Arbor Realty Trust Dividend Cuts and Delinquencies by Quarter

Which "delinquent" is which: Arbor has two loan books

Arbor's filings use the word "delinquent" for two different things. The first is the structured book: bridge loans, mezzanine and preferred equity that Arbor makes and keeps, $12.11 billion of unpaid principal at June 30, 2026, of which $11.32 billion are bridge loans on average 14.5 months from maturity with a last-dollar loan-to-value of 78%. Arbor funds it with CLOs, repurchase lines and unsecured notes, and its losses land on Arbor's income statement. The second is the agency servicing book: $36.7 billion of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA and private-label loans Arbor originated, sold and still services. Those loans are mostly not on Arbor's balance sheet, but Arbor shares losses on the Fannie Mae ones: such loans carry “an obligation to partially guarantee the performance of the loan.”

The filings use different definitions for each. For the servicing book, Arbor writes: “Delinquent loans reflect loans that are contractually 60 days or more past due.” At June 30, 2026 that was $1.12 billion, with four loans totaling $22.6 million in bankruptcy and forty-two loans totaling $422.2 million foreclosed. For the structured book, “non-performing” generally means more than 60 days past due, with an exception: loans are classified as non-performing “unless past due payments due to us are in the process of being collected or otherwise reasonably certain to be received in the immediate future.” That exception matters. At June 30, 2026 Arbor had $91.2 million of loans more than 60 days past due that it still classified as performing ($237.0 million at December 31, 2025), including one $58.6 million loan it was in the process of modifying. Our table of non-performing loans below therefore understates the loans that were actually late on that date.

A third bucket sits below non-performing. Loans 60 days or less past due can be classified as non-accrual when Arbor has doubt about collection: “we classify those loans as non-accrual and recognize interest income only when cash is received.” That bucket was $956.9 million (24 loans) at the end of 2023, fell to $48.3 million by December 2025, was zero at March 31, 2026 and was $94.9 million (three loans) at June 30, 2026.

The dividend, quarter by quarter

Arbor declares each quarter's dividend with its results, four to eight weeks after quarter-end. The dividend below is the one declared for that quarter; "announced" is the date of the earnings release. Distributable earnings is Arbor's own non-GAAP measure, which the company says it considers “in determining its quarterly dividend”; the last column is the company's alternative figure that excludes realized losses on resolved assets, where it gave one.

The dividend went from $0.40 (Q4 2022) to $0.42 and then $0.43 for seven straight quarters, a level it held while distributable earnings slid from $0.57 to $0.40. The first cut came when distributable earnings was $0.28 ($0.31 excluding realized losses) and the dividend went to $0.30, a payout of about 107% of the headline figure (our arithmetic). The second came when distributable earnings was $0.07 for Q1 2026. For the full year 2025 distributable earnings were $1.07 a share (the company's figure) against $1.20 of dividends declared for the four quarters (our arithmetic). The Q1 2025 10-Q says only: “We declared a cash dividend of $0.30 per share, a reduction from our previous quarterly dividend of $0.43 per share,” and the Q1 2026 10-Q uses the same words for $0.17 and $0.30. Neither gives a reason.

Two other claims on the same earnings rank ahead of common holders. Arbor's three preferred series cost about $10.3 million a quarter in dividends (6.375% Series D, 6.25% Series E and 6.25% Series F), and the coupons on the unsecured notes in the table further down. At the $5.42 price Arbor paid in July 2026, the $0.17 dividend annualizes to $0.68, or about 12.5% (our arithmetic); that is a yield on the price Arbor paid, not on any price you can assume.

The bridge book: non-performing loans, reserves and modifications

Each row is the position at quarter-end from the earnings release (counts, UPB and reserves) and the 10-Q or 10-K (allowance cross-check). Amounts in $ millions. The non-performing count and UPB are loans more than 60 days past due that Arbor classified as non-performing; “-” means the figure is not reported on a comparable basis.

Three things stand out. First, 2023 was a different company. Non-performing loans were four loans and $7.75 million of UPB at the end of 2022 and still only $157.9 million at September 30, 2023; by the end of 2024 they were 26 loans and $651.8 million. Second, modifications did a lot of the work. Arbor modified loans with $1.76 billion of UPB in Q1 2024 alone, and $386.9 million in Q2 2026, with borrowers generally expected to put in new capital; Arbor records interest on a modified loan on an accrual basis when the loan is contractually current. Third, the allowance is large against the non-performing amount but small against the book: $163.4 million is about 1.35% of $12.11 billion (our arithmetic), and the specific reserves on impaired loans were only $46.5 million on $440.8 million of UPB, with a last-dollar loan-to-value of 97% on those loans.

In the second quarter of 2026 Arbor recorded a $38.2 million provision and $13.6 million of impairments on two foreclosed properties, and foreclosed on five loans with a UPB of $121.4 million while selling five REO properties for $79.8 million. Its 10-Q says: “These conditions have contributed to weaker performance in certain of our legacy assets, leading to increased defaults and delinquencies.”

The agency servicing book and the CLO "credit risk" bucket

Two series are rarely quoted together. The first is delinquency in the agency servicing portfolio and Arbor's CECL reserve for Fannie Mae loss-sharing; the second is the number and size of loans the CLO collateral manager has flagged as a credit risk. The 10-Qs define the latter: “A credit risk asset is generally defined as one that, in the CLO collateral manager’s reasonable business judgment, has a significant risk of becoming a defaulted asset.” At December 31, 2022 there were none.

Agency delinquencies went from $38.7 million at the end of 2022 to $1.12 billion at June 30, 2026, and from 1.17% to 3.06% of the portfolio, which is about 2.6 times the 2023 rate (our arithmetic). The Fannie Mae loss-sharing reserve rose from $22.7 million to $82.3 million, now 0.34% of the Fannie Mae servicing portfolio per the Q2 2026 release. The CLO credit-risk bucket is the cleanest early-warning number in the filings: it reached 12 loans and $308.3 million at the end of 2023, 46 loans and $1.60 billion a year later and 54 loans and $2.02 billion at September 30, 2025, before falling to 20 loans and $808.3 million at June 30, 2026 in a period when Arbor unwound CLO 17 and modified and foreclosed other loans. The last column shows real estate owned rising over the same years.

How the debt changed: from CLOs to repurchase lines to unsecured notes

Amounts in $ million, from the earnings-release balance sheets.

Securitized debt, almost all CLOs, fell from $7.85 billion to $2.97 billion while repurchase facilities went the other way. The reason is in the filings: replenishment periods ended on every legacy CLO between September 2023 and August 2024, after which repayments pay the notes down, and Arbor chose to unwind several CLOs with new repurchase lines ("Closed on a new $1.15 billion repurchase facility to unwind in full two CLO vehicles" in the Q1 2025 release). It redeemed CLO 17's remaining $787.0 million in May 2026 at par with repurchase borrowings. At the same time it issued new CLOs: CLO 21 for $762.6 million in March 2026 ($674.0 million sold to investors at an initial 1.73% over term SOFR) and a further $825.0 million securitization on August 11, 2026, after the Q2 report, with $730.1 million of investment-grade notes at 1.76% over term SOFR.

The four securitization vehicles at June 30, 2026, with weighted average note rates:

The unsecured side matters for a common holder because it ranks ahead of the stock and has been refinanced at higher coupons. At June 30, 2026 Arbor had $1.88 billion of senior unsecured notes outstanding, weighted average 6.86%, before July's refinancing:

On July 6, 2026 Arbor sold $375.0 million of 6.25% convertible senior notes due July 1, 2029 at an initial conversion price of about $6.10 a share. It said it would use the proceeds to repurchase $11.6 million of stock (2,140,300 shares), repurchase about $102.7 million of stock through a prepaid forward, and redeem the $270 million of 4.50% notes due September 1, 2026. After those steps the unsecured notes would be about $1.6 billion plus the new $375 million convertible, our arithmetic from the table ($1,875.0 million less $270.0 million, plus $375.0 million, is $1,980.0 million).

Book value, buybacks and what "49% of book value" means

Arbor's releases do not print a book value per share. They do say what the stock cost relative to it. The discount went from about 4% in April 2024 to 51% below book value in July 2026 (our arithmetic: 100% less 49%):

At the July 2026 price of $5.42 and 49% of book value, book value is implied at about $11 a share (our arithmetic from the two figures Arbor gives). Arbor's stockholders' equity, preferred stock included, was $2.78 billion at June 30, 2026, down $340.1 million (our arithmetic: 3,118.0 less 2,777.9) from the end of 2023. The 10-Q says Arbor has a repurchase program of up to $150.0 million. The conversion price of the new notes, about $6.10, is above the $5.42 Arbor paid, so the convertible holders and the buyback sit on opposite sides of the stock price. Arbor's chairman, chief executive officer and president, Ivan Kaufman, is also chief executive of Arbor Commercial Mortgage (ACM); the 2025 10-K says he has about 7% of the voting power of Arbor's stock.

Lawsuits: private, dismissed, and no government action in the filings

Arbor's legal proceedings note covers one securities class action and several derivative suits. On July 31, 2024 a shareholder sued Arbor and certain executive officers in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for purchasers between May 7, 2021 and July 11, 2024. The amended complaint alleged false statements about internal controls, lending practices and agency requirements. These are allegations; Arbor's 10-Q says the court granted its motion to dismiss on March 31, 2026, that the plaintiffs chose not to amend, and that on May 5, 2026 it “dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and judgment was entered in favor of Defendants.” The time to appeal has expired. The derivative suits filed from February to August 2025 were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice between June 18 and July 14, 2026.

We searched all 15 periodic reports (the 10-Ks for 2022 to 2025 and the 10-Qs from Q1 2023 to Q2 2026) for “subpoena,” “Department of Justice,” “Wells notice,” “Division of Enforcement,” “formal order,” “informal inquiry,” “U.S. Attorney” and “grand jury.” None appears. Arbor reports no SEC or DOJ investigation in those documents. That does not rule out a nonpublic inquiry, which companies are not always required to disclose.

What a holder or prospective buyer can do with this

This page is analysis of public documents. These are the things the filings let you check yourself.

• Compare the dividend to the earnings measure Arbor itself uses. Q1 and Q2 2026 distributable earnings were $0.07 and $0.10 against a $0.17 dividend; the company's figure excluding realized losses was $0.18 and $0.15. Which one you rely on is the whole question, and it determines whether a third cut is in the numbers.
• Look at both delinquency lines. The bridge book's non-performing UPB is below its mid-2024 peak, but the agency servicing delinquency rate has risen in each of the last eight quarters (our arithmetic from the table), and the CLO credit-risk bucket fell from $2.02 billion to $808.3 million in three quarters.
• Read the financing change. Moving from CLOs to repurchase lines raises leverage on the loans but also exposes them to margin-call terms; the 10-Q says certain repurchase facilities “are subject to margin call provisions associated with changes in interest spreads.” The unsecured stack and the new convertible have maturities in 2026 to 2030.
• Dates to watch: the Q3 2026 10-Q and earnings release, which Arbor filed on October 31 in 2025 and November 1 in 2024; the first coupon on the 6.25% convertible, January 1, 2027; and the remaining reinvestment periods on CLO 21 and the August 2026 CLO, each about two and a half years from closing.
• The share price is not here. The filings do not quote a market price, so we do not either, and we take no view on it. For how apartment-debt maturities are stacking up more broadly, see our commercial real estate debt maturity wall, a comparable public mortgage lender in Ready Capital, and how bridge loans work from the borrower's side. If you came here from a non-traded vehicle, how non-traded REITs differ from publicly traded ones covers the exit difference.

FAQ

All figures are from Arbor Realty Trust, Inc. (CIK 1253986) SEC filings read on EDGAR on October 14, 2026: Forms 10-K for 2022 (accession 0001104659-23-023097), 2023 (0001628280-24-005456), 2024 (0001628280-25-007183) and 2025 (0001253986-26-000019); Forms 10-Q for each quarter from Q1 2023 to Q2 2026 (latest 0001253986-26-000048, filed July 31, 2026); the 15 quarterly earnings releases furnished as Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K from February 17, 2023 to July 31, 2026; and the 8-Ks of March 23, 2026 (CLO 21), July 6, 2026 (convertible notes) and August 11, 2026 (new CLO). Sums, percentages, ratios and the implied book value are our arithmetic. Allegations in the class action are the plaintiffs' and were dismissed. This is analysis of public documents, not investment, legal or tax advice.