RealtyMogul Sold Four Portland-Area Properties on the Same Day and Published the Scorecard for All Four: Underwritten at 2.1x, Coming Back at About 0.43x

What this means for the platform as a whole is in our RealtyMogul review.

The four deals, side by side

Three days ago we wrote about a single RealtyMogul disposal, Ridgeline View Townhomes, and called the filing unusual because a sponsor had printed its own underwriting next to its own outcome. It turns out that was not a one-off. The same sponsor did it three more times, in a different vehicle, for properties sold on the same day.

Here is the complete picture, every figure taken from the two filings:

RealtyMogul dispositions of August 20, 2026

The per-unit numbers in the filings tell the same story from a different angle. Edison was bought at $304,688 a unit and sold at $212,500. Roosevelt at $348,611, sold at $279,722. Minnehaha at $335,714, sold at $290,306. Ridgeline at $356,000, sold at $286,100.

Every one of these was described as Class A or Class A- at acquisition. This was not a distressed-value strategy that went wrong. It was the safest-sounding end of the multifamily spectrum.

Why a 21% price fall becomes a 57% equity loss

This is the part worth internalising, because it generalises to essentially every syndicated real estate deal sold to retail investors, on every platform.

When a sponsor buys a $19.5 million apartment building, it does not put up $19.5 million. It puts up equity — say $6 million — and borrows the rest. The debt sits senior to the equity: it gets repaid first, in full, and it does not shrink when the building loses value.

So run the arithmetic on a simplified version of Edison. Suppose $19.5 million of property, $13.5 million of debt and $6 million of equity, and then the property sells for $13.6 million:

• The lender is owed $13.5 million and is paid $13.5 million.
• What is left for the equity is $100,000.
• The property fell 30%. The equity fell 98%.

Those are illustrative round numbers rather than Edison's actual capital structure, which the 1-U does not disclose. But the direction and the magnitude are exactly why the filing can report a 30.26% price decline and a 0.3x equity multiple in the same paragraph without contradicting itself. Leverage does not amplify losses gently; it concentrates the entire decline into the thinnest layer of the stack, which is the layer retail investors own.

Aggregate it across all four deals and the two REITs put in $16,064,130 of equity. At the multiples the filings state, roughly $6,852,976 comes back. That is $9.2 million of investor equity gone, or 57.3%, against a property-level decline of 21.27%.

Put the underwriting next to it and the gap is starker still. At the underwritten multiples the same $16.06 million should have returned about $34.4 million. The realised figure is 19.9% of plan.

What the four deals were supposed to return, and what they will

Two honest caveats on that table, because it is our arithmetic and not the REIT's. First, the equity multiples the filings give are property-level, and the REITs hold joint-venture LP interests, so the actual cash reaching a REIT can differ from a straight multiplication if the joint venture's waterfall allocates proceeds unevenly between partners. Second, the filings say "approximately" for every expected multiple. We have not seen the REITs publish a dollar figure for any of these, and we are not going to present ours as theirs.

What is not our arithmetic, and is not approximate, is the pair of numbers in each filing: 2.4x and 0.3x. 1.9x and 0.6x. 2.6x and 0.5x. 1.6x and 0.4x.

The holds ended years early, and that is a data point too

Look at the hold periods. The underwriting assumed 10 years for Edison, 7 for Roosevelt, 10 for Minnehaha and 3 for Ridgeline. The realised holds were 4.4, 4.9, 4.9 and 3.3 years.

Three of the four were sold at roughly half of their intended hold or less. That matters for interpreting the multiples fairly in both directions.

It makes the outcome look worse than a like-for-like comparison would. A 2.4x over ten years is an annualised return of about 9.2%; the deal never got the last five and a half years in which most of that compounding was supposed to happen. Selling in year four against a ten-year plan is not the same event as a ten-year plan finishing at 0.3x.

And it is also, itself, the finding. A sponsor does not exit a ten-year business plan in year four because the plan is working. The filing says as much: continuing to hold "was not expected to produce an attractive risk-adjusted return." The early exit is the sponsor's own judgment that waiting would not have fixed it, and the price achieved is the market's.

Two different reasons, one metro area

The two REITs give different explanations, and both are worth quoting exactly.

RealtyMogul Income REIT, on Edison, Roosevelt and Minnehaha:

the Company "concluded that continuing to hold [the three] Equity Investment[s] was not expected to produce an attractive risk-adjusted return", enabling it "to exit this portfolio of assets where the Company believes the market headwinds and future asset level performance creates uncertainty and risk regarding future property valuations".

RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT, on Ridgeline View, said it had evaluated "potential local and state legislative changes impacting multifamily operations, risk profile, and outlook relative to other opportunities."

The first is generic. The second is specific and points at rent regulation and landlord-tenant law in Oregon and Washington. We are not going to adjudicate which framing is more complete, and neither filing names a statute. What we will point out is the geography, because that is the part an investor can act on: Gresham, Oregon and Vancouver, Washington are both in the Portland metropolitan statistical area, and all four properties left the balance sheet on the same day, to unaffiliated buyers.

That is not four independent decisions that happened to coincide. That is a sponsor exiting a metro.

The context the sales sit in

Three further facts come from RealtyMogul Income REIT's own filings this year, and they change how the disposals read.

The NAV is $6.79, and it is still falling. A Form 1-U filed July 17, 2026 states that a distribution "equates to approximately 1.5% of the Company's net asset value on an annualized basis, assuming a $7.49 per share NAV (the then-current purchase price for the Distribution Period from April 1, 2026 to May 31, 2026)". But $7.49 is the December 31, 2025 mark. A separate Form 1-U filed June 1, 2026 discloses that the board determined NAV per share to be $6.85 as of March 31, 2026, and a later Form 1-U (accession 0001493152-26-043163) reports that the board approved $6.79 as of June 30, 2026 on September 17, 2026. Against a $10.00 original offering price that is a 32.1% decline, and against the $11.02 NAV as of June 30, 2022 (in effect from August 5, 2022) it is 38.4%, before considering distributions received (our arithmetic). Worth noting so nobody reads it as our typo: the sister vehicle, RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT, was marked at exactly the same $6.85 on March 31, 2026 in its own Form 253G2; its June 30, 2026 mark is $6.36 (253G2, accession 0001493152-26-043162). We checked each filing against its own CIK.

The distribution went from monthly to quarterly. A Form 1-U filed August 6, 2026 records that the REIT "has paid 113 consecutive distributions on a monthly basis through December 2025, and on a quarterly basis thereafter". A change in payment frequency is not a cut by itself, but it is the sort of housekeeping that usually accompanies one, and the current rate is disclosed as approximately 1.5% of NAV annualised — on a NAV that is itself down a quarter.

Nearly half of all distributions ever paid were not cash. The same filing states cumulative distributions "totaling over $47,000,000, of which approximately $23,600,000 was paid in cash and $23,400,000 was reinvested in shares" through the distribution reinvestment plan. That is not a criticism — a DRIP is a feature investors opt into — but anyone computing what they have actually received should know that roughly 49.8% of the headline distribution figure was reinvested into more shares of the same vehicle, at prices that have since been marked down to $6.79.

The thing RealtyMogul deserves credit for

We are hard on sponsors on this site, so it is worth being precise about what is unusual here, and it is not the losses. Multifamily bought in 2021 and 2022 at peak pricing, levered, in a market that then saw rates rise and rent growth stall, has produced results like these across the entire industry. Nothing about the outcome distinguishes RealtyMogul from a hundred other sponsors.

What distinguishes it is that they printed the first number again.

Almost every sponsor publishes an underwritten equity multiple when they raise the money and never mentions it again. Reporting shifts to occupancy, to NOI growth, to "asset-level business plan execution", and the original 2.4x quietly disappears from the vocabulary. You end up with investors who cannot answer the only question that matters — did this do what you said it would — because the sponsor stopped supplying the numerator.

RealtyMogul supplied it. Four times, in two filings, for four deals that all went badly, in language a retail investor can read without a spreadsheet: the initial underwriting projected a property-level equity multiple of 2.4x; based on the sale price we believe it will achieve approximately 0.3x.

That is a disclosure standard we would like every platform on this site to be held to, and it costs a sponsor nothing except the discomfort of the comparison. If more of them did it, articles like this one would be unnecessary, because the scorecard would be in the quarterly report where it belongs.

What to take from this if you are evaluating any platform

Ask for the underwritten multiple in writing, before you invest. Not the target IRR range in the marketing deck — the specific multiple for the specific deal, and the hold period it assumes. If a sponsor will not commit that to a document, they have told you something.

Then ask where the realised multiples are published. A sponsor with a track record page showing only completed deals that worked is not showing you a track record. RealtyMogul's disclosure here is buried in Regulation A supplements, which is not exactly prominent, but it is at least public and permanent.

Compute the equity, not the property. Every time you see a projected property appreciation figure, ask what the loan-to-cost is, and remember that the equity absorbs the entire move. A 20% decline in a property with 65% debt is roughly a 57% decline in the equity. That single sum would have reframed most of what was sold to retail investors between 2020 and 2022.

Watch the hold period, not just the multiple. A 2.4x over ten years and a 2.4x over three are wildly different investments, and a plan abandoned at year four is a different thing again.

Sources

All figures come from SEC EDGAR primary filings, retrieved August 30, 2026:

• Form 1-U, RealtyMogul Income REIT, Inc., filed August 27, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-040457 — the Edison, Roosevelt and Minnehaha disposals, equity invested, purchase and sale prices, per-unit prices, underwritten and expected equity multiples, hold periods, and the $441 million / $900 million portfolio figures.
• Form 1-U, RealtyMogul Income REIT, Inc., filed August 6, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-036395 — 113 consecutive distributions, over $47,000,000 total, approximately $23,600,000 cash and $23,400,000 reinvested; the change from monthly to quarterly after December 2025.
• Form 1-U, RealtyMogul Income REIT, Inc., accession 0001493152-26-043163 — the $6.79 NAV per share as of June 30, 2026, approved by the board on September 17, 2026.
• Form 1-U, RealtyMogul Income REIT, Inc., filed June 1, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-026620 — the $6.85 NAV per share as of March 31, 2026, approved by the board on June 1, 2026.
• Form 253G2, RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT, Inc., accession 0001493152-26-043162 — the $6.36 NAV as of June 30, 2026 for the sister vehicle.
• Form 253G2, RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT, Inc., filed June 1, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-026618 — the same $6.85 NAV as of March 31, 2026 for the sister vehicle.
• Form 1-U, RealtyMogul Income REIT, Inc., filed July 17, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-033775 — the $7.49 per share NAV, the approximately 1.5% of NAV annualised distribution rate, and the April 27, 2026 conversion from LLC to Maryland corporation.
• Form 253G2, RealtyMogul Apartment Growth REIT, Inc., filed August 28, 2026, accession 0001493152-26-040459 — Ridgeline View Townhomes, covered in full in our separate article on that disposal.

Blended multiples, aggregate purchase and sale totals, the per-deal shortfall table and the 57.3% equity-loss figure are our arithmetic on the REITs' stated numbers, and are labelled as such wherever they appear.