AriZona Iced Tea Founders: How a Court Valued a Half Share
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Quick answer
Two partners built AriZona, one side owned half, and that side could not sell without the other partner's consent; after litigation that began in October 2010, a New York trial court wrote on October 14, 2014 that the company's value “approached $2 billion” on October 5, 2010, and that the departing side's shares, after a 25% discount for lack of marketability and 9% simple interest, “approaches $1 billion.” The same decision records that AriZona's plan was to keep pricing its flagship can at 99 cents and that the buyer-side founder “developed the 99 cents pricing strategy as a way to increase market share.” The two sides were 7.5 times apart on value: the Ferolito parties said $3.2 billion and Vultaggio said $426 million (our ratio). The court also credited adjusted EBITDA of about $173 million for the twelve months to September 30, 2010 and rejected Tata, Nestle, Merrill Lynch and Rabo Bank figures that ranged from $1.3 billion to over $4 billion. The court did not set a final payout: it left the exact computation to “further proceedings” set for November 3, 2014, and a 2015 commentary by a valuation expert who worked for one side says the parties then settled privately, so there was no appeal and no public final number. This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.
Key takeaways
- The case is Ferolito v Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 32830(U), Supreme Court, Nassau County, Index No. 004058-12, decision and order after trial dated October 14, 2014 and entered October 15, 2014. Ferolito started it in October 2010 by asking to dissolve Beverage Marketing USA, Inc. under Business Corporation Law section 1104-a, and Vultaggio then used section 1118 to buy Ferolito's shares at “fair value.”
- Valuation dates were October 5, 2010 for Ferolito's shares and January 31, 2011 for a family trust's shares. The court wrote that AriZona's value “approached $2 billion” on the first date and was “a few percent less” on the second. It applied a 25% marketability discount (Vultaggio had asked for 35%, Ferolito for none) and 9% simple interest.
- Our arithmetic from those inputs: half of $2.0 billion is $1.0 billion, less 25% is $750 million, plus 9% simple interest over 4.02 years (October 5, 2010 to October 14, 2014) is about $272 million, for about $1.02 billion. That matches the court's “approaches $1 billion” and means interest ran at about $185,000 a day (our arithmetic).
- The court ruled out a premium for a strategic buyer: it “may not consider AriZona's ‘strategic’ or ‘synergistic’ value to a hypothetical third-party purchaser.” Expressions of interest from Tata (as high as $4.5 billion) and Nestle ($1.3 billion, then $1.45 billion) were not bids: neither did due diligence or had board approval.
- The 99-cent price appears in the record twice: AriZona's plan was to keep pricing its “flagship 24 ounce can at 99 cents” and both sides' revenue forecasts assumed it. The court also said AriZona could consider “raising prices, shrinking the size of the can” or other changes. A 2025 press report (secondary) says a 22-ounce can has been 99 cents since 1992; the court says 24 ounces.
- The root of the dispute was a 1998 Owners' Agreement that barred either partner from transferring shares to anyone not specified without the other's consent. The First Department upheld that restraint in 2010 (78 A.D.3d 529), and the trial court says it is a reason the shares carry a marketability discount.
CSV · 82 rows
AriZona founders' buyout case: timeline, claims, court inputs and our arithmetic
82 rows from the October 14, 2014 decision after trial (Nassau County Supreme Court, Index No. 004058-12) with the slip-opinion page on each row, plus labelled arithmetic and two secondary rows.
The story, with dates
AriZona was “founded in 1992 by Ferolito and Vultaggio, who had been partners in various beverage business ventures for some twenty years prior,” and it grew into what the court calls the largest privately owned beverage company in the United States. It started in Brooklyn and moved to Nassau County in 1994. The two agreed that only one of them would have final authority over the business and that Vultaggio would be that person (the “One Captain” agreement), and in 1998 they signed an Owners' Agreement that, in the court's words, prevented one partner from transferring shares to persons not specified “without the consent of the other partner.” The court says each family had received over $500 million in distributions since the founding.
| Date | Court or document | What happened | Slip op. page |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1992 | Founding | Ferolito and Vultaggio found AriZona; the Ferolito parties together own 50 percent by 2010 | 3 |
| 1998 | Owners' Agreement | Neither partner may transfer shares to persons not specified without the other's consent | 4 |
| 2008 | Ferolito's attorney | Questions whether AriZona is a viable S-Corporation; litigation on that issue is later resolved | 12 |
| 2010 | Appellate Division, First Department, 78 A.D.3d 529 | Holds the transfer restraint reasonable and valid | 4 |
| October 2010 | Supreme Court, Nassau County, Index No. 004058-12 | Ferolito petitions to dissolve Beverage Marketing USA, Inc. (BCL 1104-a); Vultaggio elects to buy his shares (BCL 1118) | 2 |
| October 5, 2010 | Valuation date | Date for Ferolito's shares, the day before he filed | 15 |
| January 31, 2011 | Valuation date | Date for the family trust's shares, chosen by the court over Vultaggio's December 31, 2012 | 16 |
| Spring 2012 | Nassau County | Another valuation action is filed and joined to the earlier matters | 2 |
| July 2012 | Appellate Division, Second Department | Dismisses claims about Ferolito's alleged bad acts, as the trial court describes it | 36 |
| May 22 to July 2, 2014 | Nassau County trial | Non-jury trial; some 34 witnesses and about 1000 pages of affidavits | 2 |
| October 14, 2014 | Decision and order after trial (entered October 15, 2014) | Value approached $2 billion; 25% marketability discount; 9% interest; shares plus interest approach $1 billion | 41-42 |
| November 3, 2014 | Nassau County | Court calls the parties back to compute the exact amount and set the payout terms | 42 |
| 2015 | Private settlement (secondary: Mercer Capital commentary) | Parties settle, so no appeal; terms not public | n/a |
What the documents show that the headlines don't
1. The $1 billion is not a price paid, and not half of a $2 billion company. The court wrote that its figure for the shares “approaches $1 billion” after the 25% discount and interest. Half of $2.0 billion is $1.0 billion before any discount, so the number sits near $1 billion partly because a discount and four years of interest roughly cancel (our arithmetic: $750 million plus about $272 million is about $1.02 billion). The decision itself says “these precise arithmetic results are not readily apparent” and sends the exact figure to further proceedings.
2. The court named a method, not a company value. It rejected the “comparable transactions” approach (Ferolito wanted 80% DCF and 20% comparables; Vultaggio wanted DCF alone) and used only a discounted cash flow. Its reason: AriZona is “truly sui generis,” with no peer that sells ready-to-drink beverages, has a partner questioning its S-Corporation status, has unaudited statements and an unclear path to control.
3. The big names were never bids. The court heard Tata executives say they had estimated AriZona at as much as $4.5 billion but never did due diligence or took it to the board. Nestle expressed interest in Ferolito's shares at $1.3 billion and then $1.45 billion, but needed a “path to control” that never came, and said AriZona's information was “woefully inadequate” (the court's quotation of that witness). Merrill Lynch's $3.2 billion in 2008 was dismissed because, the court wrote, the bank told AriZona what it wanted to hear in order to win its business.
4. The pricing decision was inside the valuation. Revenue forecasts on both sides assumed the 99-cent can. The court noted that Motel 6, Charles Shaw wine and McDonald's dollar menu had all moved off their original price points and wrote that AriZona could consider “raising prices, shrinking the size of the can,” and other changes. It read the choice as personal rather than commercial: from the buyer-side founder's perspective, “AriZona simply is his company, and he wishes to operate it as he sees fit.”
5. A seller who cannot sell is the whole story. The court found that Ferolito signed the Owners' Agreement without understanding it and that his later actions were “to get appropriate value for his share.” It also wrote that the buyer-side founder was trying to “have his cake and eat it too,” because he would neither sell the company nor let his partner sell, and wanted to keep it for his children.
6. Interest is a cost of the delay. The court set 9%, the same as the statutory rate, and noted AriZona pays the buyer-side founder 10% on loans he makes to it. On $750 million, 9% simple is about $185,000 a day (our arithmetic).
The valuation, as the court computed it
The decision does not print a table. We built this one from its text and give the slip-opinion page for each line.
| Input | Ferolito parties | Vultaggio | What the court used | Slip op. page |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value of AriZona claimed | $3.2 billion | $426 million | “approached $2 billion” on October 5, 2010 | 2, 41 |
| Method | 80% DCF and 20% comparable transactions | DCF alone | DCF alone | 16-17 |
| Tax rate | 38% | 43.5% | 43.5%, the pass-through rate both actually paid | 29-30 |
| Discount for lack of marketability | None | 35% | 25% | 33, 35 |
| Revenue growth | 10.2% a year (credited expert) | Costs assumed to track inflation | 10.2% a year; AriZona grew 13.9% a year in 2006-10 | 26-27 |
| Discount rate | 10.8% | 11% | 10.8% | 31 |
| Net cash added | $137.6 million (October 5, 2010) | Disputed as bleeding the company | $137.6 million and $161.4 million (January 31, 2011) | 32 |
| Strategic or synergy premium | Argued for it | Not stated | Not allowed | 15 |
| Prejudgment interest | Sought | Argued for denial or a lower rate | 9% simple | 40-41 |
| Step | Amount | How we got it |
|---|---|---|
| Court's value of AriZona, October 5, 2010 | about $2.0 billion | Court: “approached $2 billion” |
| Half owned by the Ferolito parties | about $1,000 million | 0.5 x 2,000 (our arithmetic) |
| Less 25% marketability discount | minus $250 million | 0.25 x 1,000 (our arithmetic) |
| Value of the half after discount | about $750 million | Our arithmetic |
| Plus 9% simple interest for 4.02 years | about $272 million | 750 x 0.09 x 4.0247 (our arithmetic) |
| Total at the decision date | about $1,022 million | Court: “approaches $1 billion” (trust shares were valued a few percent lower, as of January 31, 2011) |
| Effect if the discount had been Vultaggio's 35% | $100 million lower on the half | 0.10 x 1,000 (our arithmetic) |
| Half of each side's claimed value | $1.6 billion vs $213 million | 0.5 x 3,200 and 0.5 x 426 (our arithmetic) |
For context on the size of the business: the court credited adjusted EBITDA of $17.9 million in 1993, $61.98 million in 2003, $110.99 million in 2005, $154.8 million in 2009 and $169.4 million in 2010, and about $173 million for the twelve months to September 30, 2010. It said AriZona held over $300 million in cash during the trial. The court also treated the financial statements prepared after the litigation began as suspect and relied on the earlier, normalized figures. A 2015 commentary by Mercer Capital, whose author was a valuation expert witness for one side, reads the court's numbers as a financial control value of $1.911 billion and $1.433 billion after the 25% discount; the decision text itself prints neither figure, so treat those as that author's reading, not the court's.
What this means for your money
This dispute is a rare public look at what happens when co-owners of a private company cannot agree, and at how a court prices a stake that cannot be sold. If you own LLC units in a real estate syndication, a DST interest, shares of a non-traded fund or a minority piece of a family business, four things in the decision matter.
- A transfer restriction can trap you and then cost you again. The Owners' Agreement stopped Ferolito from selling to a stranger without consent, the First Department upheld it, and the trial court then used it as one reason for a 25% marketability discount. The restraint reduced his options and his price. In your own documents, the transfer, consent and right-of-first-refusal sections decide whether you could sell at all.
- The statute gave the minority a way out, but not a market price. Under the New York statute the court applied, a holder of more than 20 percent (the case caption's words) could petition to dissolve and the other side could elect to buy at “fair value,” which the court defined as the minority holder's proportionate interest in the going concern, not a share of a business in liquidation. Statutes for LLCs and for other states differ, and a syndication's operating agreement may replace the default rules, so read your own agreement and ask a licensed attorney in the state of formation.
- No premium for the buyer you imagine. The court would not count what Tata or Nestle might pay, because strategic value would be speculation about the future. A private-company holder should expect an appraiser to value the stand-alone business, then apply a discount.
- Discounts are a negotiation, and the number moves. Here the range argued was 0% to 35% and the court picked 25%. On a $1.0 billion half, each 10 points was $100 million (our arithmetic). The same discounts appear in tax valuations: our pages on the Form 709 gift of illiquid real estate interests and the family limited partnership quote how a marketability discount is used there. The Delaware statutory trust page shows who controls a DST. For what shareholders can and cannot force a board to do, read Dodge v. Ford (1919).
What a reader can do with this
- Read the transfer and exit sections of any private deal you hold: consent rights, rights of first refusal, drag-along and buy-sell language, and who sets the valuation date and method.
- Check whether your agreement names a price formula and a valuation date. In this case the price came from a statute and a trial: the petition was filed in October 2010 and the first decision came in October 2014.
- Ask what discount an appraiser would apply and what it would be applied to, before you sign, not after a dispute.
- If you are in a real dispute, get a business-valuation expert and a lawyer licensed in the entity's state. The court here said valuing a closely held company “is not an exact science.”
This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.
FAQ
Sources, read on November 16, 2026: Ferolito v Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 32830(U), decision and order after trial, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Index No. 004058-12, October 14, 2014 (nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2014/2014_32830.pdf), which cites Ferolito v. Vultaggio, 78 A.D.3d 529 (1st Dept. 2010); Mercer Capital, “New York's Largest Corporate Dissolution Case: AriZona Iced Tea” (2015; the author was a valuation expert witness for one side; secondary); NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth / TODAY, August 21, 2025 (secondary). Court records beyond the 2014 decision, including the appellate briefs and any later orders, were not reached and are not scored. The 2012 Second Department ruling and the settlement are reported only as described in the decision and in the commentary.