ARIS Operating Partnership, ARIS Charter Street LLC and the Rest: Apollo's REIT Has 36 Subsidiaries and Their Names Tell You What It Owns and Who Funds It

Why anyone is searching for this

The search that puts this page in front of the most eyes is not "best real estate crowdfunding platform" or anything like it. It is a query of the form "aris operating partnership l.p. aris reit aris charter street llc relationship" — and four close variants, all naming the same entities.

We should be straight about who is asking, because we checked and it is almost certainly not a person. Across the 28 days to September 18, 2026, those five queries produced 7,888 impressions and zero clicks in Google Search Console for this site (US, dataState: final). Not a low click-through rate — zero. Every impression was on desktop and none on mobile, against roughly 20% mobile for the site as a whole; and Search Console lists another 102 queries hitting this site with syntax no human types (%"pino v. cardone capital", -site:, a bare API hostname). The most economical reading is that something automated is walking a list of entity names and asking a search engine to resolve them.

That does not make the question less real — it makes it more literal. Whatever is asking, it is asking the right thing: three entity names appear together on a filing and nothing on the open internet explains how they fit. The answer requires reading one exhibit to one annual report, and that exhibit is not the kind of thing anyone writes about. So here it is, for whoever — or whatever — is reading.

The three-layer answer

The shape is what real estate people call an UPREIT, an umbrella partnership REIT. The corporation sits on top for tax and securities purposes; the partnership sits underneath and does the owning. It is not exotic — BREIT, JPMREIT and North Haven Net REIT are all built the same way — but it has one consequence that shows up directly in the numbers.

Because the operating vehicle is a partnership, a property owner can contribute a building to it and take partnership units instead of cash, deferring the capital gain that a sale would have triggered. Those unit holders are partners in the OP without ever being shareholders of the REIT. You can see exactly how much of ARIS is held that way: at July 31, 2026, third parties held 5,827,000 Class A-I Operating Partnership units worth $126,141,000 and 271,000 Class E units worth $5,892,000. That is 7.6% of the entire $1,747,345,000 net asset value sitting outside the corporation, in the partnership, in the hands of people who are not stockholders.

That is the practical reason the Operating Partnership exists, and it is why the balance sheet carries a $116,245,000 line called non-controlling interest attributable to the Operating Partnership. If you have wondered what that line is, it is them.

ARIS Charter Street, LLC is a warehouse

The specific entity in the search query turns out to be the least mysterious thing in the structure once you put two tables side by side.

Exhibit 21.1 lists ARIS Charter Street, LLC, Delaware. The portfolio table in the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q lists a property called 2865 Charter Street, industrial, Columbus, Ohio, acquired March 2025, 179,000 sq ft, 100% occupied, gross asset value $77,600,000. The acquisitions table gives the purchase price: $75,230,000.

One entity, one building, one name taken from the street it stands on. That is the whole relationship.

And it is not a one-off. Twelve of the eighteen properties in the portfolio map onto a subsidiary of the same name:

The reason to bother with a separate LLC per building is not branding. It is that a single-purpose entity ring-fences the asset: the mortgage recorded against 2865 Charter Street is a claim on ARIS Charter Street, LLC and on that warehouse, and a lender to one building does not get to reach another. This is the same structure we described in what happens when a real estate crowdfunding platform fails — and it is worth saying plainly that the protection runs in both directions and is not absolute, because the entity is still consolidated into the REIT's financial statements and its equity is still the REIT's equity.

One name in that table breaks the pattern, and the break is informative. Every property entity is called "ARIS" followed by its street name, except Parc Westborough Owner, LLC, the Massachusetts multifamily bought in May 2025 for $96,687,000. An entity that does not carry the sponsor's prefix is usually one that was acquired rather than formed — you buy the LLC that already owns the building instead of buying the building. We cannot confirm that from the filings alone, and we are flagging it as an observation about the naming, not a conclusion about the transaction.

Two further matches look near-certain on geography but we are labelling them inference rather than fact, because no filing states them: ARIS West Ashley, LLC against The Beckett (West Ashley is a district of Charleston, South Carolina, where The Beckett is), and ARIS Catawba CB, LLC against 3707 W NC 10 Hwy (Newton is the county seat of Catawba County, North Carolina).

The entity list runs ahead of the portfolio

Here is a detail that only shows up if you check the dates.

ARIS Cajon Blvd, LLC appears in Exhibit 21.1 to the 10-K filed March 10, 2026. The property at 6227 Cajon Blvd, San Bernardino was not acquired until May 2026 — two months later, for $123,296,000. The same is true of ARIS Midland Court, LLC, listed in an exhibit describing the position at year-end 2025 for a property bought in February 2026.

That is not irregular; you form the acquisition vehicle before you close. But it does mean the subsidiary list is a forward-looking document that nobody reads as one. And it leaves three entities in the March exhibit — ARIS George Road, LLC, ARIS Zerega Ave, LLC and ARIS Washington Street, LLC — with no matching property anywhere in the June 30, 2026 portfolio table. They may relate to debt collateral, to deals that did not complete, or to acquisitions still pending. The filings do not say, and we are not going to guess. It is simply a loose end that the next 10-K will resolve, and we will update this page when it does.

The financing entities name the banks — and two of them have stopped

The second naming rule is the one with real information in it.

Seven subsidiaries are named after counterparties, not addresses: ARIS JPM Repo Seller 1 and 2, ARIS Barclays Repo Seller 1 and 2, ARIS GS Repo Seller 1 and 2, and ARIS BofA CMBS Repo Seller I. These are the entities that borrow against the REIT's loan book. The 10-Q confirms the link in terms: "Certain indirect subsidiaries (the 'JPM Sellers') of the Company are party to a Master Repurchase Agreement with JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association."

So the subsidiary list tells you Apollo built plumbing for four investment banks. Now look at what is actually drawn:

Two things fall out of that table.

The cheapest money on the book is the money that left. The BofA facility was priced at SOFR + 0.55% at the end of 2025 — roughly 140 basis points inside what JPMorgan charges today — and by June 30, 2026 it is shown as N/A with no balance and no maturity. It was a CMBS repo line, and the entity built for it, ARIS BofA CMBS Repo Seller I, LLC, is still on the books. The filing does not explain the wind-down, and there are unremarkable explanations for one (the facility reached its March 2026 maturity and was not renewed because the securities financed under it were sold or repaid). But the effect on the blended cost is arithmetic: the weighted average borrowing cost went from SOFR + 1.80% to SOFR + 1.88% while borrowings grew 39%.

Goldman Sachs never shows up at all. Two GS repo seller entities exist in the March 2026 exhibit; no Goldman facility appears in the secured-debt table at either June 30, 2026 or December 31, 2025. Formed and unused, formed and already closed, or reserved for something not yet done — the filings do not say. What can be said is that the existence of a named subsidiary is not evidence of a live relationship, which is exactly the mistake anyone reading the entity list on its own would make.

What the structure is being used to do

Strip the names away and ARIS is running two businesses through one partnership.

The Real Estate segment is 18 buildings worth $1,189,875,000, overwhelmingly industrial, at 100% occupancy on every industrial and retail asset and 91-98% across the four multifamily. Nothing in the lease expiry schedule matures before 2028; 44% of annualised base rent runs beyond 2035.

The Real Estate Debt segment is $1,158,679,000 of fair value across 52 positions — 21 commercial mortgage loans at a 7.1% weighted coupon, one mezzanine loan at 11.0%, and 30 floating-rate CMBS positions at 5.1%. That book is financed with $485,147,000 of repo at SOFR + 1.88% through the JPM and Barclays sellers. Borrow at roughly SOFR plus 188 and lend at a blended 7.0%: that is the carry, and the repo entities are the machinery that makes it possible.

One credit item deserves stating rather than burying. The 10-Q discloses that one commercial mortgage loan, cost basis and fair value $17,700,000, is past its contractual maturity, and the borrower filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the year ended December 31, 2025. Apollo says it has received all monthly interest payments at the original rate plus $5,200,000 of principal repayments since maturity, and has determined the loan fully recoverable. That is a defensible position and the payment record supports it. It is still one borrower in Chapter 11 inside a 22-loan book, and it belongs in any honest description of the debt segment.

The share classes nobody bought

While we were in the NAV tables, one figure is hard to look past, and it is not about structure at all.

At July 31, 2026 the vehicle's $1,747,345,000 of net asset value breaks down like this:

And the fee on the biggest class is scheduled to go up. The 10-Q sets the management fee at 1.25% of NAV on Class S, D and I; 1.0% on Class F-I and A-I; and 1.0% on Class A-III — "provided that, for the period from April 1, 2023 through January 2, 2027, this management fee will be reduced to 0.85% of NAV for Class A-III shares." Class A-III is 59.2% of the entire fund. On the July 31 balance of $1,034,747,000, letting that reduction lapse on January 2, 2027 raises the fee on the largest class by 15 basis points, or about $1,552,000 a year. It is disclosed, it is not hidden, and it is four months away.

Class A-I and Class A-III together are 87.2% of the fund. Class S — the class listed first in the follow-on offering, the one that carries the upfront selling commission and the ongoing stockholder servicing fee, the class a retail buyer going through a broker would normally end up in — holds $285,000. That is thirteen thousand shares in a $1.7 billion vehicle.

We are not going to over-read that. Class A-I and A-III are newer classes and the follow-on offering is young, so this may simply be where the distribution effort currently sits rather than a verdict on anything. But it does mean that if you read a fee table and quote the Class S economics as "what ARIS charges," you are describing a class that almost nobody in this fund actually owns. It is the same trap we flagged at JPMREIT, where 65% of NAV sits in a class that pays no management fee at all and the reported fee therefore is not what a retail holder pays.

How the money is behaving

Three numbers, since anyone reading about the structure will want to know whether the thing works.

Distributions were covered. The Sources of Distributions table reports $44,129,000 distributed in the first half of 2026, 100% from cash flows from operating activities — and unlike some peers, the period arithmetic backs the label: actual operating cash flow was $52,358,000, giving 118.6% coverage. That is the honest version of a claim we have seen dressed up elsewhere. On AFFO of $41,817,000 the coverage is 94.8%, slightly under, and both figures deserve to be on the page.

Redemptions were honoured. ARIS repurchased $35,000,000 of shares in the half — against $9,786,000 in the first half of 2025 — and states it had no unfulfilled repurchase requests as of June 30, 2026. In a category where Fundrise and RealtyMogul have both gated, that is worth crediting, and it is the same clean record we found at Blue Owl's ORENT. Our running tally of who is and is not gating is in the NAV REIT redemption status tracker.

It is growing. Total assets went from $2,081,151,000 to $2,450,891,000 in six months, with $405,234,000 of acquisitions in the half.

The short version

Three names on a document, one relationship: the corporation is the general partner of the partnership, and the partnership owns the LLCs. ARIS Charter Street, LLC is a 179,000 sq ft warehouse in Columbus, Ohio.

The part worth taking away is the second one. A subsidiary list looks like boilerplate and is filed as boilerplate, but this one discloses which four banks Apollo built financing plumbing for, and cross-checking it against the balance sheet shows that only two of them are lending. That is a fact about the business you cannot get from the fee table, the fact sheet or the marketing deck — and it took reading an exhibit that appears exactly once in the entire EDGAR archive.

Our full forensic scoring of the vehicle itself — fees, coverage, portfolio, sponsor alignment and the three senior departures — is in the Apollo ARIS review.