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Archegos and Bill Hwang: Swaps, Bank Losses, Sentence (2026)

ResearchBy Jorge20 min read10 SEC filings cited

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Quick answer

Bill Hwang's family office, Archegos, grew from about $1.6 billion of capital on March 31, 2020 to over $36 billion on March 22, 2021 by buying total return swaps from about a dozen banks, according to the SEC's complaint of April 27, 2022; in the week of March 22, 2021 the prices of its biggest holdings fell, the banks' margin calls went unpaid, and a jury convicted Hwang in July 2024. The U.S. Attorney's Office says he was sentenced to 18 years and ordered to pay more than nine billion dollars in restitution. Credit Suisse's own independent report puts its loss at approximately $5.5 billion; Nomura reported ¥245.7 billion for its fiscal year ended March 2021; UBS reported an $861 million loss in the first half of 2021 on the default of "a client of our prime brokerage business". Morgan Stanley's two 2021 quarterly reports give no figure.

Where it stands as of November 20, 2026: the last report we read on the appeal is dated January 27, 2025 and says Hwang was free on bail while appealing. We found no Second Circuit decision, and court records are not scored here (CourtListener unavailable on November 20, 2026). We did not read the restitution or forfeiture orders themselves.

Key takeaways

  • The SEC's complaint gives three dated snapshots: about $1.6 billion of invested capital on gross exposures of about $10.2 billion on March 31, 2020; about $7.7 billion on about $54 billion on January 1, 2021; over $36 billion on over $160 billion on March 22, 2021. Capital grew about 22 times in under a year, and exposure per dollar of capital stayed between 4.4 and 7.0 times (our arithmetic).
  • The swaps are why the position was hard to see. The complaint alleges that when Archegos approached 5% of a company's shares, the Section 13(d) ownership-disclosure line, it generally moved to swaps, and that it spread them across about a dozen counterparties that each saw only their own slice.
  • Four institutions are covered by their own documents: Credit Suisse approximately $5.5 billion (independent report, July 29, 2021) and a net charge of CHF 4.8 billion in its 2021 annual report; Nomura ¥245.7 billion to March 31, 2021 plus about ¥65 billion expected in the next quarter; UBS $861 million in the first half of 2021; Morgan Stanley no figure in its Q1 and Q2 2021 10-Qs. Only Credit Suisse names Archegos in the documents we read.
  • Credit Suisse's report says it cut Archegos's standard swap margin to 7.5% in 2019 and that by September 1, 2020 the swap book was margined at 5.9% on average. ViacomCBS, Archegos's largest position, fell 6.7% on March 22, 2021. On $100 of stock margined at 5.9%, a 6.7% fall is a $6.70 loss against $5.90 of margin (our arithmetic).
  • A jury convicted Hwang on July 10, 2024 of racketeering conspiracy, securities fraud, market manipulation and wire fraud, the U.S. Attorney's Office says. Reuters reported he was sentenced to 18 years on November 20, 2024 and that his co-defendant, the former chief financial officer, received eight years on January 27, 2025.
  • Regulators fined the lender as well: the Federal Reserve Board announced a $268.5 million fine on UBS Group AG for Credit Suisse's counterparty-risk failures on July 24, 2023, and the Bank of England's Prudential Regulation Authority fined two Credit Suisse UK firms £87 million the same day, down from £124.4 million after a 30% settlement discount.

CSV · 74 rows

Archegos and Bill Hwang: exposure, bank losses, charges, sentences and fines, 2012-2025

74 rows: Archegos's capital and exposure on three dates, each bank's loss as its own document states it, the swap margin rates, the charges, the sentences and the fines. Source and document on every row.

The story, dated

A fund manager whose earlier fund settled SEC insider-trading allegations in 2012 ran a family office, borrowed from banks through contracts that never put his name on a share register, and went from $1.6 billion of capital to $36 billion in a year. The paradox of the case is in the banks' own documents: each lender could see only its own slice of the bet, and the slices were the same bet.

DateEventDocument
December 12, 2012Hwang's earlier fund, Tiger Asia, settles SEC insider-trading allegations; the report also says it pled guilty to wire fraud. It returns outside capital and becomes the family office Archegos, with roughly $500 millionCredit Suisse Special Committee report, July 29, 2021
May 2019At Archegos's request, Credit Suisse cuts its standard swap margin rate to 7.5%Credit Suisse Special Committee report
March 31, 2020Invested capital about $1.6 billion, gross exposures about $10.2 billionSEC complaint, paragraph 50
September 1, 2020Holdings at Credit Suisse alone reach $9.5 billion; the swap book is margined at 5.9% on averageCredit Suisse Special Committee report
January 1, 2021Invested capital about $7.7 billion, gross exposures about $54 billionSEC complaint, paragraph 51
March 22, 2021Over $36 billion of capital on over $160 billion of exposure. ViacomCBS announces a stock offering and its shares fall 6.7%SEC complaint, paragraph 52; U.S. Attorney's release; Credit Suisse report
March 23, 2021Hwang directs nearly a billion dollars of additional purchases of ViacomCBS and other stocks to hold the pricesU.S. Attorney's sentencing release
March 24, 2021A final attempt to reverse the fall fails; Tencent Music falls about 20%; the markets close with margin calls Archegos cannot meetU.S. Attorney's sentencing release; Credit Suisse report
March 25, 2021Credit Suisse issues margin calls totalling over $2.8 billion. That evening Archegos tells its banks it has $120 billion of gross exposure and $9 to $10 billion of equity and asks for a standstill; the banks declineCredit Suisse Special Committee report
March 26, 2021Credit Suisse delivers an Event of Default notice and starts unwindingCredit Suisse Special Committee report
April 27, 2021Nomura reports a loss of ¥245.7 billion from transactions with a US clientNomura Form 6-K
July 29, 2021Credit Suisse publishes the independent report and says its loss is approximately $5.5 billionCredit Suisse Form 6-K
April 27, 2022SEC files its civil complaint; the U.S. Attorney's Office announces criminal charges the same daySEC press release 2022-70
July 10, 2024A unanimous jury finds Hwang and his co-defendant guiltyU.S. Attorney's statement, release 24-245
November 20, 2024Hwang sentenced to 18 yearsReuters report; U.S. Attorney's release 24-391
January 27, 2025The former chief financial officer is sentenced to eight yearsReuters report

What the documents show that the headlines don't

The swaps kept the size off the ownership filings

The SEC's complaint says the vast majority of Archegos's long exposure was synthetic, “a deliberate strategy Hwang implemented to limit the visibility of market participants and Counterparties into the extent of Archegos’s aggregate holdings” (paragraph 29). It then says how the 5% line worked: “To avoid reporting thresholds under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, when Archegos approached stock holdings representing 5% of the shares outstanding of any particular issuer, it would generally shift from purchasing cash equity positions in that issuer to purchasing synthetic exposure” (paragraph 30). These are allegations in a complaint; the criminal conviction is a separate record.

The contract itself was simple. Credit Suisse's report explains a total return swap with its own example: the client puts up margin, the bank pays the client any rise in the stock and the client pays any fall, plus interest, and the bank typically hedges by buying the stock. The SEC complaint says the same of Archegos's banks: they “would purchase shares of referenced issuers in the market to the extent necessary to hedge any synthetic exposure” (paragraph 37). So the shares existed and sat with the banks, not with Archegos, which is why, as the complaint alleges, the exposure did not appear in ownership filings.

Several banks, one position

The complaint says Archegos “executed agreements with about a dozen Counterparties” and that, while each could see what Archegos held with it, each “had limited, and in some cases no, visibility into Archegos’s holdings elsewhere” (paragraphs 32 and 39). Credit Suisse's report names six other prime brokers it knew of (Morgan Stanley, Jefferies, Nomura, Wells Fargo, Deutsche Bank and UBS) and says Archegos told it that its long positions at Credit Suisse were representative of its positions at the others. Nomura's annual report says the same from the other side of the table: “It became clear that the client had similar large positions with other financial institutions, and that the client had also defaulted on margin calls with these financial institutions.”

That is why the unwind hurt: every bank held hedge shares in the same stocks and had to sell them into the same falling market. Nomura wrote that, because of “the significant volume of positions being closed by both us and the other affected financial institutions and the effect on market prices”, it recognized ¥204.2 billion of trading losses plus ¥41.6 billion of credit-loss provisions. Credit Suisse entered a managed-liquidation agreement with UBS and Nomura on March 28, 2021 and sold approximately $3 billion and $2.2 billion of overlapping positions in block sales on April 5 and April 14, 2021.

Who lost what, in each institution's own document

InstitutionLoss as its own document states itDocument and dateNames Archegos?
Credit SuisseApproximately $5.5 billionSpecial Committee report, Form 6-K, July 29, 2021Yes
Credit SuisseCHF 5.0 billion in the first half of 2021; CHF 594 million (USD 653 million) in the second quarterForm 6-K media release, July 29, 2021Yes
Credit SuisseA loss of CHF 4,803 million in the Investment Bank in 2021; a net charge of CHF 4.8 billion for the groupForm 20-F for 2021, filed March 10, 2022Yes
Nomura¥204.2 billion of trading losses plus ¥41.6 billion of credit-loss provisions to March 31, 2021; about ¥65 billion more expected in the quarter ending June 30, 2021Form 20-F filed June 25, 2021No: 'U.S. Prime Brokerage Event', 'the client'
Nomura¥245.7 billion of loss from transactions with a US clientForm 6-K, April 27, 2021No: 'a US client'
UBSUSD 861 million for the first half of 2021, of which USD 87 million in the second quarter (so about USD 774 million in the first quarter, our arithmetic)UBS Group second-quarter 2021 report, Form 6-K, July 20, 2021No: 'a client of our prime brokerage business'
Morgan StanleyNo loss figure foundForms 10-Q for the quarters ended March 31 and June 30, 2021No
Credit Suisse UK firmsAround US$5.1 billion booked to the two UK firmsPrudential Regulation Authority release, July 24, 2023Yes

Three things stand out. First, one event gives five numbers for one bank (Credit Suisse): $5.5 billion in the report, CHF 5.0 billion for the first half, CHF 4.8 billion for the year, CHF 4,803 million in one division and US$5.1 billion in the UK regulator's release. They differ by currency, period and entity; we give each with its document and do not reconcile them. Second, Nomura and UBS do not name Archegos in the pages we read, and we found no loss figure in Morgan Stanley's two quarterly reports; the Credit Suisse report lists figures “as publicly reported” for Nomura (approximately $2.9 billion), UBS (approximately $774 million) and Morgan Stanley (approximately $1 billion), which is where the headline numbers for those banks come from. Third, the Credit Suisse results release says its investigation “found that, this was not a situation where the business and risk personnel engaged in fraudulent or illegal conduct or acted with ill intent”: the bank's staff were found to have failed at risk management, while the court record is about what Archegos told the banks.

What the prosecutors and the SEC say Archegos told the banks

The U.S. Attorney's Office says that as Hwang's trading led to large positions, “Archegos’s counterparties started to impose limits on Archegos’s trading”, and that Hwang, his chief financial officer and others “conspired to make repeated, materially false and misleading statements to Archegos’s counterparties about Archegos’s portfolio of securities”. Its statement on the verdict says the two “were able to fraudulently inflate a $1.5 billion portfolio into a $36 billion portfolio”. The SEC complaint alleges the trading side as well: large pre-market trading and “marking the close”, meaning large trading in the last 30 minutes of the day, to push up the prices of the stocks it held.

The court and agency outcomes

DateBodyOutcomeDocument
April 27, 2022SEC, civil caseComplaint against Archegos, Hwang and three Archegos executives; seeks injunctions, return of ill-gotten gains, civil penalties and officer-and-director bars. We found no final judgment in the documents readSEC press release 2022-70
July 10, 2024U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, criminal caseJury finds Hwang guilty (Reuters: 10 of 11 counts) and the co-defendant guilty on all three counts he facedU.S. Attorney's statement 24-245; Reuters
November 20, 2024U.S. District Court, Southern District of New YorkHwang sentenced to 18 years, three years of supervised release, and restitution of more than nine billion dollars, per the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney's page is dated December 19, 2024U.S. Attorney's release 24-391; Reuters
January 27, 2025U.S. District Court, Southern District of New YorkFormer chief financial officer sentenced to eight years; Reuters says he is expected to stay free on bail while he appeals, and that Hwang is also appealing and free on bailReuters
July 24, 2023Federal Reserve BoardConsent order and a $268.5 million fine on UBS Group AG for Credit Suisse's counterparty credit-risk management with ArchegosFederal Reserve press release
July 24, 2023Prudential Regulation Authority£87 million fine on Credit Suisse International and Credit Suisse Securities (Europe); £124.4 million before a 30% settlement discountPRA news release

The Federal Reserve says its action and the PRA's total approximately $387 million. The SEC case is numbered 1:22-cv-03402 in the Southern District of New York; we did not read its docket or the criminal docket. The Fed's fine is on UBS Group AG because UBS completed its acquisition of Credit Suisse on June 12, 2023, and it covers Credit Suisse's conduct, not UBS's.

ViacomCBS: the offering that started the fall

The U.S. Attorney's Office says that on March 22, 2021 “ViacomCBS announced a seasoned equity offering”. The company's own prospectus supplements show the sale: on March 22, 2021 it offered $2,000,000,000 of Class B common stock when the last reported price was $100.34, and concurrently 10,000,000 shares of mandatory convertible preferred stock with a $100.00 liquidation preference, about $1.0 billion (our arithmetic), so about $3.0 billion in all. The final prospectus supplement priced the common stock at $85.00 per share for $1,700,000,000, down 15.3% from $100.34 (our arithmetic), with the last reported price on March 23, 2021 at $91.25.

What this means for your money

  • Leverage is a price you pay for every move against you. The complaint puts Archegos's leverage at “between 400% and 700%, and sometimes as high as 1000%”. Credit Suisse's report says swap margins had been 15-25% before the 2019 cut to 7.5% and averaged 5.9% by September 2020. On $100 of stock margined at 5.9%, the borrower holds $5.90 of cushion; at 7.5% it is $7.50 (our arithmetic). ViacomCBS fell 6.7% in one day. A fall bigger than the cushion triggers a call for more cash, and the call comes when cash is hardest to find.
  • Concentration made it worse. The complaint says a third to a half of Archegos's gross exposure sat in its ten largest positions, and that its top ten moved from companies such as Amazon and Microsoft in March 2020 to ViacomCBS, Discovery and China-based companies by March 2021. When a position is too big to sell without moving the price, a margin call becomes a forced sale into a falling market.
  • A missing ownership filing says little about exposure. If a holder moves to swaps as it nears 5% (complaint, paragraph 30), the share register shows less than the exposure. The same applies to a fund you own: read its derivatives and borrowing notes, not only its holdings list. For ownership filings read line by line, see Michael Burry's 13F history and Saba Capital's 13D filings.
  • The lender's loss is not the investor's. In this case the losses fell on banks, on buyers and sellers of the stocks at manipulated prices, and, the U.S. Attorney's Office says, on Archegos employees whose deferred pay was tied to the fund. For cases where individual investors or creditors held the loss, see FTX creditor recoveries, Lehman's examiner report and what Madoff's victims got back.
  • A court figure is not a payment. The U.S. Attorney's Office reports restitution of more than nine billion dollars. We found no document that states how much has been paid.
  • Ask any vehicle you own four questions: how much is borrowed against it, who the lenders are, what happens to the position if its price falls 10%, and whether any one holding is large enough to be hard to sell. In a non-traded REIT, BDC or interval fund these sit in the borrowings and leverage notes; our reading of Fundrise Income Fund's leverage shows where to look.

This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice. The SEC statements are allegations in a complaint; the criminal convictions are the court's record.

FAQ

Sources, read on November 20, 2026: SEC press release 2022-70 and complaint, SEC v. Hwang et al., 1:22-cv-03402 (S.D.N.Y., filed April 27, 2022); U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, statement of July 10, 2024 (release 24-245) and sentencing release 24-391 (Internet Archive copies); Reuters reports of July 10, 2024, November 20, 2024 and January 27, 2025; Credit Suisse Group AG Form 6-K of July 29, 2021, accession 0001370368-21-000064 (Special Committee report) and 0001370368-21-000061 (results release), and Form 20-F for 2021, accession 0001370368-22-000019; Nomura Holdings Form 20-F, accession 0001193125-21-199397, and Form 6-K, accession 0001193125-21-132516; UBS Group AG Form 6-K, accession 0001610520-21-000069; Morgan Stanley Forms 10-Q, accessions 0000895421-21-000334 and 0000895421-21-000425; ViacomCBS Form 424B5, accessions 0001193125-21-089752 and 0001193125-21-094654; Federal Reserve Board press release of July 24, 2023; Prudential Regulation Authority news release of July 24, 2023.

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