RealtyMogul Underwrote 1.6x and Sold at 0.4x: The Ridgeline View Numbers, From Its Own Filing

For the platform-level picture, see our RealtyMogul review.

The one sentence

Sponsors do not usually publish their own scorecard. This one did, in a routine offering-circular supplement filed on a Friday in late August:

The initial underwriting projected a property-level equity multiple of 1.6x throughout a 3-year hold period. Based on the sale price, we expect the Ridgeline View Property will achieve approximately a 0.4x equity multiple over the 3.3-year hold period.

Read it twice. The sponsor told investors it expected to turn each dollar into $1.60, and is telling them now that it expects to hand back about 40 cents. Both figures come from the same company, about the same asset, in the same paragraph.

Almost every argument on this website about non-traded real estate comes down to one question: how far is the projection from the outcome? Sponsors publish the projection constantly and the outcome almost never. Here, unusually, we have both — and the gap is 1.2x of equity multiple, or 75% of what was promised.

What was bought, and what it sold for

Two things are worth separating carefully here, because they are easy to blur.

The price move was ordinary. A 19.63% decline on a 2023-vintage Class A multifamily asset in the Portland–Vancouver metro is unremarkable for the vintage. Plenty of institutional apartment deals bought at 2021–2023 pricing are worth less today. Nobody needs a scandal to explain it.

The equity outcome was not ordinary, and leverage is why. The joint venture carried an $11,765,000 five-year loan from an unaffiliated lender against a property bought for $17,800,000 — roughly 66% of cost. When the asset falls 19.63%, the loan does not fall with it. The whole decline lands on the equity, and the equity was the thin slice.

That is the entire mechanism, and it is the single most under-explained feature of syndicated real estate sold to retail investors: a fifth off the property is three-fifths off you. The projection of 1.6x and the outcome of 0.4x are not two different assessments of the building. They are the same building, seen from above and from beneath a loan.

Applied to the REIT's own stated $4,000,000 of joint-venture equity, a 0.4x property-level multiple implies something in the region of $1,600,000 returned against $4,000,000 invested — a shortfall of roughly $2,400,000 versus capital, and roughly $4,800,000 versus what 1.6x would have produced. We flag the arithmetic as an implication rather than a disclosed figure: the filing gives the property-level multiple and the REIT's investment amount, but does not separately state the dollars this REIT will receive.

The $462,500 nobody was going to mention

Buried in the same supplement is a detail that would not normally surface at all.

On April 24, 2026, the REIT issued a promissory note to the joint venture for $462,500. The proceeds were used to pay, among other things, a deposit the lender required in connection with the $11,765,000 loan. And the filing states plainly that repayment of that member loan received priority over distributions on the equity investment.

In plain terms: sixteen months before the sale, the deal needed cash to keep its lender satisfied, and the REIT put in more money — structured so that the new money got out before the old money. At closing the note was repaid in full with accrued interest.

This is normal capital-structure practice and it is not, on its face, improper. It is worth naming for a different reason: it is a dated, disclosed signal of stress that arrived four months before the disposal. An investor reading supplements as they were filed had that signal in April. An investor reading a quarterly summary did not.

That is the general lesson we keep re-learning about Regulation A vehicles, and it is the reason this site reads supplements rather than dashboards: the sponsor's website tells you the story, and the filing tells you the sequence — and the sequence is where the stress shows up first.

Why the REIT says it sold

The stated reason is not distress, and we should quote it accurately rather than paraphrase it into one:

After evaluating the potential local and state legislative changes impacting multifamily operations, risk profile, and outlook relative to other opportunities that may be available to us, we concluded that continuing to hold the Equity Investment was not expected to produce an attractive risk-adjusted return.

The buyer was an unaffiliated third party — not a related entity, which matters, because sales to affiliates at soft prices are one of the recurring ways losses get moved around in this structure rather than realised.

Two honest readings coexist. The generous one: management looked at Washington State's multifamily regulatory direction, decided the forward return did not justify the risk, and took a bad price now rather than a worse one later. That is a defensible decision and the filing makes it in defensible language.

The sceptical one: the position needed a $462,500 lender deposit in April, the loan had roughly a year and a half left to run on a five-year term struck in 2023, and refinancing a 2023-vintage apartment loan into 2026 rates on a building now worth 19.63% less is a hard conversation. Selling ends that conversation.

The filing supports the first reading and does not exclude the second. We are not in a position to choose between them, and we are not going to pretend otherwise.

Where this sits in the rest of the portfolio

This is not the REIT's first bad outcome, and the sequence is what gives the Ridgeline disclosure its weight:

The NAV is $6.85 per share (as of March 31, 2026) against a $10.00 issue price, and both the repurchase programme and the dividend-reinvestment plan are suspended — so a holder can neither sell back to the REIT nor compound out of the problem. The full forensic history is in our RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT review, and the NAV series across the two MogulREIT vehicles is in the MogulREIT NAV record.

The two portfolio-level numbers in the supplement are worth writing down, with a caution attached. Approximately $247 million of property value is owned by or underlies the REIT's investments today, against approximately $500 million since inception. It is tempting to read that as "half the value is gone." It is not that: the inception figure is cumulative and includes assets that were sold, including sales at a profit. What it does establish is the scale — this is a vehicle that has touched half a billion dollars of property and now sits behind a quarter of a billion.

What a reader should take from this

One realised deal is not a verdict on a sponsor. Ridgeline View is one asset, sold in a bad year for its vintage, and a single 0.4x does not prove systematic mis-underwriting. Anyone telling you it does is selling you something too.

But a disclosed 1.6x-versus-0.4x is a rare and usable calibration point, and it belongs in the file with the rest of the record. The useful question is not "was this deal bad" — it plainly was — but "how often does this sponsor publish the outcome next to the projection at all?" Almost never. That it did so here is the reason this filing is worth reading, and the reason we track the gap between RealtyMogul's underwriting and its outcomes as a running series rather than a one-off.

The short version

A sponsor published its own projection and its own outcome in the same paragraph, and they were 1.6x and 0.4x.

The property fell 19.63%. The equity fell far more, because a $11,765,000 loan sat underneath it. Neither of those facts is scandalous on its own. What makes the filing worth reading is that it is one of the few places in retail real estate where the promise and the result are printed next to each other — and the distance between them is the whole subject of this website.