a nonfiduciary capacity is within the words of the paragraph. |
| 26 U.S.C. 675(4)(C) | A power of administration includes “a power to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of an equivalent value.” | This is the usual way a document makes a trust a grantor trust on purpose. It is why Delaware lets an adviser or protector be nonfiduciary and why the Uniform Directed Trust Act excludes powers that must be nonfiduciary for the grantor’s tax objectives. |
| Rev. Rul. 2008-22 (IRB 2008-16) | A grantor’s retained nonfiduciary power to substitute property of equivalent value “will not, by itself, cause the value of the trust corpus to be includible in the grantor’s gross estate under § 2036 or 2038,” if the trustee has a fiduciary obligation to ensure equivalent value and the power cannot shift benefits among beneficiaries. | The ruling is about estate tax and about a power held by the grantor. It is the reason a nonfiduciary substitution power and a fiduciary trustee are paired in many drafts. |
The tension is visible in the state tables. A state that makes the protector a fiduciary by default (Nevada, Tennessee, Wyoming, New Hampshire) puts the protector on the wrong side of a power that 675(4) wants held in a nonfiduciary capacity, so the drafter has to carve that one power out. A state like South Dakota, where the default is nonfiduciary, needs no carve-out for it. Which result the family wants is a tax decision, and it is why the protector clause and the tax plan are written together. For a sale of real estate to a grantor trust, see our guide to the intentionally defective grantor trust sale.
If the grantor becomes the protector: estate inclusion
The usual mistake is to name the settlor as protector for “control.” Three provisions say why that can be expensive.
| Provision | What the text says | Why it matters for a settlor-protector |
|---|---|---|
| Treas. Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1) | “A power in a donee to remove or discharge a trustee and appoint himself may be a power of appointment.” But the donee “is not considered to have a power of appointment if he only had the power to appoint a successor, including himself, under limited conditions which did not exist at the time of his death, without an accompanying unrestricted power of removal.” | An unrestricted removal power paired with the right to appoint oneself is the fact pattern the regulation names. A removal power limited to reasons in the instrument, with successors who are not related or subordinate, is a different pattern. |
| Same paragraph | “A power to amend only the administrative provisions of a trust instrument, which cannot substantially affect the beneficial enjoyment of the trust property or income, is not a power of appointment.” | An administrative-only amendment power is treated differently from one that can shift enjoyment. |
| 26 U.S.C. 2036(a)(2) | The gross estate includes property transferred in trust where the decedent retained “the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.” | A protector power to add or shift beneficiaries, held by the settlor, is a right to designate. |
| 26 U.S.C. 2038(a)(1) | Inclusion where enjoyment was subject to change through a power “(in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person” to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. | “Whatever capacity” closes the argument that a protector title is different from a trustee title. |
| Rev. Rul. 2004-64 (IRB 2004-27) | Trustee discretion to reimburse the grantor’s income tax does not by itself cause inclusion, but discretion “combined with other facts (including . . . a power retained by A to remove the trustee and name A as successor trustee . . .) may cause inclusion.” | The ruling names the removal-and-successor power as an aggravating fact. Mandatory reimbursement causes inclusion of the full value under 2036(a)(1). |
Inclusion is not automatically a tax cost for a family of this size. For 2026 the basic exclusion amount is $15,000,000 (26 U.S.C. 2010(c)(3), as amended by Public Law 119-21 section 70106; Rev. Proc. 2025-32), and property included in the gross estate takes a basis equal to its fair market value at death (26 U.S.C. 1014(a)(1), (b)(9)). Our guide to the 2026 estate tax exemption sets out the rest, and the dynasty trust page covers a trust built to stay out of the estate. A trust meant to be outside the settlor’s reach for other reasons, such as Medicaid planning, runs on a different test; see our page on the Medicaid asset protection trust and rental property.
Worked example: a $1,500,000 irrevocable trust holding a rental LLC (our arithmetic)
Assumptions, all ours: the trust holds one LLC interest worth $1,500,000; the LLC passes through $90,000 of taxable income a year; the settlor’s basis in the interest is $600,000; the trust keeps the income; and where the owner pays the tax we assume the next $90,000 falls in the 24% bracket. The 2026 trust rate is $3,851 plus 37% of the excess over $16,000 (Rev. Proc. 2025-32, section 4, Table 5).
| Case | Protector design | Income tax on the $90,000 (2026) | Estate and basis effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Independent protector, narrow powers | Removes and replaces the trustee for reasons in the instrument, amends administrative terms only. No power to shift beneficial interests, no substitution power. We assume no other grantor trust trigger. | Non-grantor trust pays $3,851 + 37% × ($90,000 − $16,000) = $31,231 if it keeps the income. | The settlor holds no power, so the protector does not by itself bring the trust into the estate. Without inclusion, 1014(b)(9) does not apply and there is no new basis at the settlor’s death. |
| B. Independent protector who also holds a nonfiduciary substitution power | Adds the 675(4)(C) power, exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity. | If the trust is a grantor trust, the owner pays about $90,000 × 24% = $21,600, or $9,631 less than in Case A ($31,231 − $21,600). The trust keeps the full $90,000. | Rev. Rul. 2008-22 is about a grantor holding the power; the estate analysis of a protector holding it is not covered here. |
| C. Settlor names himself protector with unrestricted removal and self-appointment | Power to remove the trustee at any time and appoint himself. | Not computed here. The same power can also support grantor trust status. | Risk of a power of appointment under Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1) and inclusion under 2036(a)(2) or 2038(a)(1). Inclusion would be $1,500,000, or 10% of the $15,000,000 basic exclusion ($1,500,000 ÷ $15,000,000). If included, a date-of-death basis of $1,500,000 removes $900,000 of gain ($1,500,000 − $600,000). |
The figures are annual and illustrative. They ignore depreciation, state tax, net investment income tax, distributions to beneficiaries (which move taxable income to them) and growth. The point is the sign of the effect, not the size: the same $1,500,000 can sit on three different tax maps depending on one clause.
Protector or decanting?
A protector with an amendment power changes a trust under the trust’s own terms. Decanting moves the assets into a new trust under a statute, and the two can reach similar results with different tax and notice consequences. We cover the decanting statutes state by state in a separate page: trust decanting statutes by state, the Uniform Trust Decanting Act and tax.
What we did not verify
We read the seven statutes above in full for the sections cited. We did not compile which states enacted Uniform Trust Code section 808 or the Uniform Directed Trust Act, because the Uniform Law Commission’s enactment map could not be saved as text, and secondary counts we found disagreed. We did not read other states’ protector statutes, Wyoming’s directed trust section (4-10-718), or Delaware’s separate rules on advisers beyond 3313 and 3313A. Wyoming is read from a published copy of the Wyoming Statutes and from the 2023 Enrolled Act 53, Tennessee from the 2023 edition on a legal-publisher site, and Nevada from an Internet Archive capture of the legislature’s page; check the current official text before relying on any of them.
Decision points before naming a protector
- Who can the family trust with the power, and who must it not be? The person holding a power to shift interests, terminate or remove the trustee is, in tax terms, usually a nonadverse party.
- Is the protector meant to be a fiduciary? In Nevada, Tennessee, Wyoming and New Hampshire the statute says so by default, and in South Dakota it does not. The clause should say what standard applies, in plain words.
- Which of the seven powers does the family need? Situs change, termination and distribution veto are not in every list. A power that is not listed can still be granted where the list is a menu, but the document must grant it.
- Is a grantor trust wanted? If so, the 675(4)(C) substitution power and the trustee’s duty to check equivalent value should be decided on purpose and not left to boilerplate.
- Can the settlor ever become the protector, or a successor protector? If the answer is yes through a successor clause, read Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1) again.
- What does the LLC need? Say who votes the LLC interest and who may sell the rental.
What a reader can do with this
- Find your trust’s governing law and its protector clause. The statute that applies is the one the document names, and a clause that says “trust protector” without defining powers leaves the state list to fill the gap.
- Check the fiduciary line. Does the document say the protector is a fiduciary, is not, or say nothing? Compare it with Table 1.
- Check who the protector can be. If the settlor, or someone related or subordinate to the settlor, can be named protector or successor protector, ask counsel about Reg. 20.2041-1(b)(1), 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1).
- Check the tax intent against the powers. If the trust is meant to be a grantor trust, look for the 675(4)(C) substitution power. If it is meant to be a separate taxpayer, look for any protector power to add beneficiaries or shift interests, which can pull it back toward 674(a).
- Read the trustee’s side. Ask what the trustee is paid, and whether it has agreed to follow the protector’s direction, which Delaware 3313(b) and West Virginia 44D-8A-809 make low risk for the trustee.
- Bring the rental’s numbers. Basis, value and annual income are what turn the rules above into dollars, as in the example.
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Sources, read and saved on November 8, 2026: Delaware Code title 12 chapter 33 (delcode.delaware.gov); South Dakota Codified Laws chapter 55-1B (sdlegislature.gov); Nevada Revised Statutes chapter 163, Internet Archive capture of leg.state.nv.us; Alaska Statutes 13.36.370 (akleg.gov); Tennessee Code 35-15-1201 and 35-15-1202, 2023 edition (Justia, Internet Archive capture); Wyoming Statutes 4-10-710 to 4-10-712 (Unicourt published code) and 2023 Enrolled Act 53, House Bill 0101 (wyoleg.gov); New Hampshire RSA 564-B:12-1201 to 12-1205 (gencourt.state.nh.us, Internet Archive captures); Uniform Trust Code with comments (Uniform Law Commission); West Virginia Code chapter 44D article 8A (code.wvlegislature.gov); 26 U.S.C. 672, 674, 675, 1014, 2010, 2036 and 2038 and 26 CFR 20.2041-1 (law.cornell.edu); Revenue Ruling 2004-64 (Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-27) and Revenue Ruling 2008-22 (Internal Revenue Bulletin 2008-16), irs.gov; Revenue Procedure 2025-32, irs.gov. Worked examples are our arithmetic. State rules change and each document controls its own trust; this is a reading of statutes, not a reading of any particular trust.
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