What Happened to Patch of Land (2026): The Quiet Collapse of a Top-3 RE Crowdfunding Platform

Why competitors get this story wrong

Almost every other write-up of "what happened to Patch of Land" gets the basic ownership chain wrong. We've seen at least three published articles claim Texas Capital Bank acquired Patch of Land in late 2018. Wikipedia attributes a 2022 acquisition to Churchill Real Estate. Both are factually incorrect.

The verified record:

• Patch of Land was acquired by Cloverhill Funding LLC in an asset-purchase transaction announced July 29, 2021 (via PR Newswire); the legacy platform told investors the sale completed July 27, 2021.
• The new entity name was Patch Funding LLC, then rebranded to Patch Lending on March 7, 2022 (announced via GlobeNewswire).
• Texas Capital's merger in this period was its merger of equals with Independent Bank Group, announced December 9, 2019 and terminated May 26, 2020. Direct searches of SEC EDGAR, Texas Capital Bancshares investor relations, court records, and the California DFPI return zero hits linking TCB to POL.

The reason this matters: investors who try to chase down their old POL notes by calling Texas Capital Bank find themselves at a dead end. The actual ownership chain runs through Cloverhill Funding LLC, and the indenture trustee bank servicing the original POL notes was never publicly named in any document we could locate. (POL's general counsel described it in 2015 only as "a bank who we've paid a lot of money to up-front.") Identifying that trustee is the critical first step for any legacy noteholder still seeking recovery.

The 2013–2018 rise

POL launched in October 2013 alongside the SEC's Title II rule allowing general solicitation under Reg D 506(c). It was one of three pioneer platforms (along with RealtyShares and PeerStreet) targeting the same product: 6–24-month residential bridge / fix-and-flip first-lien mortgage loans, fractionalized as borrower-payment-dependent notes for accredited investors only.

The platform's pitch was an indenture-trustee structure introduced in 2015 — a bankruptcy-remote SPE pledged each loan's promissory note to an unidentified indenture trustee bank for the benefit of POL noteholders, perfected by a UCC filing. This was POL's structural answer to the platform-failure question: if POL goes under, the notes survive at the trustee level. (PeerStreet had a similar bankruptcy-remote SPV structure — and as we documented in our bankruptcy-remote real estate crowdfunding pillar, even bankruptcy-remote SPVs have failure modes when the parent company collapses.)

Key milestones:

• April 8, 2015 — $23.6M Series A led by SF Capital Group with Ron Suber participating
• Q1 2016 — Crossed $100M cumulative origination, $25M+ returned to investors
• April 2016 — Hired Paul Deitch (ex-Oaktree Capital) as CEO; Jason Fritton became Executive Chairman
• June 2017 — Expanded SF Capital debt facility to $30M
• November 1, 2017 — Deitch stepped down, citing personal reasons; Fritton resumed CEO role
• Late 2018 — the company said it had funded almost 2,000 loans worth over $800M, on properties valued over $1.2B, and had returned over $200M in principal and interest

The November 2018 Crowdfund Insider piece — POL voicing support for the sector after RealtyShares' collapse — is darkly ironic in retrospect. POL was using RealtyShares' failure as a marketing moment, three years before its own retail-investor wind-down.

The 2019–2021 quiet pivot

After Deitch's exit, POL's institutional-versus-retail strategy shifted under the surface. The November 2018 metrics were the last public origination figures POL ever published. Through 2019 and 2020 the platform continued operating but its press cadence collapsed; founder visibility dropped; AdaPia d'Errico (former CMO) and Amy Wan (former General Counsel) had already left.

The pattern we'd later identify as the POL Pattern — quiet pivot from retail crowdfunding to institutional capital partners — was already underway by 2019–2020. Two pieces of evidence:

1. The Velmont Enterprises, Inc. v. Patch of Land Lending, LLC opinion (N.C. Ct. App., COA22-40, October 18, 2022) records that in fall 2020 POL's Kelvin Munemitsu agreed to an early payoff of four loans at 80% of the balance, then refused the funds; the trial court granted summary judgment to the borrower and the appeals court affirmed. Lenders running their book down toward an exit start accepting discounted payoffs to clean their portfolio for sale. That's what this looks like.
2. AlphaCentric Prime Meridian Income Fund (CIK 0001697196) — an institutional fund — repeatedly disclosed POL note holdings on Form NPORT-P 2020–2022. Real institutional money was in the platform when it was being prepared for sale.

The Cloverhill exit (July 29, 2021)

The Cloverhill press release announced an asset purchase (not stock), price not disclosed. Cloverhill provided growth equity plus arranged a new funding facility. Teddy Wasserman, head of Cloverhill's Board of Advisors, fronted the announcement.

The strategic disclosure in Cloverhill's release: Patch Funding (the new entity) described itself as a residential business-purpose lender and said it would continue to work with "institutional capital partners who have been recurring buyers."

Translated: the retail crowdfunding model was killed. The platform's value to Cloverhill was the loan-origination engine plus the institutional-buyer relationships — not the accredited-investor noteholder base.

The press release was silent on the fate of legacy retail crowdfunding investors and their outstanding notes. The release quoted Carlo Tabibi as "co-founder and former CEO," and a co-founder said he was "thrilled to have seen the full life cycle of the company I started." The language is consistent with founder exits.

The investor stranding

According to The Real Estate Crowdfunding Review (R.E.C.R.), the most-cited independent platform reviewer, in its June 2022 investor survey:

• 0% would recommend the platform
• 100% would not

Investor-reported default figures R.E.C.R. published (claims from 2017):

• 15% in foreclosure on a 20-loan portfolio
• 16% uncured default rate on a 30+ loan portfolio
• 30% uncured default on a 13-loan portfolio

Worked example documented by R.E.C.R.: a November 2018 Chicago single-family fix-and-flip resulted in a 47% loss to investors ($88,000 lost), with $48,000 — 30% of total sale proceeds — consumed by legal fees alone.

On August 23, 2023, The Real Estate Crowdfunding Review reported that Patch of Land's website had "ceased responding." Investors with maturing 2017–2020 vintage notes were left with non-performing instruments, no portal, no clear servicer contact, and only the unidentified indenture trustee bank as a theoretical recourse. Source: R.E.C.R. ongoing review with primary investor-survey data.

The DFPI revocation (May 3, 2023)

The most concrete regulatory record is the California DFPI's Order Summarily Revoking Finance Lender/Broker License against Patch Lending, LLC (CFL #60DBO-137789), dated May 3, 2023 and issued in the name of Commissioner Clothilde V. Hewlett (signed by a Financial Institutions Manager).

The cause: failure to file an Annual Report under California Financial Code §22159 after the April 12, 2023 notice. Statutory authority §22715. Sub-regulatory in nature — it's a license-lapse revocation, not a fraud finding. But the optics for any legacy POL/Patch Lending investor are devastating: the platform that originated their notes lost its California consumer-lending license for failing to keep its own paperwork current.

This is also why our real estate crowdfunding failures pillar treats POL/Patch Lending separately from PeerStreet's June 2023 Chapter 11 — different exit modes (managed wind-down + license lapse versus formal bankruptcy), but a parallel outcome for retail noteholders: stranded principal.

Current status (September 2026)

• patchofland.com 301-redirects to patchlending.com.
• patchlending.com presents a certificate for *.wpengine.com and returns HTTP 404 (checked September 12, 2026): there is no live Patch Lending site.
• No retail investor offering exists.
• No SEC filings since December 21, 2017 (a Form D by Patch of Land, Inc.) for any of the three Patch of Land CIKs (1590209, 1629777, 1645337).
• California lending license revoked May 2023 and not re-issued in any public DFPI record we could locate. Whether Patch Lending operates in California today via out-of-state DSCR lending exemptions or has re-licensed elsewhere is unclear without an NMLS Consumer Access multi-state pull.

What today's POL noteholders should actually do

If you're still holding 2017–2020 vintage Patch of Land Reg D notes:

1. Pull your original Private Placement Memorandum (PPM). The PPM names the indenture trustee bank — that bank, not Patch Lending, holds the legal machinery for note distributions on bankruptcy-remote SPVs. POL's general counsel described the trustee in 2015 only as "a bank who we've paid a lot of money to up-front," but it's named in your PPM.
2. Contact the trustee directly. The trustee's responsibility under the indenture survives Patch of Land's portal sunset. If your loan paid off cleanly and your distributions stopped, the trustee should still have records.
3. Document any settlement offer or release you signed. A signed release can extinguish the right to pursue the underlying loan, so read it before assuming any claim survives.
4. For the legal residue: there is no class action active that we've located. Federal securities-fraud claims (Rule 10b-5) must be filed within 2 years of discovery and no later than 5 years after the violation (28 U.S.C. §1658(b)); Securities Act §13 claims have a 1-year/3-year limit. For notes bought in 2017–2020 the federal 5-year outer limit has run; state-law claims may differ, so check with counsel.
5. Tax treatment: a worthless-securities loss under IRC 165(g) or a non-business bad-debt deduction under IRC 166 may apply to permanently lost POL principal. We cover this in detail in our real estate crowdfunding tax loss harvesting article.

The pattern (and the platforms today that match it)

The "POL Pattern" recurs across the 2013–2018 wave of pioneer crowdfunding platforms:

1. Founder team launches in 2013–2014 boom, capitalizing on newly-effective Title II.
2. Series A from a family office, fintech VC, or strategic finance partner by 2015–2016.
3. Originations cross $500M–$1B by 2018; press cadence peaks.
4. Quiet pivot from retail crowdfunding to institutional capital partners around 2019–2020 — the retail UX, accreditation friction, and regulatory burden simply don't scale to a billion-dollar book.
5. Asset sale to a private buyer who keeps the loan-origination engine but extinguishes the retail platform.
6. Legacy retail investors stranded with non-performing notes and a closed portal.

Bisnow reported in May 2024 that EquityMultiple, RealtyMogul, and YieldStreet have all dramatically reduced retail crowdfunding deal flow — fielding "as few as 10% of the deals they were offering at the peak" per Adam Gower. Cadre was acquired by YieldStreet in January 2024 — the same playbook structure.

Any platform whose public messaging shifts from "we crowdfund our loans" to "we work with institutional capital partners" is signaling stage 4. That doesn't mean they'll all hit stage 5 — but it's the pattern to watch.

Critically: managed wind-downs are not better than bankruptcies for retail investors. They are typically worse. PeerStreet's June 2023 Chapter 11 triggered an automatic stay, a creditors' committee, and court-supervised distribution. POL's managed exit produced a platform wind-down, a dark website, and a license-lapse revocation. PeerStreet investors at least have a docket they can read; POL investors have a dead URL.

For the broader pattern of platform exits, see our real estate crowdfunding failures pillar and what happened to PeerStreet deep-dive.

FAQ

Sources

• California DFPI — Patch Lending LLC enforcement action listing
• California DFPI — Order Summarily Revoking license #60DBO-137789, May 3, 2023 (PDF)
• SEC EDGAR — Patch of Land Inc (CIK 1590209)
• SEC EDGAR — Patch of Land LLC 201500001 (CIK 1645337)
• SEC EDGAR — Patch of Land Series Convertible Note LLC (CIK 1629777)
• Cloverhill Funding LLC acquires Patch of Land — PR Newswire (July 29, 2021)
• Patch of Land rebrands to Patch Lending — GlobeNewswire (March 7, 2022)
• Patch of Land $23.6M Series A — BusinessWire (April 8, 2015)
• Paul Deitch CEO departure — Crowdfund Insider (November 1, 2017)
• POL late-2018 figures — Crowdfund Insider (November 10, 2018)
• Velmont Enterprises Inc. v. Patch of Land Lending LLC — NC Court of Appeals (2022)
• The Real Estate Crowdfunding Review — Patch of Land ongoing review
• Bisnow — Many once-booming crowdfunding platforms now at a cliff's edge (May 21, 2024)

Last verified: September 12, 2026. If you have legacy Patch of Land notes and need help identifying the indenture trustee or evaluating recovery options, consult a securities attorney — this article is research, not legal advice.