Nvidia IPO Prospectus 1999: $12 a Share, 94% From Two Customers
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Quick answer
NVIDIA went public on January 22, 1999 at $12.00 a share, and the final prospectus, dated January 21, 1999, describes a company that was growing fast and still losing money: losses in every year from 1993 through the first three quarters of 1997, two board makers buying 94% of its 1997 revenue, and a rival agreeing to buy its largest customer. The prospectus (Form 424B4) offered 3,500,000 shares for $42,000,000, with estimated net proceeds of $37.3 million. In the nine months to October 25, 1998 it reported $92.7 million of revenue and a $3.5 million net loss, an accumulated deficit of about $17.1 million and 184 employees. Six stock splits later (2 x 2 x 2 x 1.5 x 4 x 10), one IPO share is 480 shares and the $12.00 price is $0.025 (our arithmetic). At $202.40, the average price NVIDIA paid for its own shares from June 22 to July 26, 2026 (10-Q filed August 26, 2026), those 480 shares come to $97,152, 8,096 times the IPO price (our arithmetic, dividends left out).
Key takeaways
- The offer (424B4, accession 0001012870-99-000192, dated January 21, 1999): 3,500,000 shares, all sold by the company, at $12.00; $42,000,000 to the public, $2,940,000 of underwriting discounts, estimated net proceeds of $37.3 million, of which about $5.0 million could repay a credit facility. The first annual report said net proceeds were $37.5 million, plus $5.9 million from 525,000 more shares sold on February 2, 1999.
- Money before the IPO: revenue of $1.2 million (1995), $3.9 million (1996) and $29.1 million (1997), then $92.7 million in the nine months to October 25, 1998; net losses of $6.4 million, $3.1 million and $3.6 million in 1995 to 1997 and $3.5 million in the nine months to October 25, 1998. The company reported profits only in the quarters ended December 31, 1997 and October 25, 1998.
- Customers: STB and Diamond were 63% and 31% of 1997 revenue (94% together); in the nine months to October 25, 1998, STB, Diamond and Creative were 40%, 28% and 12% (80%). The prospectus says 3Dfx, a competitor that had sued NVIDIA on September 21, 1998, had agreed to acquire STB.
- Three patent suits were pending when the shares were priced: SGI (notified April 9, 1998), S3 (May 11, 1998) and 3Dfx (September 21, 1998). The company said it would “defend itself vigorously.”
- Control and liquidity: officers and directors held 69.1% before the offering and 56.9% after; Jen-Hsun Huang's 3,100,000 shares were 13.1% before and 10.8% after. Of 28,595,976 shares outstanding, 25,095,976 were restricted, and 17,991,627 became eligible for sale when the 180-day lock-up expired. The May 2026 proxy statement puts Huang at 870,604,104 shares, 3.58%.
- What one share became: splits of 2-for-1 (June 2000), 2-for-1 (September 2001), 2-for-1 (April 2006), 3-for-2 (September 2007), 4-for-1 (July 2021) and 10-for-1 (June 2024), each recorded in an NVIDIA 10-K, multiply to 480. The 24.3 billion shares on the 10-K cover at February 20, 2026 compare with 28,595,976 after the IPO.
CSV · 143 rows
Nvidia's 1999 IPO prospectus: offering terms, income statement, customers, ownership, lock-up, lawsuits, risk factors, and every stock split to 2024
143 rows from NVIDIA's final prospectus (424B4) and first S-1, its first 10-K405, six later 10-Ks, one 10-Q and the 2026 proxy statement. Accession or document on every row.
The story, dated from the filings
NVIDIA's IPO took ten and a half months from first filing to pricing. It filed a Form S-1 on March 6, 1998, with the price and share count blank and a proposed Nasdaq symbol of “NVID,” then filed seven amendments to the same registration before the final prospectus of January 21, 1999, ten months and fifteen days later (our arithmetic). On May 7, 1998 its lawyers asked the SEC to withdraw two Form 8-A registrations because the S-1 would not become effective before May 23, 1998. The filings do not say why the offering waited; they do show what changed in the meantime: three patent suits, a rival agreeing to buy its largest customer and a quarter of yield problems.
| Date | What the filing shows | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 6, 1998 | First Form S-1; price and shares blank, proposed symbol “NVID”; 92 employees at December 31, 1997; accumulated deficit about $14.0 million | S-1, accession 0001012870-98-000618 |
| Apr 9, 1998 | SGI notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware | 424B4, Legal Proceedings |
| Apr 24, 1998 to Jul 27, 1998 | Three S-1/A amendments (April 24, June 8 and July 27, 1998) | EDGAR filing list |
| May 7, 1998 | Request to withdraw the Form 8-A registrations; S-1 not expected to be effective before May 23, 1998 | RW, accession 0001012870-98-001201 |
| May 11, 1998 | S3 notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the Northern District of California (three patents) | 424B4, Legal Proceedings |
| Sep 21, 1998 | 3Dfx notifies NVIDIA of a patent suit in the Northern District of California | 424B4, Legal Proceedings |
| Nov 20 and Dec 23, 1998 | Fourth and fifth S-1/A amendments | EDGAR filing list |
| Jan 13 and Jan 20, 1999 | Sixth and seventh S-1/A amendments | EDGAR filing list |
| Jan 15, 1999 | Convertible subordinated notes convert into 1,571,429 shares | 424B4, summary footnote |
| Jan 21, 1999 | Date of the final prospectus: 3,500,000 shares at $12.00 | 424B4, accession 0001012870-99-000192 |
| Jan 22, 1999 | Final prospectus filed; public trading begins | 424B4; 10-K for fiscal 2026 |
| Jan 27, 1999 (expected) | Delivery of the shares against payment | 424B4, cover page |
| Feb 2, 1999 | Underwriters buy 525,000 more shares at $12.00 | 10-K405, accession 0000929624-99-000772 |
| Apr 29, 1999 | First annual report: revenue $158.2 million and net income $4.1 million for the year ended January 31, 1999 | 10-K405, accession 0000929624-99-000772 |
The offering, line by line
The cover page and the “Use of Proceeds” and “Dilution” sections hold the terms. Everything below is from the final prospectus.
| Item | Figure | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Price | $12.00 a share | The price to the public in the prospectus dated January 21, 1999 |
| Shares offered | 3,500,000, all sold by the company | No existing holder sold shares in the offering |
| Total to the public | $42,000,000 | Before the 525,000-share over-allotment option, which would have brought it to $48,300,000 |
| Underwriting discount | $0.84 a share, $2,940,000 in total | 7% of the price (our arithmetic); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Hambrecht & Quist and Prudential Securities led |
| Expenses | $1,800,000 estimated | Paid by the company on top of the discount |
| Estimated net proceeds | $37.3 million | The first 10-K405 reported $37.5 million |
| Use of proceeds | About $5.0 million to repay a credit facility; the rest for general corporate purposes and capital expenditures | The company expected to spend about $10.0 million on capital expenditures in fiscal 2000 |
| Shares outstanding after the offering | 28,595,976 | Includes 1,571,429 shares from notes converted on January 15, 1999 |
| Net tangible book value per share | $0.73 before, $1.95 after | New investors faced immediate dilution of $10.05 a share |
| What earlier holders paid | $31,856,000 for 25,065,226 shares, an average of $1.27 | New investors paid $12.00, about 9.4 times that average (our arithmetic) |
| Dividends | None ever paid | The prospectus expected none in the foreseeable future |
The money before the IPO: revenue, gross profit and losses
The summary financial data show how steeply revenue climbed once the RIVA128 chip began shipping in August 1997, and that profit had not followed.
| Period | Revenue | Gross profit (loss) | Net income (loss) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 5 to Dec 31, 1993 (inception) | none | none | $(484) thousand |
| Year ended Dec 31, 1994 | none | none | $(1,361) thousand |
| Year ended Dec 31, 1995 | $1,182 thousand | $(367) thousand | $(6,377) thousand |
| Year ended Dec 31, 1996 | $3,912 thousand | $874 thousand | $(3,077) thousand |
| Year ended Dec 31, 1997 | $29,071 thousand | $7,827 thousand | $(3,589) thousand |
| Nine months to Sep 28, 1997 | $5,537 thousand | $631 thousand | $(5,013) thousand |
| Nine months to Oct 25, 1998 | $92,700 thousand | $25,300 thousand | $(3,532) thousand |
| Year ended Jan 31, 1999 (first 10-K405) | $158,237 thousand | not shown here | $4,130 thousand |
Three details matter. First, the prospectus says plainly: “The Company incurred losses in each year from inception through the first three quarters of 1997.” It reports net income only in the quarters ended December 31, 1997 and October 25, 1998. Second, all of 1995 and 1996 revenue came from the first product, the NV1, which the company stopped selling in the first quarter of 1996 after the PC industry adopted Microsoft's Direct3D and SGI's OpenGL; in the prospectus's words, “the Company experienced a significant reduction in revenue from sales of the NV1.” It also stopped developing the NV2, a chip for a game console, and began the RIVA128. Third, royalties were small: $5.9 million from ST in the nine months to October 25, 1998, about 6% of revenue.
Who paid the bills: customer concentration
NVIDIA sold chips to the companies that build graphics boards, and those boards went into PCs from Compaq, Dell, Gateway, IBM, Micron and Packard Bell NEC. The prospectus names the board makers and their share of revenue.
| Period | Largest customers and share of total revenue | Together |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Diamond 86% | 86% |
| 1996 | Diamond 82% | 82% |
| 1997 | STB 63%, Diamond 31% | 94% (our arithmetic) |
| Nine months to Oct 25, 1998 | STB 40%, Diamond 28%, Creative 12% | 80% (our arithmetic) |
| Year ended Jan 31, 1999 (first 10-K405) | STB 35%, Diamond 27%, Creative 13%, Intel 12% | 87% (our arithmetic) |
The prospectus calls the concentration a risk in its own words: “A majority of the Company's sales have been to a limited number of customers and its sales are highly concentrated.” It adds that customers had “experienced financial difficulties in the past.” The sharpest line is about STB: 3Dfx, which made competing 3D chips, had agreed to acquire STB, and the company expected that “sales to STB will be reduced significantly from prior levels.” That is the customer that bought 40% of its chips in the nine months to October 25, 1998, being bought by a competitor that had filed a patent suit against NVIDIA on September 21, 1998.
What nearly broke the company, in its own words
The risk-factor section is the part of a prospectus that lawyers write to be complete rather than flattering. Read in hindsight it is a list of the ways this company could have ended.
| Risk | What the prospectus says | Dates and numbers |
|---|---|---|
| One product line | “Since the Company has no other product line, the Company's business, financial condition and results of operations would be materially adversely affected” if its graphics processors did not win acceptance in the mainstream PC market | All revenue from 3D graphics processors for PCs |
| Manufacturing yields | The company “experienced difficulties commencing volume production” of the RIVA128ZX in March 1998 and the RIVA TNT in July 1998; the cause was yield problems that “resulted in lower than expected revenues and higher manufacturing costs” | Later resolved, the prospectus says |
| One chip maker | TSMC was the primary manufacturer and, the prospectus says, had no obligation to supply any minimum quantity; wafers were bought on a purchase-order basis | TSMC replaced ST as the main wafer source |
| Patent suits | Three suits (SGI, S3, 3Dfx) seeking unspecified damages, including treble damages, and orders to stop selling the RIVA family; “The Company has and intends to continue to defend itself vigorously with respect to all three lawsuits.” | April 9, May 11 and September 21, 1998 |
| PC demand | “During the spring of 1998, many PC makers experienced reduced demand for their products, resulting in increased inventories.” | Hit the quarter ended July 1998 |
| Growth and controls | “The Company's financial and management controls, reporting systems and procedures are very limited and will need to be upgraded significantly.” Employees went from 71 (September 28, 1997) to 184 (October 25, 1998) | No officer or employee had an employment agreement |
| Losses | Accumulated deficit of about $17.1 million at October 25, 1998, up from about $14.0 million at December 31, 1997 in the first S-1 | Net loss in the quarters ended April and July 1998 |
Who owned the company, and who could sell when
The ownership table is where the founders appear. Jen-Hsun Huang, then 35, was President, Chief Executive Officer and a director; the prospectus says he “co-founded the Company in April 1993.” Two other officers, Chris A. Malachowsky and Curtis R. Priem, also co-founded it. Each of the three held about 13% before the offering.
| Holder | Shares | Before the offering | After the offering |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jen-Hsun Huang | 3,100,000 | 13.1% | 10.8% |
| Chris A. Malachowsky | 3,062,500 | 13.0% | 10.7% |
| Curtis R. Priem | 3,062,500 | 13.0% | 10.7% |
| Entities associated with Sequoia Capital VI | 3,095,902 | 13.2% | 10.8% |
| Entities associated with Sutter Hill Ventures | 2,786,090 | 11.9% | 9.8% |
| All directors and executive officers (12 people) | 16,286,845 | 69.1% | 56.9% |
Huang's 3,100,000 includes 100,000 options exercisable within 60 days and shares held by trusts and family members, some of which the footnote says he did not have voting power over. His 1997 salary was $149,134 with no option grants, and the prospectus set his salary at $250,000 for the year ending January 31, 1999. The 2026 proxy statement reports his total pay for the year ended January 25, 2026 at $36,343,830. The same proxy counts 870,604,104 shares beneficially owned, 3.58% of the stock; the 8-K of November 12, 2026 reports that his resignation as CEO and director took effect on November 11, 2026.
The lock-up table tells a holder when new supply could reach the market. Of 28,595,976 shares outstanding after the offering, 25,095,976 were restricted. The prospectus lists when they could be sold:
| When | Shares eligible for sale | Condition |
|---|---|---|
| January 21, 1999 (prospectus date) | 10,000 | Immediate |
| About April 21, 1999 (90 days, our arithmetic) | 4,990,000 | 90 days after the prospectus date |
| About July 20, 1999 (180 days, our arithmetic) | 17,991,627 | When the lock-up agreements, covering all officers and directors, expire; Morgan Stanley's written consent was needed to sell earlier |
What one IPO share became
NVIDIA's filings record six splits since the IPO. We took each one from an NVIDIA 10-K that states the ratio and dates, not from memory, and multiplied them.
| Split | Date | Shares from one IPO share after it | Split-adjusted IPO price | Where NVIDIA records it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| At the IPO | January 22, 1999 | 1 | $12.00 | 424B4 |
| 2-for-1 | Record date June 12, 2000 | 2 | $6.00 | 10-K405 filed April 27, 2001 (0001012870-01-500492) |
| 2-for-1 | Record date August 28, 2001; shares distributed September 17, 2001 | 4 | $3.00 | 10-K filed March 29, 2004 (0001045810-04-000007) |
| 2-for-1 | Effective April 6, 2006 | 8 | $1.50 | 10-K filed March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011) |
| 3-for-2 | Effective September 10, 2007 | 12 | $1.00 | 10-K filed March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011) |
| 4-for-1 | Executed July 19, 2021 | 48 | $0.25 | 10-K filed March 18, 2022 (0001045810-22-000036) |
| 10-for-1 | Distributed after the close on June 7, 2024 | 480 | $0.025 | 10-K filed February 25, 2026 (0001045810-26-000021) |
A cross-check on the cover pages of the 10-Ks: 165,452,881 shares on March 5, 2004, then 554,782,115 on March 14, 2008, then 2.51 billion on March 11, 2022, then 24.3 billion on February 20, 2026. Each jump is roughly what the splits in between predict (for example, 165.5 million x 3 is about 496 million), so there is no sign of a split we missed.
The worked example below uses one number from a recent NVIDIA document: the average price paid per share in the share repurchases it reports in its 10-Q for the quarter ended July 26, 2026 (filed August 26, 2026). It is what NVIDIA paid, with broker commissions, for its own shares from June 22, 2026 to July 26, 2026. It is not a market quote for November 17, 2026, and the stock has moved since July; closing prices for November 2026 are on the 8-K page linked above.
| Step | Arithmetic | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Shares today from one 1999 share | 2 x 2 x 2 x 1.5 x 4 x 10 | 480 |
| Split-adjusted IPO price | $12.00 / 480 | $0.025 |
| One IPO share at $202.40 | 480 x $202.40 | $97,152, which is 8,096 times $12.00 |
| 100 IPO shares ($1,200 at $12.00) | 100 x 480 x $202.40 | $9,715,200 |
| All 3,500,000 IPO shares, restated and valued the same way | 3,500,000 x 480 x $202.40 | about $340.0 billion |
| Shares outstanding after the IPO, restated | 28,595,976 x 480 | 13,726,068,480, against 24.1 billion on August 21, 2026 |
Every row above is our arithmetic. It assumes a holder kept every share, ignores dividends (NVIDIA raised its quarterly dividend from $0.01 to $0.25 a share on May 18, 2026) and taxes, and takes no view on what the shares are worth today. The most recent 10-Q on file when we read EDGAR was the one filed on August 26, 2026; the next one will carry a newer repurchase price.
What the documents show that the headlines don't
- The company was not yet profitable on a full-year basis. The nine months to October 25, 1998 had $92.7 million of revenue and a $3.5 million loss, and the prospectus says the revenue growth “may not be sustainable.” The first full fiscal year with net income was the one ended January 31, 1999: $4.1 million on $158.2 million of revenue.
- The business described is PC graphics. The words “data center,” “CUDA,” “GPU” and “artificial” do not appear anywhere in the final prospectus (our search of the saved text). The company says it designs “3D graphics processors and related software” for “the mainstream PC market.” By the fiscal 2026 10-K, revenue was $215.9 billion and net income $120.1 billion, with about 42,000 employees against 184 in the prospectus: revenue of about 1,365 times the $158.2 million of the first 10-K405 (our arithmetic).
- Two customers decided whether the year worked. In 1997 two board makers were 94% of revenue, and by the nine months to October 25, 1998 three were 80%.
- A competitor was both suing and buying. 3Dfx sued NVIDIA on September 21, 1998 and had agreed to acquire a customer that was 40% of NVIDIA's revenue in that period.
- Insiders kept control after the sale. Officers and directors held 56.9% after the offering, and the underwriters' buyers got 12.3% of the shares for 56.9% of the cash paid in (our arithmetic from the dilution table).
- The first filing waited ten and a half months. The date of the first S-1 is in EDGAR; the reason for the delay is not in any document we read.
What this means for your money
An IPO prospectus is the one moment a company is legally required to write down its weaknesses in plain sentences. The questions NVIDIA's prospectus answers are the same ones to ask of any fund, REIT or private company that sells you shares.
- Who pays the revenue? Customer percentages sit in the risk factors and the notes. Here two customers were 94% of a year.
- Who controls the votes after the sale? The ownership table shows it: 56.9% in the hands of officers and directors, and a classified board with staggered terms approved by stockholders before the IPO.
- When can insiders sell? The lock-up table gives dates and share counts. Here 87.8% of shares were restricted (our arithmetic), and most were free after 180 days.
- Who gets paid first? The underwriters took $2,940,000 and about $5.0 million of proceeds could repay a lender before any product spending.
- What did earlier holders pay? An average of $1.27 against $12.00, and the dilution table says so.
- What can a holder expect? The prospectus says no dividend had ever been paid and none was expected in the foreseeable future, so a holder's way out was the Nasdaq quotation the shares were approved for.
What a reader can do with this
- Look up any public company's registration on EDGAR and open the final prospectus (Form 424B4 or 424B1), not only the S-1; the final one has the price, the share count and the date. NVIDIA's list for 1998 and 1999 is in the table above.
- Compare the first S-1 with the final prospectus. Here the accumulated deficit went from about $14.0 million to $17.1 million, employees from 92 to 184, and three lawsuits were added.
- Check split history in the 10-K, where companies state each ratio and date, before trusting a “what $1,000 would be worth” figure from a website. Any such figure is only as good as the split count behind it.
- If you hold or follow NVIDIA, the same company keeps filing: 10-Qs, 8-Ks and proxy statements carry the numbers this page uses for 2026.
This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.
FAQ
Sources, read on November 17, 2026: NVIDIA Corporation on SEC EDGAR (CIK 1045810): final prospectus, Form 424B4, filed January 22, 1999 (accession 0001012870-99-000192); Form S-1 filed March 6, 1998 (0001012870-98-000618); request for withdrawal of Form 8-A filed May 7, 1998 (0001012870-98-001201); the EDGAR filing list for 1998 and 1999; Form 10-K405 filed April 29, 1999 (0000929624-99-000772) and April 27, 2001 (0001012870-01-500492); Forms 10-K filed March 29, 2004 (0001045810-04-000007), March 21, 2008 (0001045810-08-000011), March 18, 2022 (0001045810-22-000036) and February 25, 2026 (0001045810-26-000021); Form 10-Q filed August 26, 2026 (0001045810-26-000075); DEF 14A filed May 12, 2026 (0001045810-26-000036); Form 8-K filed November 12, 2026 (0001045810-26-000082). Arithmetic labelled “our arithmetic” is ours.