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Nvidia IPO Prospectus 1999: $12 a Share, 94% From Two Customers

ResearchBy Jorge21 min read12 SEC filings cited

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Quick answer

NVIDIA went public on January 22, 1999 at $12.00 a share, and the final prospectus, dated January 21, 1999, describes a company that was growing fast and still losing money: losses in every year from 1993 through the first three quarters of 1997, two board makers buying 94% of its 1997 revenue, and a rival agreeing to buy its largest customer. The prospectus (Form 424B4) offered 3,500,000 shares for $42,000,000, with estimated net proceeds of $37.3 million. In the nine months to October 25, 1998 it reported $92.7 million of revenue and a $3.5 million net loss, an accumulated deficit of about $17.1 million and 184 employees. Six stock splits later (2 x 2 x 2 x 1.5 x 4 x 10), one IPO share is 480 shares and the $12.00 price is $0.025 (our arithmetic). At $202.40, the average price NVIDIA paid for its own shares from June 22 to July 26, 2026 (10-Q filed August 26, 2026), those 480 shares come to $97,152, 8,096 times the IPO price (our arithmetic, dividends left out).

Key takeaways

  • The offer (424B4, accession 0001012870-99-000192, dated January 21, 1999): 3,500,000 shares, all sold by the company, at $12.00; $42,000,000 to the public, $2,940,000 of underwriting discounts, estimated net proceeds of $37.3 million, of which about $5.0 million could repay a credit facility. The first annual report said net proceeds were $37.5 million, plus $5.9 million from 525,000 more shares sold on February 2, 1999.
  • Money before the IPO: revenue of $1.2 million (1995), $3.9 million (1996) and $29.1 million (1997), then $92.7 million in the nine months to October 25, 1998; net losses of $6.4 million, $3.1 million and $3.6 million in 1995 to 1997 and $3.5 million in the nine months to October 25, 1998. The company reported profits only in the quarters ended December 31, 1997 and October 25, 1998.
  • Customers: STB and Diamond were 63% and 31% of 1997 revenue (94% together); in the nine months to October 25, 1998, STB, Diamond and Creative were 40%, 28% and 12% (80%). The prospectus says 3Dfx, a competitor that had sued NVIDIA on September 21, 1998, had agreed to acquire STB.
  • Three patent suits were pending when the shares were priced: SGI (notified April 9, 1998), S3 (May 11, 1998) and 3Dfx (September 21, 1998). The company said it would “defend itself vigorously.”
  • Control and liquidity: officers and directors held 69.1% before the offering and 56.9% after; Jen-Hsun Huang's 3,100,000 shares were 13.1% before and 10.8% after. Of 28,595,976 shares outstanding, 25,095,976 were restricted, and 17,991,627 became eligible for sale when the 180-day lock-up expired. The May 2026 proxy statement puts Huang at 870,604,104 shares, 3.58%.
  • What one share became: splits of 2-for-1 (June 2000), 2-for-1 (September 2001), 2-for-1 (April 2006), 3-for-2 (September 2007), 4-for-1 (July 2021) and 10-for-1 (June 2024), each recorded in an NVIDIA 10-K, multiply to 480. The 24.3 billion shares on the 10-K cover at February 20, 2026 compare with 28,595,976 after the IPO.

CSV · 143 rows

Nvidia's 1999 IPO prospectus: offering terms, income statement, customers, ownership, lock-up, lawsuits, risk factors, and every stock split to 2024

143 rows from NVIDIA's final prospectus (424B4) and first S-1, its first 10-K405, six later 10-Ks, one 10-Q and the 2026 proxy statement. Accession or document on every row.

The story, dated from the filings

NVIDIA's IPO took ten and a half months from first filing to pricing. It filed a Form S-1 on March 6, 1998, with the price and share count blank and a proposed Nasdaq symbol of “NVID,” then filed seven amendments to the same registration before the final prospectus of January 21, 1999, ten months and fifteen days later (our arithmetic). On May 7, 1998 its lawyers asked the SEC to withdraw two Form 8-A registrations because the S-1 would not become effective before May 23, 1998. The filings do not say why the offering waited; they do show what changed in the meantime: three patent suits, a rival agreeing to buy its largest customer and a quarter of yield problems.

DateWhat the filing showsSource
Mar 6, 1998First Form S-1; price and shares blank, proposed symbol “NVID”; 92 employees at December 31, 1997; accumulated deficit about $14.0 millionS-1, accession 0001012870-98-000618
Apr 9, 1998SGI notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware424B4, Legal Proceedings
Apr 24, 1998 to Jul 27, 1998Three S-1/A amendments (April 24, June 8 and July 27, 1998)EDGAR filing list
May 7, 1998Request to withdraw the Form 8-A registrations; S-1 not expected to be effective before May 23, 1998RW, accession 0001012870-98-001201
May 11, 1998S3 notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the Northern District of California (three patents)424B4, Legal Proceedings
Sep 21, 19983Dfx notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the Northern District of California424B4, Legal Proceedings
Nov 20 and Dec 23, 1998Fourth and fifth S-1/A amendmentsEDGAR filing list
Jan 13 and Jan 20, 1999Sixth and seventh S-1/A amendmentsEDGAR filing list
Jan 15, 1999Convertible subordinated notes convert into 1,571,429 shares424B4, summary footnote
Jan 21, 1999Date of the final prospectus: 3,500,000 shares at $12.00424B4, accession 0001012870-99-000192
Jan 22, 1999Final prospectus filed; public trading begins424B4; 10-K for fiscal 2026
Jan 27, 1999 (expected)Delivery of the shares against payment424B4, cover page
Feb 2, 1999Underwriters buy 525,000 more shares at $12.0010-K405, accession 0000929624-99-000772
Apr 29, 1999First annual report: revenue $158.2 million and net income $4.1 million for the year ended January 31, 199910-K405, accession 0000929624-99-000772

The offering, line by line

The cover page and the “Use of Proceeds” and “Dilution” sections hold the terms. Everything below is from the final prospectus.

ItemFigureWhat it means
Price$12.00 a shareThe price to the public in the prospectus dated January 21, 1999
Shares offered3,500,000, all sold by the companyNo existing holder sold shares in the offering
Total to the public$42,000,000Before the 525,000-share over-allotment option, which would have brought it to $48,300,000
Underwriting discount$0.84 a share, $2,940,000 in total7% of the price (our arithmetic); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Hambrecht & Quist and Prudential Securities led
Expenses$1,800,000 estimatedPaid by the company on top of the discount
Estimated net proceeds$37.3 millionThe first 10-K405 reported $37.5 million
Use of proceedsAbout $5.0 million to repay a credit facility; the rest for general corporate purposes and capital expendituresThe company expected to spend about $10.0 million on capital expenditures in fiscal 2000
Shares outstanding after the offering28,595,976Includes 1,571,429 shares from notes converted on January 15, 1999
Net tangible book value per share$0.73 before, $1.95 afterNew investors faced immediate dilution of $10.05 a share
What earlier holders paid$31,856,000 for 25,065,226 shares, an average of $1.27New investors paid $12.00, about 9.4 times that average (our arithmetic)
DividendsNone ever paidThe prospectus expected none in the foreseeable future

The money before the IPO: revenue, gross profit and losses

The summary financial data show how steeply revenue climbed once the RIVA128 chip began shipping in August 1997, and that profit had not followed.

PeriodRevenueGross profit (loss)Net income (loss)
Apr 5 to Dec 31, 1993 (inception)nonenone$(484) thousand
Year ended Dec 31, 1994nonenone$(1,361) thousand
Year ended Dec 31, 1995$1,182 thousand$(367) thousand$(6,377) thousand
Year ended Dec 31, 1996$3,912 thousand$874 thousand$(3,077) thousand
Year ended Dec 31, 1997$29,071 thousand$7,827 thousand$(3,589) thousand
Nine months to Sep 28, 1997$5,537 thousand$631 thousand$(5,013) thousand
Nine months to Oct 25, 1998$92,700 thousand$25,300 thousand$(3,532) thousand
Year ended Jan 31, 1999 (first 10-K405)$158,237 thousandnot shown here$4,130 thousand

Three details matter. First, the prospectus says plainly: “The Company incurred losses in each year from inception through the first three quarters of 1997.” It reports net income only in the quarters ended December 31, 1997 and October 25, 1998. Second, all of 1995 and 1996 revenue came from the first product, the NV1, which the company stopped selling in the first quarter of 1996 after the PC industry adopted Microsoft's Direct3D and SGI's OpenGL; in the prospectus's words, “the Company experienced a significant reduction in revenue from sales of the NV1.” It also stopped developing the NV2, a chip for a game console, and began the RIVA128. Third, royalties were small: $5.9 million from ST in the nine months to October 25, 1998, about 6% of revenue.

Who paid the bills: customer concentration

NVIDIA sold chips to the companies that build graphics boards, and those boards went into PCs from Compaq, Dell, Gateway, IBM, Micron and Packard Bell NEC. The prospectus names the board makers and their share of revenue.

PeriodLargest customers and share of total revenueTogether
1995Diamond 86%86%
1996Diamond 82%82%
1997STB 63%, Diamond 31%94% (our arithmetic)
Nine months to Oct 25, 1998STB 40%, Diamond 28%, Creative 12%80% (our arithmetic)
Year ended Jan 31, 1999 (first 10-K405)STB 35%, Diamond 27%, Creative 13%, Intel 12%87% (our arithmetic)

The prospectus calls the concentration a risk in its own words: “A majority of the Company's sales have been to a limited number of customers and its sales are highly concentrated.” It adds that customers had “experienced financial difficulties in the past.” The sharpest line is about STB: 3Dfx, which made competing 3D chips, had agreed to acquire STB, and the company expected that “sales to STB will be reduced significantly from prior levels.” That is the customer that bought 40% of its chips in the nine months to October 25, 1998, being bought by a competitor that had filed a patent suit against NVIDIA on September 21, 1998.

What nearly broke the company, in its own words

The risk-factor section is the part of a prospectus that lawyers write to be complete rather than flattering. Read in hindsight it is a list of the ways this company could have ended.

RiskWhat the prospectus saysDates and numbers
One product line“Since the Company has no other product line, the Company's business, financial condition and results of operations would be materially adversely affected” if its graphics processors did not win acceptance in the mainstream PC marketAll revenue from 3D graphics processors for PCs
Manufacturing yieldsThe company “experienced difficulties commencing volume production” of the RIVA128ZX in March 1998 and the RIVA TNT in July 1998; the cause was yield problems that “resulted in lower than expected revenues and higher manufacturing costs”Later resolved, the prospectus says
One chip makerTSMC was the primary manufacturer and, the prospectus says, had no obligation to supply any minimum quantity; wafers were bought on a purchase-order basisTSMC replaced ST as the main wafer source
Patent suitsThree suits (SGI, S3, 3Dfx) seeking unspecified damages, including treble damages, and orders to stop selling the RIVA family; “The Company has and intends to continue to defend itself vigorously with respect to all three lawsuits.”April 9, May 11 and September 21, 1998
PC demand“During the spring of 1998, many PC makers experienced reduced demand for their products, resulting in increased inventories.”Hit the quarter ended July 1998
Growth and controls“The Company's financial and management controls, reporting systems and procedures are very limited and will need to be upgraded significantly.” Employees went from 71 (September 28, 1997) to 184 (October 25, 1998)No officer or employee had an employment agreement
LossesAccumulated deficit of about $17.1 million at October 25, 1998, up from about $14.0 million at December 31, 1997 in the first S-1Net loss in the quarters ended April and July 1998

Who owned the company, and who could sell when

The ownership table is where the founders appear. Jen-Hsun Huang, then 35, was President, Chief Executive Officer and a director; the prospectus says he “co-founded the Company in April 1993.” Two other officers, Chris A. Malachowsky and Curtis R. Priem, also co-founded it. Each of the three held about 13% before the offering.

HolderSharesBefore the offeringAfter the offering
Jen-Hsun Huang3,100,00013.1%10.8%
Chris A. Malachowsky3,062,50013.0%10.7%
Curtis R. Priem3,062,50013.0%10.7%
Entities associated with Sequoia Capital VI3,095,90213.2%10.8%
Entities associated with Sutter Hill Ventures2,786,09011.9%9.8%
All directors and executive officers (12 people)16,286,84569.1%56.9%

Huang's 3,100,000 includes 100,000 options exercisable within 60 days and shares held by trusts and family members, some of which the footnote says he did not have voting power over. His 1997 salary was $149,134 with no option grants, and the prospectus set his salary at $250,000 for the year ending January 31, 1999. The 2026 proxy statement reports his total pay for the year ended January 25, 2026 at $36,343,830. The same proxy counts 870,604,104 shares beneficially owned, 3.58% of the stock; the 8-K of November 12, 2026 reports that his resignation as CEO and director took effect on November 11, 2026.

The lock-up table tells a holder when new supply could reach the market. Of 28,595,976 shares outstanding after the offering, 25,095,976 were restricted. The prospectus lists when they could be sold:

WhenShares eligible for saleCondition
January 21, 1999 (prospectus date)10,000Immediate
About April 21, 1999 (90 days, our arithmetic)4,990,00090 days after the prospectus date
About July 20, 1999 (180 days, our arithmetic)17,991,627When the lock-up agreements, covering all officers and directors, expire; Morgan Stanley's written consent was needed to sell earlier

What one IPO share became

NVIDIA's filings record six splits since the IPO. We took each one from an NVIDIA 10-K that states the ratio and dates, not from memory, and multiplied them.

SplitDateShares from one IPO share after itSplit-adjusted IPO priceWhere NVIDIA records it
At the IPOJanuary 22, 19991$12.00424B4
2-for-1Record date June 12, 20002$6.0010-K405 filed April 27, 2001 (0001012870-01-500492)
2-for-1Record date August 28, 2001; shares distributed September 17, 20014$3.0010-K filed March 29, 2004 (0001045810-04-000007)
2-for-1Effective April 6, 20068$1.5010-K filed March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011)
3-for-2Effective September 10, 200712$1.0010-K filed March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011)
4-for-1Executed July 19, 202148$0.2510-K filed March 18, 2022 (0001045810-22-000036)
10-for-1Distributed after the close on June 7, 2024480$0.02510-K filed February 25, 2026 (0001045810-26-000021)

A cross-check on the cover pages of the 10-Ks: 165,452,881 shares on March 5, 2004, then 554,782,115 on March 14, 2008, then 2.51 billion on March 11, 2022, then 24.3 billion on February 20, 2026. Each jump is roughly what the splits in between predict (for example, 165.5 million x 3 is about 496 million), so there is no sign of a split we missed.

The worked example below uses one number from a recent NVIDIA document: the average price paid per share in the share repurchases it reports in its 10-Q for the quarter ended July 26, 2026 (filed August 26, 2026). It is what NVIDIA paid, with broker commissions, for its own shares from June 22, 2026 to July 26, 2026. It is not a market quote for November 17, 2026, and the stock has moved since July; closing prices for November 2026 are on the 8-K page linked above.

StepArithmeticResult
Shares today from one 1999 share2 x 2 x 2 x 1.5 x 4 x 10480
Split-adjusted IPO price$12.00 / 480$0.025
One IPO share at $202.40480 x $202.40$97,152, which is 8,096 times $12.00
100 IPO shares ($1,200 at $12.00)100 x 480 x $202.40$9,715,200
All 3,500,000 IPO shares, restated and valued the same way3,500,000 x 480 x $202.40about $340.0 billion
Shares outstanding after the IPO, restated28,595,976 x 48013,726,068,480, against 24.1 billion on August 21, 2026

Every row above is our arithmetic. It assumes a holder kept every share, ignores dividends (NVIDIA raised its quarterly dividend from $0.01 to $0.25 a share on May 18, 2026) and taxes, and takes no view on what the shares are worth today. The most recent 10-Q on file when we read EDGAR was the one filed on August 26, 2026; the next one will carry a newer repurchase price.

What the documents show that the headlines don't

  • The company was not yet profitable on a full-year basis. The nine months to October 25, 1998 had $92.7 million of revenue and a $3.5 million loss, and the prospectus says the revenue growth “may not be sustainable.” The first full fiscal year with net income was the one ended January 31, 1999: $4.1 million on $158.2 million of revenue.
  • The business described is PC graphics. The words “data center,” “CUDA,” “GPU” and “artificial” do not appear anywhere in the final prospectus (our search of the saved text). The company says it designs “3D graphics processors and related software” for “the mainstream PC market.” By the fiscal 2026 10-K, revenue was $215.9 billion and net income $120.1 billion, with about 42,000 employees against 184 in the prospectus: revenue of about 1,365 times the $158.2 million of the first 10-K405 (our arithmetic).
  • Two customers decided whether the year worked. In 1997 two board makers were 94% of revenue, and by the nine months to October 25, 1998 three were 80%.
  • A competitor was both suing and buying. 3Dfx sued NVIDIA on September 21, 1998 and had agreed to acquire a customer that was 40% of NVIDIA's revenue in that period.
  • Insiders kept control after the sale. Officers and directors held 56.9% after the offering, and the underwriters' buyers got 12.3% of the shares for 56.9% of the cash paid in (our arithmetic from the dilution table).
  • The first filing waited ten and a half months. The date of the first S-1 is in EDGAR; the reason for the delay is not in any document we read.

What this means for your money

An IPO prospectus is the one moment a company is legally required to write down its weaknesses in plain sentences. The questions NVIDIA's prospectus answers are the same ones to ask of any fund, REIT or private company that sells you shares.

  • Who pays the revenue? Customer percentages sit in the risk factors and the notes. Here two customers were 94% of a year.
  • Who controls the votes after the sale? The ownership table shows it: 56.9% in the hands of officers and directors, and a classified board with staggered terms approved by stockholders before the IPO.
  • When can insiders sell? The lock-up table gives dates and share counts. Here 87.8% of shares were restricted (our arithmetic), and most were free after 180 days.
  • Who gets paid first? The underwriters took $2,940,000 and about $5.0 million of proceeds could repay a lender before any product spending.
  • What did earlier holders pay? An average of $1.27 against $12.00, and the dilution table says so.
  • What can a holder expect? The prospectus says no dividend had ever been paid and none was expected in the foreseeable future, so a holder's way out was the Nasdaq quotation the shares were approved for.

What a reader can do with this

  • Look up any public company's registration on EDGAR and open the final prospectus (Form 424B4 or 424B1), not only the S-1; the final one has the price, the share count and the date. NVIDIA's list for 1998 and 1999 is in the table above.
  • Compare the first S-1 with the final prospectus. Here the accumulated deficit went from about $14.0 million to $17.1 million, employees from 92 to 184, and three lawsuits were added.
  • Check split history in the 10-K, where companies state each ratio and date, before trusting a “what $1,000 would be worth” figure from a website. Any such figure is only as good as the split count behind it.
  • If you hold or follow NVIDIA, the same company keeps filing: 10-Qs, 8-Ks and proxy statements carry the numbers this page uses for 2026.

This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.

FAQ

Sources, read on November 17, 2026: NVIDIA Corporation on SEC EDGAR (CIK 1045810): final prospectus, Form 424B4, filed January 22, 1999 (accession 0001012870-99-000192); Form S-1 filed March 6, 1998 (0001012870-98-000618); request for withdrawal of Form 8-A filed May 7, 1998 (0001012870-98-001201); the EDGAR filing list for 1998 and 1999; Form 10-K405 filed April 29, 1999 (0000929624-99-000772) and April 27, 2001 (0001012870-01-500492); Forms 10-K filed March 29, 2004 (0001045810-04-000007), March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011), March 18, 2022 (0001045810-22-000036) and February 25, 2026 (0001045810-26-000021); Form 10-Q filed August 26, 2026 (0001045810-26-000075); DEF 14A filed May 12, 2026 (0001045810-26-000036); Form 8-K filed November 12, 2026 (0001045810-26-000082). Arithmetic labelled “our arithmetic” is ours.

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